Data Mining Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

A systematic literature review of blockchain-based applications: Current status, classification and open issues

Many epidemic networks admit the partition of the population into three compartments of respective susceptible, infected, and removed individuals. These epidemics involve a conflict between the agent who is propagating the threat and the defender who tries to limit the importance of the propagation. In case of incapability of both agents to monitor the transitions of the network state, this conflict is generally modeled by a stochastic game. The resolution of this class of game is general enough, but remains unscalable. To overcome the curse of dimensionality, we propose a new framework that takes into account the network topology, and we show that the best strategy for each player at each period to optimize his/her overall outcome is to focus on the set of most influential nodes. That is, the use of players’ memory is no longer necessary and, as a matter of result, the proposed algorithm is less time and memory consumptive than the value iteration-based algorithms. 

A Network Centrality Game for Epidemic Control

In cyber and threat intelligence areas, Indicators of Compromise (IOC) can be used as inputs to security controls to guide defense and mitigation activities. We propose a collaboration model in certain attributes in IOC model related to the (1) seriousness of the threat that the IOC triggers and (2) the confidence in the IOC detection or prediction are built based on a community or collaborative model. In this model, users can subscribe or introduce new IOCs based on their own/systems’ exposures or analysis. They can also assess IOCs created by others and vote to continuously change IOC seriousness and confidence values.

Towards building actionable indicators of compromise based on a collaboration model

This paper is concerned with the optimal allocation of detection resources (sensors) to mitigate multi-stage attacks, in the presence of the defender's uncertainty in the attacker's intention. We model the attack planning problem using a Markov decision process and characterize the uncertainty in the attacker's intention using a finite set of reward functions -- each reward represents a type of the attacker. Based on this modeling framework, we employ the paradigm of the worst-case absolute regret minimization from robust game theory and develop mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulations for solving the worst-case regret minimizing sensor allocation strategies for two classes of attack-defend interactions: one where the defender and attacker engage in a zero-sum game, and another where they engage in a non-zero-sum game. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework using a stochastic gridworld example.

Optimizing Sensor Allocation against Attackers with Uncertain Intentions: A Worst-Case Regret Minimization Approach

Deep neural network (DNN) is a popular model implemented in many systems to handle complex tasks such as image classification, object recognition, natural language processing etc. Consequently DNN structural vulnerabilities become part of the security vulnerabilities in those systems. In this paper we study the root cause of DNN adversarial examples. We examine the DNN response surface to understand its classification boundary. Our study reveals the structural problem of DNN classification boundary that leads to the adversarial examples. Existing attack algorithms can generate from a handful to a few hundred adversarial examples given one clean image. We show there are infinitely many adversarial images given one clean sample, all within a small neighborhood of the clean sample. We then define DNN uncertainty regions and show transferability of adversarial examples is not universal. We also argue that generalization error, the large sample theoretical guarantee established for DNN, cannot adequately capture the phenomenon of adversarial examples. We need new theory to measure DNN robustness.

Understanding Adversarial Examples Through Deep Neural Network's Response Surface and Uncertainty Regions.

The invention is a secure logic chip with resistance to hardware Trojan induced data leakage. The invention solves the untrustworthy fabrication risk problem by introducing a secure logic chip design such that even when the design is entirely known to an attacker and a data leakage Trojan is injected subsequently, no useful information can be obtained. This invention contains several features including randomized encoding of binary logic, converting any combinational binary logic into one with randomized encoding, and partitioning a randomized encoded logic for split manufacturing.

Charles A. Kamhoua

Papers

A Network Centrality Game for Epidemic Control

Towards building actionable indicators of compromise based on a collaboration model

Optimizing Sensor Allocation against Attackers with Uncertain Intentions: A Worst-Case Regret Minimization Approach

Understanding Adversarial Examples Through Deep Neural Network's Response Surface and Uncertainty Regions.

Secure logic chip for resisting hardware trojan induced leakage in combinational logics