Conceptual and methodological ambiguities surrounding the concept of perceived behavioral control are clarified. It is shown that perceived control over performance of a behavior, though comprised of separable components that reflect beliefs about self-efficacy and about controllability, can nevertheless be considered a unitary latent variable in a hierarchical factor model. It is further argued that there is no necessary correspondence between self-efficacy and internal control factors, or between controllability and external control factors. Self-efficacy and controllability can reflect internal as well as external factors and the extent to which they reflect one or the other is an empirical question. Finally, a case is made that measures of perceived behavioral control need to incorporate self-efficacy as well as controllability items that are carefully selected to ensure high internal consistency.

Summary and Conclusions
Perceived control over performance of a behavior can account for consider- able variance in intentions and actions. However, ambiguities surrounding the concept of perceived behavioral control have tended to create uncertainties and to impede progress. The present article attempted to clarify conceptual ambiguities and resolve issues related to the operationalization of perceived behavioral control. Recent research has demonstrated that the overarching concept of perceived behavioral control, as commonly assessed, is comprised of two components: self-efficacy (dealing largely with the ease or difficulty of performing a behavior) and controllability (the extent to which performance is up to the actor). Contrary to a widely accepted view, it was argued that self-efficacy expectations do not necessarily correspond to beliefs about internal control factors, and that controllability expectations have no necessary basis in the perceived operation of external factors. Instead, it was suggested that self-efficacy and controllability may both reflect beliefs about the presence of internal as well as external factors. Rather than making a priori assumptions about the internal or external locus of self-efficacy and controllability, this issue is best treated as an empirical question.

Also of theoretical significance, the present article tried to dispel the notion that self-efficacy and controllability are incompatible with, or independent of, each other. Although factor analyses of perceived behavioral control items provide clear and consistent evidence for the distinction, there is sufficient commonality between self-efficacy and controllability to suggest a two-level hierarchical model. In this model, perceived behavioral control is the overarching, superordinate construct that is comprised of two lower-level components: self-efficacy and controllability. This view of the control component in the theory of planned behavior implies that measures of perceived behavioral control should contain items that assess self-efficacy as well as controllability. Depending on the purpose of the investigation, a decision can be made to aggregate over all items, treating perceived behavioral control as a unitary factor, or to distinguish between self-efficacy and controllability by entering separate indices into the prediction equation.

Perceived Behavioral Control, Self-Efficacy, Locus of Control, and the Theory of Planned Behavior

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

/pdf/the-weirdest-people-in-the-world-480wr4m3kb.pdf

The WEIRDest People in the World

Are Americans more individualistic and less collectivistic than members of other groups? The authors summarize plausible psychological implications of individualism-collectivism (IND-COL), meta-analyze cross-national and within-United States IND-COL differences, and review evidence for effects of IND-COL on self-concept, well-being, cognition, and relationality. European Americans were found to be both more individualistic-valuing personal independence more-and less collectivistic-feeling duty to in-groups less-than others. However, European Americans were not more individualistic than African Americans, or Latinos, and not less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans. Among Asians, only Chinese showed large effects, being both less individualistic and more collectivistic. Moderate IND-COL effects were found on self-concept and relationality, and large effects were found on attribution and cognitive style.

/pdf/rethinking-individualism-and-collectivism-evaluation-of-47xorn4mh7.pdf

Rethinking individualism and collectivism: evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses.

/pdf/weird-languages-have-misled-us-too-comment-on-henrich-et-al-57dmcdjt24.pdf

WEIRD languages have misled us, too [Comment on Henrich et al.]

The Social Psychology of Organizations.

There has been a growing interest in the psychology of money (e.g., Rick, Cryder, & Loewenstein, 2008; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). In the target article, Zhou and Gao (this issue) offer a refreshing perspective on money and social support, maintaining that money and social support are substitutes of each other for alle viating pain. In a comprehensive review of the extant research literature, these authors found clear evidence for their view. Specifically, they found that (a) antici pation of pain heightens the desire for social support as well as the desire for money, (b) reminding people of social support and money can alleviate pain, and (c) so cial exclusion and monetary loss can cause pain. Zhou and Gao's innovative analysis suggests that money is not just a metric of utility attached to the goods and ser vices it can buy. Instead, money itself carries hedonic values through its (perceived) analgesic capability. In this commentary, we will expand Zhou and Gao's analysis by relating it to basic economic principles. We argue that because money and social support are sub stitutable analgesics, an individual's desire for them in concrete situations can be predicted from the shape of indifference curves relating the desirability of money and social support and the relative efficiency of pursu ing wealth and social support with limited resources. This psycho-economic analysis highlights the eco nomic rationality of optimizing the sedative utility or soothing comfort of money and social support. It orga nizes Zhou and Gao's ideas into a set of parsimonious and elegant propositions and brings out some broader implications that are not apparent in Zhou and Gao's theoretical narrative. In the last section of this com mentary, we go beyond optimization of soothing com fort and consider the value or utility people attach to identity signaling in materialistic consumption.

Psycho-Economics of Money and Social Support

(1991). Reduction of Socially Desirable Responses in Attitude Assessment Through the Enlightenment Effect. The Journal of Social Psychology: Vol. 131, No. 4, pp. 585-587.

Reduction of socially desirable responses in attitude assessment through the enlightenment effect

What Culture Could Be

There has been ample criticism of the individualism – collectivism distinction in both consumer and cross-cultural psychology. Recent research (Brewer & Chen, 2007) for instance has argued that there is a conceptual confusion about the meaning of ingroups that constitute the target of collectivism. Whereas all societies must meet primary needs for both individual and social identity, it is argued that individuals from Easterner societies define their collective identity in form of a depersonalized social category (group collectivism) while Westerners rely on a network of interpersonal relationships (relational collectivism). We tested this new framework in a consumer context. In two experimental studies we provide empirical evidence that Easterners make consumption choices that satisfy belongingness through relational collectivism whereas Westerners prefer aspects of group collectivism.

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Chi-Yue Chiu

Papers

Psycho-Economics of Money and Social Support

Reduction of socially desirable responses in attitude assessment through the enlightenment effect

What Culture Could Be

Relational Versus Group Collectivism and Optimal Distinctiveness in a Consumption Context

Why do People Think Culturally When Making Decisions? Theory and Evidence