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[서평]「Computer Organization and Design, The Hardware/Software Interface」

Im Jahre 1977 wurde der „Data Encryption Algorithm“ (DEA) vom „National Bureau of Standards“ (NBS, später „National Institute of Standards and Technology“ – NIST) zum amerikanischen Verschlüsselungsstandard für Bundesbehörden erklärt [NBS_77]. 1981 folgte die Verabschiedung der DEA-Spezifikation als ANSI-Standard „DES“ [ANSI_81]. Die Empfehlung des DES als StandardVerschlüsselungsverfahren wurde auf fünf Jahre befristet und 1983, 1988 und 1993 um jeweils weitere fünf Jahre verlängert. Derzeit liegt eine Neufassung des NISTStandards vor [NIST_99], in dem der DES für weitere fünf Jahre übergangsweise zugelassen sein soll, aber die Verwendung von Triple-DES empfohlen wird: eine dreifache Anwendung des DES mit drei verschiedenen Schlüsseln (effektive Schlüssellänge: 168 bit) [NIST_99]. Der DES basiert auf einer von Horst Feistel bei IBM entwickelten Blockchiffre („Lucipher“) mit einer Schlüssellänge von 128 bit. Da die amerikanische „National Security Agency“ (NSA) dafür gesorgt hatte, daß der DES eine Schlüssellänge von lediglich 64 bit besitzt, von denen nur 56 bit relevant sind, und spezielle Substitutionsboxen (den „kryptographischen Kern“ des Verfahrens) erhielt, deren Konstruktionskriterien von der NSA nicht veröffentlicht wurden, war das Verfahren von Beginn an umstritten. Kritiker nahmen an, daß es eine geheime „Trapdoor“ in dem Verfahren gäbe, die der NSA eine OnlineEntschlüsselung auch ohne Kenntnis des Schlüssels erlauben würde. Zwar ließ sich dieser Verdacht nicht erhärten, aber sowohl die Zunahme von Rechenleistung als auch die Parallelisierung von Suchalgorithmen machen heute eine Schlüssellänge von 56 bit zum Sicherheitsrisiko. Zuletzt konnte 1998 mit einer von der „Electronic Frontier Foundation“ (EFF) entwickelten Spezialmaschine mit 1.800 parallel arbeitenden, eigens entwickelten Krypto-Prozessoren ein DES-Schlüssel in einer Rekordzeit von 2,5 Tagen gefunden werden. Um einen Nachfolger für den DES zu finden, kündigte das NIST am 2. Januar 1997 die Suche nach einem „Advanced Encryption Standard“ (AES) an. Ziel dieser Initiative ist, in enger Kooperation mit Forschung und Industrie ein symmetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren zu finden, das geeignet ist, bis weit ins 21. Jahrhundert hinein amerikanische Behördendaten wirkungsvoll zu verschlüsseln. Dazu wurde am 12. September 1997 ein offizieller „Call for Algorithm“ ausgeschrieben. An die vorzuschlagenden symmetrischen Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen wurden die folgenden Anforderungen gestellt: nicht-klassifiziert und veröffentlicht, weltweit lizenzfrei verfügbar, effizient implementierbar in Hardund Software, Blockchiffren mit einer Blocklänge von 128 bit sowie Schlüssellängen von 128, 192 und 256 bit unterstützt. Auf der ersten „AES Candidate Conference“ (AES1) veröffentlichte das NIST am 20. August 1998 eine Liste von 15 vorgeschlagenen Algorithmen und forderte die Fachöffentlichkeit zu deren Analyse auf. Die Ergebnisse wurden auf der zweiten „AES Candidate Conference“ (22.-23. März 1999 in Rom, AES2) vorgestellt und unter internationalen Kryptologen diskutiert. Die Kommentierungsphase endete am 15. April 1999. Auf der Basis der eingegangenen Kommentare und Analysen wählte das NIST fünf Kandidaten aus, die es am 9. August 1999 öffentlich bekanntmachte: MARS (IBM) RC6 (RSA Lab.) Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen) Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen) Twofish (Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall, Ferguson).

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

Marc Dacier's topic is: intrusion detection vs. detection of errors caused by intentionally malicious faults. Although research on intrusion detection has been carried out for more than two decades, it has recently received increased attention due to the success of the Internet. A recent survey conducted by the IBM Global Security Laboratory indicates that more than 20 intrusion-detection products are now available on the market, whereas two years ago there were only three. Despite this growth of product offerings, intrusion-detection solutions are still in their infancy. Not only is there a lack of understanding of what an intrusion really is, but also how it should be handled. Moreover, from a technical point of view, many critical issues remain unsolved.In this talk, Marc presents what has been done in the intrusion domain in the past, and highlights new research directions that need to be addressed. He will highlight the relationship between intrusion detection and fault tolerance, drawing on the body of knowledge that has been developed within the traditional dependability community, and noting the opportunities for these two communities to work together to solve this important problem.Sami Saydjari's topic is: the detection of novel, previously unseen attacks. Although intrusion detection is a field still in its infancy, two broad approaches have evolved: pattern-based detection and anomaly-based detection. Pattern-based detection, sometimes called misuse-based detection, relies on matching known patterns of attacks already suffered. Anomaly-based detection, on the other hand, relies on detecting behaviors that are abnormal with respect to some normal standard. An example is that of a masquerader trying to hide behind someone else's login; unless the masquerader is clever indeed, his activities will stand out as anomalous against a victim's profile of normal behavior. Anomaly-based detection techniques appear to hold the best hope of detecting new variants of attacks.Sami emphasizes that although there exist some low-level sensors that can detect known attacks, the research community must move quickly in learning how to detect novel attacks at much higher detection rates (state of the art is around 80%) while keeping the false positive rates very low (0.1% or better). Detecting novel attacks will require better anomaly detection algorithms. Achieving a 99.9% detection rate will require gaining a firm understanding of the "sweet spots" of various detection algorithms, as well as an understanding of how to fuse the results of the best of the best. There is also a need to better represent knowledge of attack patterns in a canonical form, to be able to share that knowledge across multiple detection tools, and to be able to judge tools on the basis of how effectively they use knowledge, as opposed to which tool can include the largest corpus of precompiled (pattern-based) knowledge into its on-line database.The session concludes with an open discussion of how research communities can work together to reduce undependability caused by intentionally malicious faults.

Intrusion Detection

IEEE transactions on very large scale integration (VLSI) systems

This paper considers the use of electromagnetic pulses (EMP) to inject transient faults into the calculations of a hardware and a software AES. A pulse generator and a 500 um-diameter magnetic coil were used to inject the localized EMP disturbances without any physical contact with the target. EMP injections were performed against a software AES running on a CPU, and a hardware AES (with and without countermeasure) embedded in a FPGA. The purpose of this work was twofold: (a) reporting actual faults injection induced by EMPs in our targets and describing their main properties, (b) explaining the coupling mechanism between the antenna used to produce the EMP and the targeted circuit, which causes the faults. The obtained results revealed a localized effect of the EMP since the injected faults were found dependent on the spatial position of the antenna on top of the circuit's surface. The assumption that EMP faults are related to the violation of the target's timing constraints was also studied and ascertained thanks to the use of a countermeasure based on monitoring such timing violations.

Electromagnetic Transient Faults Injection on a Hardware and a Software Implementations of AES

Injection of transient faults as a way to attack cryptographic implementations has been largely studied in the last decade. Several attacks that use electromagnetic fault injection against hardware or software architectures have already been presented. On micro controllers, electromagnetic fault injection has mostly been seen as a way to skip assembly instructions or subroutine calls. However, to the best of our knowledge, no precise study about the impact of an electromagnetic glitch fault injection on a micro controller has been proposed yet. The aim of this paper is twofold: providing a more in-depth study of the effects of electromagnetic glitch fault injection on a state-of-the-art micro controller and building an associated register-transfer level fault model.

/pdf/electromagnetic-fault-injection-towards-a-fault-model-on-a-g1jnjs3ubz.pdf

Electromagnetic Fault Injection: Towards a Fault Model on a 32-bit Microcontroller

Whilst clock fault attacks are known to be a serious security threat, an in-depth explanation of such faults still seems to be put in order.

This work provides a theoretical analysis, backed by practical experiments, explaining when and how clock faults occur. Understanding and modeling the chain of events following a transient clock alteration allows to accurately predict faulty circuit behavior. A prediction fully confirmed by injecting variable-duration faults at predetermined clock cycles.

We illustrate the process by successfully attacking an fpga aes implementation using a dll-based fpga platform (one-bit fault attack).

/pdf/when-clocks-fail-on-critical-paths-and-clock-faults-cm7otaw3om.pdf

When clocks fail: on critical paths and clock faults

True random number generators (TRNGs) are ubiquitous in data security as one of basic cryptographic primitives. They are primarily used as generators of confidential keys, to initialize vectors, to pad values, but also as random masks generators in some side channel attacks countermeasures. As such, they must have good statistical properties, be unpredictable and robust against attacks. This paper presents a contactless and local active attack on ring oscillators (ROs) based TRNGs using electromagnetic fields. Experiments show that in a TRNG featuring fifty ROs, the impact of a local electromagnetic emanation on the ROs is so strong, that it is possible to lock them on the injected signal and thus to control the monobit bias of the TRNG output even when low power electromagnetic fields are exploited. These results confirm practically that the electromagnetic waves used for harmonic signal injection may represent a serious security threat for secure circuits that embed RO-based TRNG.

/pdf/contactless-electromagnetic-active-attack-on-ring-oscillator-x3fucaf0tn.pdf

Contactless electromagnetic active attack on ring oscillator based true random number generator

Cryptographic devices are vulnerable to the nowadays well known side channel leakage analysis. Secret data can be revealed by power analysis attacks such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). First, we give an overview of DPA in mono-bit and multi-bit cases. Next, the existing multi-bit DPA methods are generalized into the proposed Partitioning Power Analysis (PPA) method. Finally, we focus on the CPA technique, showing that this attack is a case of PPA with special coefficients and a normalization factor. We also propose a method that allows us to improve the performance of CPA by restricting the normalization factor.

/pdf/a-proposition-for-correlation-power-analysis-enhancement-2laqb7ile3.pdf

Bruno Robisson

Papers

Electromagnetic Transient Faults Injection on a Hardware and a Software Implementations of AES

Electromagnetic Fault Injection: Towards a Fault Model on a 32-bit Microcontroller

When clocks fail: on critical paths and clock faults

Contactless electromagnetic active attack on ring oscillator based true random number generator

A proposition for correlation power analysis enhancement