Ananish Chaudhuri

TL;DR: The authors survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game and find that there is a greater variation in the propensity to punish corrupt behavior than in propensity to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures.

TL;DR: For example, this article found that women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, and there are no significant gender differences in the propensity to engage in and punish corrupt behavior in India, Indonesia, and Singapore.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors report results from experiments analyzing trust and trustworthiness, which are components of social capital and have an impact on diverse economic phenomena, and find that trustworthiness in the trust game implies trust but not vice versa.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the Minimum Effort Game, which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria.