Data Mining Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

A systematic literature review of blockchain-based applications: Current status, classification and open issues

The mining process in the Blockchain is very resource intensive, therefore, miners form coalitions to verify each block of transactions in return for a reward where only the first coalition that accomplishes the proof-of-work will be rewarded. This leads to intense competitions among miners and consequently dishonest mining strategies, such as block withholding attack, selfish mining, eclipse attack and stubborn mining, to name a few. As a result, it is necessary to regulate the mining process to make miners accountable for any dishonest mining behavior. We therefore propose a new reputation-based framework for the proof-of-work computation in the Blockchain in which miners not only are incentivized to conduct honest mining but also disincentivized to commit to any malicious activities against other mining pools. We first illustrate the architecture of our reputation-based paradigm, explain how the miners are rewarded or penalized in our model, and subsequently, we provide game theoretical analyses to show how this new framework encourages the miners to avoid dishonest mining strategies. In our setting, a mining game is repeatedly played among a set of pool managers and miners where the reputation of each miner or mining ally is continuously measured. At each round of the game, the pool managers send invitations only to a subset of miners based on a non-uniform probability distribution defined by the miners’ reputation values. We show that by using our proposed solution concept, honest mining becomes Nash Equilibrium in our setting. In other words, it will not be in the best interest of the miners to employ dishonest mining strategies even by gaining a short-term utility. This is due to the consideration of a long-term utility in our model and its impact on the miners’ utilities overtime.

Incentivizing Blockchain Miners to Avoid Dishonest Mining Strategies by a Reputation-Based Paradigm

Blockchain for Distributed Systems Security

This work presents ChainFS, a middleware system that secures cloud storage services using a minimally trusted Blockchain ChainFS hardens the cloud-storage security against forking attacks The ChainFS middleware exposes a file-system interface to end users Internally, ChainFS stores data files in the cloud and exports minimal and necessary functionalities to the Blockchain for key distribution and file operation logging We implement the ChainFS system on Ethereum and S3FS and closely integrate it with FUSE clients and Amazon S3 cloud storage We measure the system performance and demonstrate low overhead

ChainFS: Blockchain-Secured Cloud Storage

Blockchain-based audit trails provide a consensus-driven and tamper-proof trail of system events that are helpful in creating provenance in enterprise solutions However, taking into account the transaction bulk generated by these applications and the throughput limitations of existing blockchains, a single ledger for record keeping can be inefficient and costly To that end, we see an imperative need for a new blockchain design that is capable of addressing current challenges, without compromising security and provenance Hence, we propose BlockTrail, a scalable and efficient blockchain solution for auditing applications BlockTrail fragments the legacy blockchain systems into layers of co-dependent hierarchies, thereby reducing the time and space complexity, and increasing the throughput BlockTrail is prototyped on &#x201C;Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance&#x201D; (PBFT) protocol with a custom-built blockchain Experiments with BlockTrail show that compared to the conventional schemes, BlockTrail is more efficient, and has less storage footprint

BlockTrail: A Scalable Multichain Solution for Blockchain-Based Audit Trails

Robust CYBersecurity information EXchange (CYBEX) infrastructure is envisioned to protect the firms from future cyber attacks via collaborative threat intelligence sharing, which might be difficult to achieve via sole effort. The executive order from the U. S. federal government clearly encourages the firms to share their cybersecurity breach and patch related information among other federal and private firms for strengthening their as well as nation's security infrastructure. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework to investigate the economic benefits of cyber-threat information sharing and analyze the impacts and consequences of not participating in the game of information exchange. We model the information exchange framework as distributed non-cooperative game among the firms and investigate the implications of information sharing and security investments. The proposed incentive model ensures and self-enforces the firms to share their breach information truthfully for maximization of its gross utility. Theoretical analysis of the incentive framework has been conducted to find the conditions under which firms' net benefit for sharing security information and investment can be maximized. Numerical results verify that the proposed model promotes such sharing, which helps to relieve their total security technology investment too.

Charles A. Kamhoua

Papers

Incentivizing Blockchain Miners to Avoid Dishonest Mining Strategies by a Reputation-Based Paradigm

Blockchain for Distributed Systems Security

ChainFS: Blockchain-Secured Cloud Storage

BlockTrail: A Scalable Multichain Solution for Blockchain-Based Audit Trails

Game Theoretic Modeling to Enforce Security Information Sharing among Firms