Showing papers on "Surprise published in 1982"
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: In this article, Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders.
Abstract: Long before Germany's blitzkrieg swept the West, European leaders had received many signals of its imminence. Stalin, too, had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding "provocative" defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June 1941. And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, and three Arab-Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings. Richad K. Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid-twentieth century to illustrate his thesis: surprise attacks occur, not because intelligence services fail to warn, but because of the disbelief of political leaders."Although the probability is low that the United States will fail to deter direct attack by the Soviet Union," Betts says, "the intensity of the threat warrants painstaking analysis of how to cope with it." His own investigation of the historical, psychological, political, diplomatic, and military aspects of his subject heightens understanding of why surprise attacks succeed and why victim nations fail to respond to warnings. In discussing current policy he focuses on the defense of Western Europe and applies the lessons of history to U.S. defense planning, offering detailed recommendations for changes in strategy. Obviously some of the potential dangers of military surprise cannot be prevented. The important thing, he emphasizes, is that "without forces that exceed requirements (the solution Moscow appears to have chosen), it is vital to ensure that what forces exist can be brought to bear when needed.
169 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a general theory of deception is proposed for military deception and strategic surprise in the context of strategic surprise, and the theory is extended to include deception in general theory.
Abstract: (1982). Toward a general theory of deception. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 178-192.
109 citations
Book•
01 Oct 1982
TL;DR: The stifling of dissent by an institution widely acclaimed as the bulwark of democracy in America is discussed in this paper, where it may be no surprise to late twentieth century cynics that institutions eventually destroy goals they were meant to achieve; but it is nevertheless a paradox that a society should repress intellectual freedom with the institution of education.
Abstract: This book is about the stifling of dissent by an institution widely acclaimed as the bulwark of democracy in America. It may be no surprise to late twentieth-century cynics that institutions eventually destroy goals they were meant to achieve; but it is nevertheless a paradox that a society should repress intellectual freedom with the institution of education.
57 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing the relation between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power, focusing especially on the distinction between two kinds of threats whose implications for bargaining are quite different.
Abstract: Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.” When it has touched on the question of bargaining advantage, it has used inappropriate models and failed to draw correct conclusions from the models it has used. The article outlines the main ways in which deterrence theory must be corrected, focusing especially on the distinction between two kinds of threats whose implications for bargaining are quite different.
43 citations
TL;DR: Event-related brain potentials to colored slides contained a late positive component that was significantly enhanced when adults recognized the person, place, or painting in the photograph.
Abstract: Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to colored slides contained a late positive component that was significantly enhanced when adults recognized the person, place, or painting in the photograph. Additionally, two late components change in amplitude, corresponding to the amount of surprise reported. Because subjects received no instructions to differentiate among the slides, these changes in brain potentials reflect natural classifications made according to their perceptions and evaluations of the pictorial material. This may be a useful paradigm with which to assess perception, memory, and orienting capacities in populations such as infants who cannot follow verbal instructions.
31 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss deception and deception in the context of military deception and strategic surprise in the field of intelligence and deception, and present a survey of the literature. pp.
Abstract: (1982). Intelligence and deception. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 122-154.
30 citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors showed that the author of the Nun's Priest's Tale, the Bestiary of Love, and unmoralized literature can anticipate when the author will double back to surprise us.
Abstract: Animal fables pass from country to country and century to century, but not unchanged. Because fables have explicit moralizations, the innovative medieval fabulists (Marie, Odo, and Berechiah through Henryson) help us test what authors meant by meaning and what freedoms they took with tradition. We catch them thinking aloud. As they develop social satire, play with allegory, and dramatize style, they maintain a consistent reasoning process something like what we now call structuralist, but something, too, like Augustinian exegesis. We can partially learn to read like a medieval reader, yet we find even the explicit and documented meanings too various to be caught, caged, and cataloged by our theories. With fables as with their wilder cousins, the Nun's Priest's Tale, the Bestiary of Love, and unmoralized literature, neither we nor the medieval reader can anticipate when the author will double back to surprise us. Surprise, it seems, was itself a tradition.
15 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, military deception, strategic surprise, and conventional deterrence: A political analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971-73 Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp 94-121
Abstract: (1982) Military deception, strategic surprise, and conventional deterrence: A political analysis of Egypt and Israel, 1971–73 Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp 94-121
TL;DR: In this article, the authors put self-regulation and legislation into perspective and gave an overall picture of the means of regulating advertising throughout the whole of Europe, and placed four broad bands: countries with no self regulation, those with weak selfregulation, those having strong legislation, and finally the ten countries with strong self regulation.
Abstract: The extent of the self-regulation of advertising in Europe may come as a surprise to some readers. The main purpose of this paper is to put self-regulation and legislation into perspective and to give an overall picture of the means of regulating advertising throughout the whole of Europe. The regulation systems are placed in four broad bands: countries with no self-regulation, those with weak self-regulation, those with strong legislation, and finally the ten countries with strong self-regulation. Information is also given about the control bodies, their structures and their powers.
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TL;DR: De Man was born in 1919 as discussed by the authors, which will come as a surprise to many of his readers, who will have taken him to be a strong writer, perhaps in his thirties, on the basis of marked anomalies of his exposition: a drive
Abstract: Paul de Man was born in 1919.1 This fact will come as a surprise, I think, to many of his readers. Many will have begun reading him about 1971, with the publication of Blindness and Insight and his increasing conspicuousness in the new critical journals Diacritics, New Literary History, and Glyph. They will have taken him to be a "strong" writer, perhaps in his thirties, on the basis of marked anomalies of his exposition: a drive
TL;DR: McLeish as mentioned in this paper argued that the feeling for kollektiv, "the notion of a physical, supernatural unity generated by communal life" is as old as anything in recorded Russian social history.
Abstract: It has been alleged that the feeling for kollektiv, "the notion of a physical, supernatural unity generated by communal life — in … any group endowed with a common purpose, mutual trust, and empathetic unity" is as old as anything in recorded Russian social history (J. McLeish, Soviet psychology: History, theory, content. London: Methuen, 1975. P. 26). It should be no surprise that it is a salient issue in Soviet social psychology, given its postrevolutionary impetus in the work of A. S. Makarenko ([The road to life] (2nd ed.). Moscow: "Inostrannaia literatura," 1951) with the groups of homeless children entrusted to his care, and the subsequent emphasis on the collective in countless contexts of Soviet work and life.
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: Mac Laverty's beautifully turned stories are full of humour, terse realism and moments of touching or shocking surprise as discussed by the authors, such as when Nelson plays truant and sees something he wishes he hadn't in the title story, "A Time to Dance", and when Sadie and Agnes, retired prostitutes hit upon an inventive new way of making someone happy with a phone call, while in "My Dear Palestrina' a remarkable music teacher initiates her pupil into the mysteries of art and maturity.
Abstract: Bernard Mac Laverty's beautifully turned stories are full of humour, terse realism and moments of touching or shocking surprise. Nelson plays truant and sees something he wishes he hadn't in the title story, "A Time to Dance". In "Phonefun Limited", Sadie and Agnes, retired prostitutes hit upon an inventive new way of making someone happy with a phone call, while in "My Dear Palestrina'", a remarkable music teacher initiates her pupil into the mysteries of art and maturity.
TL;DR: The two most significant military lessons of the Lebanese war are the supremacy of the heavy tank on the modern battlefield and the importance of both intelligence and surprise in defeating enemy air and air-defense forces as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The two most significant military lessons of the Lebanese war are the supremacy of the heavy tank on the modern battlefield and the importance of both intelligence and surprise in defeating enemy air and air-defense forces.
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TL;DR: The first issue of the Quarterly includes references to definitions first suggested in the 1940's and the need for the reporting of results to be made comprehensible to the manager and the confidentiality of much work and therefore a reluctance to publish practical studies.
Abstract: From a very early stage in the emergence of O.R. as a way of tackling problems, its exponents have attempted to find a simple way of expressing its objectives to nonpractitioners. Redefinitions have been helpful or misleading, sublime and ridiculous. "The application of the scientific method to the provision of bases for executive action, in particular when the behaviour of people, either by themselves or in relation to their environment and equipment, is involved".1 The first issue of the Quarterly includes references to definitions first suggested in the 1940's by, amongst others, P. M. S. Blackett, R. Watson-Watt, C. Kittel, C. Goodeve, W. J. Morvath and L. H. C. Tippett. It also describes the need for the reporting of results to be made comprehensible to the manager. The second issue points out the confidentiality of much work and therefore a reluctance to publish practical studies. Such comments have a familiar ring, and it will not come as any surprise to find that issue three is concerned with education, and issue four with social science and accounting. The com? mon thread of historical survey and qualifications necessary for O.R. workers also occurred throughout these first issues. Even the Society, on its formation, allowed members from those who were engaged in some form of Operational Research "whether or not it is so called".
TL;DR: In this article, military deception and strategic surprise in the Soviet Union were discussed, and the authors proposed a method for detecting deception in the form of surprise attacks, which is called deception-and-surprise.
Abstract: (1982). Soviet strategic deception, 1955–1981. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 5, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise, pp. 40-93.
04 Feb 1982
TL;DR: In this article, Taurek argued that the preference for higher numbers in itself represents a dubious and confused way of thinking, and therefore should not be regarded as significant in moral decision making.
Abstract: In 'Should the Numbers Count?' John Taurek asks whether the relative numbers of people whose welfare is affected by a given choice is ever of itself a determining factor in moral trade-off situations.1 No one raises a question like this unless they have a surprise, and so Taurek unsurprisingly concludes that numbers alone should not, or need not, ever be regarded as significant in moral decision. Taurek's strategy is to argue that the common belief that, other things being equal, we are morally required to help the greater number is incompatible with other things that many of us commonly believe. He additionally argues that the preference for higher numbers in itself represents a dubious and confused way of thinking.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was revealed that the government had abandoned its protection of Official Information Bill within a fortnight of its second reading in the House of Lords, and that it should have failed to survive its first encounter outside the departmental world in which it was conceived, came as no surprise to those familiar with what Dick Crossman in reference to excessive secrecy, once described as the real English disease.
Abstract: IN NOVEMBER 1979 THE GOVERNMENT ABANDONED ITS PROtection of Official Information Bill within a fortnight of its second reading in the Lords. That it should have failed to survive its first encounter outside the departmental world in which it was conceived, came as no surprise to those familiar with what Dick Crossman, in reference to excessive secrecy, once described as the real English disease.
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: In the military context therefore denial of surprise to a potential aggressor is paramount and the acquisition of intelligence to ensure surprise is a vital factor in any operational venture as discussed by the authors, which is true throughout the history of warfare and perhaps never more so than during the Arab/Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.
Abstract: May I say that I consider it a great privilege to be asked to give this lecture to honour the memory of such a distinguished leader in the Aviation Industry. Of the principles of war defined by Clausewitz the element of surprise has probably made the greatest contribution to success. In the military context therefore denial of surprise to a potential aggressor is paramount. Equally, the acquisition of intelligence to ensure surprise is a vital factor in any operational venture. As General Lemnitzer said in 1963, when Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ‘Aerial reconnaissance permits the effective use of valuable resources and forces and can easily spell the difference between the success and failure of any military operation’. These words underline the importance of reconnaissance to the successful conduct of war. This has been true throughout the history of warfare and perhaps never more so than during the Arab/Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: A kitten, intent on exploration, has some misadventures before she discovers a happy surprise as mentioned in this paper, which is a classic example of a "cat's life" in the literature.
Abstract: A kitten, intent on exploration, has some misadventures before she discovers a happy surprise.
Journal Article•