Data Mining Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

A systematic literature review of blockchain-based applications: Current status, classification and open issues

Software Defined Networking (SDN) facilitates network orchestration and ability to reconfigure the network plane at run time. Despite ubiquitous adoption of SDN, there is also growing concern about security risks posed by SDN. The security risks stem from centralized controller, trust issues between network elements due to Open APIs and an insecure OpenFlow channel. However, SDN controllers are a common target since compromising SDN controllers has the capability of impairing the entire network. SDN controller protection efforts have centered around replicating controllers for redundancy and hardening host Operating Systems. There is lack of research efforts on the security impact of adopting multiple SDN controllers. In this paper, we present a network diversity modeling framework to assess impact on security risk due to multiple SDN controllers. Using attack graphs and diversity models, we explore the security impact of resource relationships to SDN multiple controller networks. Our results reveal that having similar resource instances in different multiple SDN controllers increases the security risk.

Diversity Modeling to Evaluate Security of Multiple SDN Controllers

This paper considers the problem of mitigating jamming attacks by aiming to deceive the jammer. Specifically, in the presence of a jammer, to defend a transmitter-receiver pair sending (real) information, the paper proposes the novel technique of sending fake information over a second transmitter-receiver pair in order to deceive the jammer into investing some of its jamming power budget for jamming the channel carrying fake information. The paper develops a leader-follower model where the jammer (acting as the follower) adopts it’s jamming strategy after sensing the communication activities on the channels carrying the real and fake information, while the system (acting as the leader) adopts its power allocation strategy prior to the jammer. The paper characterizes the optimal power allocation strategy of the system considering the jammer to be non-strategic in nature, as well as characterizes the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategy of the leader-follower game considering both the system and the jammer to be strategic entities. Extensive simulation results are provided to gain insights into the deception strategies developed in the paper.

Mitigation of Jamming Attacks via Deception

Cyber-physical system (CPS) refers to the next generation of an engineered system that requires tight integration of cyber world and the man-made physical world to achieve stability, security, reliability, robustness, and efficiency in the system. Emerging software-defined networking (SDN) can be integrated as the communication infrastructure with the critical physical infrastructure like smart power grid to accomplish such a system. This Chapter gives an overview of SDN, smart grid and SDN-based smart grid. SDN can provide security against various types of attacks by providing consistent access control, applying efficient and effective security policies, and managing and controlling the network through the use of a centralized SDN controller. Thus, it has security advantages due to its design nature. However, SDN does suffer from security shortcomings too as all the layers in SDN architecture are vulnerable to attacks. In the line of this, the chapter discusses various types of attacks related to SDN architecture and their countermeasures. It also demonstrates the applicability of SDN to provide security in smart grids. Finally, the Chapter categorizes different types of attacks and their countermeasures related to SDN based smart grids.

Towards Secure Software-Defined Networking Integrated Cyber-Physical Systems: Attacks and Countermeasures

In this chapter, we develop a defense strategy to secure Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) based on a hypergame employing deceptive techniques. The hypergame is played multiple rounds. At each round, the adversary updates its perception of the attack graph and chooses the next node to compromise. The defender updates its perceived list of compromised nodes and actively feeds false signals to the adversary to create deception. The hypergame developed in this chapter provides an important theoretical framework for us to model how a cyberattack spreads on a network and the interaction between the adversary and the defender. It also provides quantitative metrics such as the time it takes the adversary to explore the network and compromise the target nodes. Based on these metrics, the defender can reboot the network devices and reset the network topology in time to clean up all potentially compromised devices and to protect the critical nodes. The hypergame provides useful guidance on how to create cyber deceptions so that the adversary cannot obtain information about the correct network topology and can be deterred from reaching the target critical nodes on a military network while it is in service.

A Hypergame‐Based Defense Strategy Toward Cyber Deception in Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT)

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is envisioned to be one of the most challenging security problems in the coming decade. One key challenge in CIP is the ability to allocate resources, either personnel or cyber, to critical infrastructures with different vulnerability and criticality levels. In this work, a contract-theoretic approach is proposed to solve the problem of resource allocation in critical infrastructure with asymmetric information. A control center (CC) is used to design contracts and offer them to infrastructures' owners. A contract can be seen as an agreement between the CC and infrastructures using which the CC allocates resources and gets rewards in return. Contracts are designed in a way to maximize the CC's benefit and motivate each infrastructure to accept a contract and obtain proper resources for its protection. Infrastructures are defined by both vulnerability levels and criticality levels which are unknown to the CC. Therefore, each infrastructure can claim that it is the most vulnerable or critical to gain more resources. A novel mechanism is developed to handle such an asymmetric information while providing the optimal contract that motivates each infrastructure to reveal its actual type. The necessary and sufficient conditions for such resource allocation contracts under asymmetric information are derived. Simulation results show that the proposed contract-theoretic approach maximizes the CC's utility while ensuring that no infrastructure has an incentive to ask for another contract, despite the lack of exact information at the CC.

Charles A. Kamhoua

Papers

Diversity Modeling to Evaluate Security of Multiple SDN Controllers

Mitigation of Jamming Attacks via Deception

Towards Secure Software-Defined Networking Integrated Cyber-Physical Systems: Attacks and Countermeasures

A Hypergame‐Based Defense Strategy Toward Cyber Deception in Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT)

Contract-Theoretic Resource Allocation for Critical Infrastructure Protection