We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

Part I. Introduction: 1. Do rules matter? 2. Classifying electoral systems 3. Evaluating electoral systems Part II. The Consequences for Voting Behavior: 4. Party systems 5. Social cleavages 6. Party loyalties 7. Turnout Part III. The Consequences for Political Representation: 8. Women 9. Ethnic minorities 10. Constituency service Part IV. Conclusions: 11. The impact of electoral engineering.

Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior

https://www.eods.eu/library/Democratic%20Electoral%20Systems%20around%20the%20World%201946-2011.pdf

Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946-2011

The Economic Effects of Constitutions. By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003. 320p. $35.00.Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have produced the most ambitious study yet that attempts to identify and estimate the effects of constitutional design on economic outcomes. They draw on data from more than 80 countries and control for demographic, historical, regional, and economic characteristics. The purpose is to determine whether the shape of political institutions has measurable impact on economic policies (e.g., fiscal balance, social welfare spending), on government performance (e.g., corruption indices, protection of property rights), and on direct measures of economic performance (e.g., productivity of capital and labor). The political institutions that draw the most attention are constitutional regime type and the method of electing legislators.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Through the use of an original data set of bill initiation activity in six presidential democracies, we advance scholarly understanding of how the institutional incentives faced by legislative candidates influence representation. We extend and adapt theory, derived primarily from the experience of the U.S. Congress, demonstrating its viability, once assumed constants from the U.S. case are explicitly modeled, in quite distinct institutional contexts. In particular, we find the focus of individual legislators on national versus parochial concerns responds to the incentives provided by the candidate selection process, general election rules, legislator career patterns, and interbranch relations.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x

Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies

/^t ocial scientists often attribute moderation of the political salience of ethnicity in ethnically di verse societies to the presence of cross-cutting cleavages?that is, to dimensions of identity or l^J interest along which members of the same ethnic group may have diverse allegiances. Yet, es timating the causal effects of cross-cutting cleavages is difficult. In this article, we present experi mental results that help explain why ethnicity has a relatively minor political role in Mali, an ethni cally heterogeneous sub-Saharan African country in which ethnic identity is a poor predictor of vote choice and parties do not form along ethnic lines. We argue that the cross-cutting ties afforded by an informal institution called "cousinage" help explain the weak association between ethnicity and individual vote choice. The experimental research design we introduce may be useful in many other settings. Social scientists often attribute moderation of the political salience of ethnicity in ethnically di verse societies to the presence of cross-cutting cleavages?that is, to dimensions of identity or inter est along which members of the same ethnic group may have diverse allegiances (Dahl 1956; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). When individuals who are members of the same group or social category on one dimen sion of interest or identity, such as ethnicity, are mem bers of different groups on another dimension, such as social class, their competing interests on the second dimension may undercut their primary allegiance to interests arising on the first dimension. Cross-cutting cleavages can thereby inhibit the extent to which po

Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali THAD DUNNING and LAUREN HARRISON Yale University

The accountability deficit in latin america

List of tables List of figures List of abbreviations 1. Studying democratic institutions in Venezuela 2. The electoral system's impact on the role of congress in the policy-making process 3. The President's legislative role: the initiation of legislation and presidential decree authority 4. Influencing the executive branch during policy formation: consultative commissions 5. Participating in the execution of policy: the decentralized public administration 6. Institutionalized dominance and its dynamics: the relative participation of business and labor 7. The policy impact: the economic development strategy and patterns of government spending 8. Political institutions, crisis, and reform 9. Venezuelan institutional design in comparative perspective Postscript: the 2000 constitution Notes References Index.

Brian F. Crisp

Papers

Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies

Cross-cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali THAD DUNNING and LAUREN HARRISON Yale University

The accountability deficit in latin america

Democratic Institutional Design: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups

Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity