Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

https://www.isid.ac.in/~dmishra/pap_doc/network.pdf

A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks

Probability and Measure

The History of Economic Analysis

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation R o d G a r r a t t andCheng-Zhong Qin Department of Economics University of California Santa B a r b a r a , C A 93106 A p r i l 7, 2000 Introduction T h i s paper addresses coalition government formation We formulate a model that ad- dresses why and when coalition governments form that include more t h a n the m i n i m u m number of parties required for a majority N o n m i n i m u m winning coalition governments are interesting i n our setting since they do not maximize the surplus of the governing parties T h i s feature of the model captures the idea that coalition governments w i t h broader membership must accommodate a wider spectrum of policy beliefs, and that this diminishes each parties benefit to being i n power We model coalition government formation as a cooperation formation game (See Q i n , 1996) T h i s is a strategic game i n which each player independently identifies w h o m she wishes to cooperate w i t h i n a given coalitional game Payoffs follow a solution imposed on the coalitional game that depends on the structure of cooperation among the players We begin by establishing results that are generally applicable to cooperation formation games of a l l types We then look specifically at the particular problem of coalition government formation by examining a particular cooperation formation game, that we call the government formation game T h e government formation game has three players, who are taken to represent political parties E a c h party i n the game has an exogenously determined policy position and a share of votes that it received i n an election To avoid boring cases, it is assumed that no party has a majority of the votes and that any two parties can form a majority The coalition of parties that forms the government is the one that controls a majority of the votes cast T h e members of the government are entitled to share a surplus, that is

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures

https://escholarship.org/content/qt9cm846c4/qt9cm846c4.pdf

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set

It is shown that for every NTUmarket game, there is amarket thatrepresents the game whosecompetitive payoff vectors completely fill up theinner core of the game. It is also shown that for every NTU market game and for any point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has the given inner core point as itsunique competitive payoff vector. These results prove a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.

Cheng-Zhong Qin

Papers

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set

A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games