Showing papers on "Surprise published in 1977"
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical discussion of some of the problems facing intelligence communities and decision makers in their efforts to guard against a surprise attack is examined in the light of three "noise levels" (three environmental background noises), as well as in relation to the complexities involved in the mutual evaluation of intentions and capabilities of opposing sides.
Abstract: The first part of this paper is a theoretical discussion of some of the problems facing intelligence communities and decision makers in their efforts to guard against a surprise attack. These difficulties are examined in the light of three “noise levels” (three environmental background noises), as well as in relation to the complexities involved in the mutual evaluation of intentions and capabilities of opposing sides. The author's pessimistic conclusions regarding the possibilities of preventing a surprise attack are summarized by five intelligence paradoxes (or contradictions), three of which appear in the theoretical section and the other two in the case study of the Yom Kippur War. The second part of this article is a case study of the conditions and perceptions of Israeli decision makers which made surprise inevitable at the outbreak of the war. The conclusion is a summary of the lessons which, even if they cannot provide a foolproof guarantee against surprise, can dampen the effects of a surprise attack and supply decision makers with some guidelines for improving their alertness and readiness to face surprise.
51 citations
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: The term intrinsic motivation is used in this article to refer to a cognitive theory of motivation in which the idea of behavior for its own sake and as its own reward is central; individuals behave partly because behaving is better than not behaving (which is probably not possible for any extended period).
Abstract: The term intrinsic motivation is used in this chapter to refer to a cognitive theory of motivation in which the idea of behavior for its own sake and as its own reward is central. We include in our definition essentially what Hunt (1963) meant by “motivation inherent in information processing and action,” the reinforcing property of tension induction, and behavior that is instigated, maintained, and directed by such stimulus characteristics as novelty, complexity, incongruity, and surprise; that is, by what Berlyne (1960, 1963, 1966) has called the “collative variables.” Individuals behave partly because behaving is better than not behaving (which is probably not possible for any extended period), and they appear frequently to behave in particular ways in order to obtain further opportunities to take in and process information.
44 citations
13 citations
01 Mar 1977
3 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1977
2 citations
2 citations
TL;DR: The outlook is for continued lower enrollments and progressively tighter taxpayer control over monies to support higher education as discussed by the authors, and the only surprise is that the education profession is taking so long to do something about it.
Abstract: There is an undeniable need for improved coordination of educatio al trai ing efforts. The only surprise is that the education profession is taking so long to do something about it. There are fewer students now select ing teaching careers and consequently less support money for individual training programs. The outlook is for continued lower enrollments and progressively tighter taxpayer control over monies to support higher educa tion.