世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

The present historical moment may seem a particularly inopportune time to review Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam's latest exploration of civic decline in America. After all, the outpouring of volunteerism, solidarity, patriotism, and self-sacrifice displayed by Americans in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks appears to fly in the face of Putnam's central argument: that \"social capital\" -defined as \"social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them\" (p. 19)'has declined to dangerously low levels in America over the last three decades. However, Putnam is not fazed in the least by the recent effusion of solidarity. Quite the contrary, he sees in it the potential to \"reverse what has been a 30to 40-year steady decline in most measures of connectedness or community.\"' As an example of how the current \"war on terrorism\" could generate a durable civic renewal, Putnam points to the burst in civic practices that occurred during and after World War II, which he says \"permanently marked\" the generation that lived through it and had a \"terrific effect on American public life over the last half-century.\" 3 If Americans can follow this example and channel their current civic

Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community

We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and a?ects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative e?ectiveness of the institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The predictions of the model are empirically tested—by means of Structural Equation Modelling that treats the shadow economy and the corruption market as latent variables—using data from OECD countries. The results show that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly (through its e?ect on the shadow market).

How do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. The effects of decentralization do not transmit through government efficiency and effectiveness, in line with the system stability hypothesis of Frey and Luechinger (2004).

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Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? System stability versus government efficiency: an empirical test

We examine whether and under which circumstances World Bank projects and IMF programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. Using a sample of more than 90 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, we find that crises are on average more likely as a consequence of Bank and Fund involvement. While the effects of the IMF to some extent depend on the model specification, those of the World Bank are shown to be robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation. We also find that governments face an increasing risk to enter a crisis when they remain under an arrangement once the economy performs better. The (economic) conditions present when a new arrangement is initiated, however, do not affect the impact of Fund and Bank on the probability of a crisis. Finally, while crisis probability rises when a government turns to the IFIs itself, programs inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis.

Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis

The paper develops a theoretical model showing a mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. According to the model, higher corruption induces stricter restrictions and vice versa. We test the model using panel data for 112 countries over the period 1984-2002 and find that corruption and restrictions are indeed mutually determined. Estimating the model simultaneously, capital account restrictions induce higher corruption. Higher corruption, in turn, is associated with more restrictions on the capital account. The empirical relationship is, however, not completely robust.

The Intriguing Nexus Between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions

The paper investigates the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Specifically, the paper tests whether the effect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country served on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period the aid is committed, which provides quasi-random variation in aid. The results show that the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when aid was committed during a country's tenure on the UNSC. This holds when we restrict the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and thus where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous. Two conclusions arise from this. First, short-term political favoritism reduces the effectiveness of aid. Second, results of studies using political interest variables as instruments for overall aid arguably estimate the effect of politically motivated aid and thus a lower bound for the effect of all aid.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/7771.pdf?abstractid=2814787&mirid=3

Axel Dreher

Papers

How do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy

Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? System stability versus government efficiency: an empirical test

Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis

The Intriguing Nexus Between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions

Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth: The Impact of Un Security Council Membership on the Effectiveness of Aid