Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive presentation and interpretation of the Ensemble Kalman Filter (EnKF) and its numerical implementation. The EnKF has a large user group, and numerous publications have discussed applications and theoretical aspects of it. This paper reviews the important results from these studies and also presents new ideas and alternative interpretations which further explain the success of the EnKF. In addition to providing the theoretical framework needed for using the EnKF, there is also a focus on the algorithmic formulation and optimal numerical implementation. A program listing is given for some of the key subroutines. The paper also touches upon specific issues such as the use of nonlinear measurements, in situ profiles of temperature and salinity, and data which are available with high frequency in time. An ensemble based optimal interpolation (EnOI) scheme is presented as a cost-effective approach which may serve as an alternative to the EnKF in some applications. A fairly extensive discussion is devoted to the use of time correlated model errors and the estimation of model bias.

The Ensemble Kalman Filter: Theoretical formulation and practical implementation

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Framework Convention on Climate Change

Recent coordinated efforts, in which numerous general circulation climate models have been run for a common set of experiments, have produced large datasets of projections of future climate for various scenarios. Those multimodel ensembles sample initial conditions, parameters, and structural uncertainties in the model design, and they have prompted a variety of approaches to quantifying uncertainty in future climate change. International climate change assessments also rely heavily on these models. These assessments often provide equal-weighted averages as best-guess results, assuming that individual model biases will at least partly cancel and that a model average prediction is more likely to be correct than a prediction from a single model based on the result that a multimodel average of present-day climate generally outperforms any individual model. This study outlines the motivation for using multimodel ensembles and discusses various challenges in interpreting them. Among these challenges are that the number of models in these ensembles is usually small, their distribution in the model or parameter space is unclear, and that extreme behavior is often not sampled. Model skill in simulating present-day climate conditions is shown to relate only weakly to the magnitude of predicted change. It is thus unclear by how much the confidence in future projections should increase based on improvements in simulating present-day conditions, a reduction of intermodel spread, or a larger number of models. Averaging model output may further lead to a loss of signal— for example, for precipitation change where the predicted changes are spatially heterogeneous, such that the true expected change is very likely to be larger than suggested by a model average. Last, there is little agreement on metrics to separate ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ models, and there is concern that model development, evaluation, and posterior weighting or ranking are all using the same datasets. While the multimodel average appears to still be useful in some situations, these results show that more quantitative methods to evaluate model performance are critical to maximize the value of climate change projections from global models.

/pdf/challenges-in-combining-projections-from-multiple-climate-5chcoy1x6z.pdf

Challenges in Combining Projections from Multiple Climate Models

Infinite Horizon Optimal Control

A stochastic control model for simultaneously planning production and maintenance in a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) is proposed, and an efficient technique for computing the optimal control policy is developed. The model extends previous formulations by including an age-dependent machine failure rate and by allowing the control to influence some jump rates (namely the preventive maintenance activities). By using an adaptation to the case of piecewise-deterministic systems of the approximation technique initially proposed by H.J. Kushner (1977) in the realm of the optimal control of diffusions, one shows how it is possible to computer the optimal control for a two-machine system. >

Manufacturing flow control and preventing maintenance: a stochastic control approach

This paper deals with an application of a variant of Karmarkar's projective algorithm for linear programming to the solution of a generic nondifferentiable minimization problem. This problem is closely related to the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition technique used in large-scale convex programming. The proposed method is based on a column generation technique defining a sequence of primal linear programming maximization problems. Associated with each problem one defines a weighted potential function which is minimized using a variant of the projective algorithm. When a point close to the minimum of the potential function is reached, a corresponding point in the dual space is constructed, which is close to the analytic center of a polytope containing the solution set of the nondifferentiable optimization problem. An admissible cut of the polytope, corresponding to a new supporting hyperplane of the epigraph of the function to minimize, is then generated at this approximate analytic center. In the primal space this new cut translates into a new column for the associated linear programming problem. The algorithm has performed well on a set of convex nondifferentiable programming problems.

Decomposition and nondifferentiable optimization with the projective algorithm

Sequential Stackelberg E-Equilibria in Two-Person Games

The FP6 TOCSIN project has evaluated climate change mitigation options in China and India and the conditions for strategic cooperation on research, development and demonstration (RDD (II) a strong increase in Annex I support regarding RD (III) a well-designed mix of instruments and targets in an effective climate deal that addresses manifold national interests and concerns.

Alain Haurie

Papers

Infinite Horizon Optimal Control

Manufacturing flow control and preventing maintenance: a stochastic control approach

Decomposition and nondifferentiable optimization with the projective algorithm

Sequential Stackelberg E-Equilibria in Two-Person Games

Reinforcing the EU Dialogue with Developing Countries on Climate Change Mitigation