W. Wilson's (1967) review of the area of subjective well-being (SWB) advanced several conclusions regarding those who report high levels of "happiness". A number of his conclusions have been overturned: youth and modest aspirations no longer are seen as prerequisites of SWB. E. Diener's (1984) review placed greater emphasis on theories that stressed psychological factors. In the current article, the authors review current evidence for Wilson's conclusions and discuss modern theories of SWB that stress dispositional influences, adaptation, goals, and coping strategies. The next steps in the evolution of the field are to comprehend the interaction of psychological factors with life circumstances in producing SWB, to understand the causal pathways leading to happiness, understand the processes underlying adaptation to events, and develop theories that explain why certain variables differentially influence the different components of SWV (life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect).

Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress

The emerging field of emotion regulation studies how individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express them. This review takes an evolutionary perspective and characterizes emotion in terms of response tendencies. Emotion regulation is denned and distinguished from coping, mood regulation, defense, and affect regulation. In the increasingly specialized discipline of psychology, the field of emotion regulation cuts across traditional boundaries and provides common ground. According to a process model of emotion regulation, emotion may be regulated at five points in the emotion generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cognitions, and (e) modulation of responses. The field of emotion regulation promises new insights into age-old questions about how people manage their emotions.

http://www.elaborer.org/cours/A13/lectures/Gross1998.pdf

The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies" - the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.

/pdf/time-discounting-and-time-preference-a-critical-review-47don96ek5.pdf

Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review

the total number of papers may exceed 10,000. Nevertheless, cost consideration forced us to consider mostly published papers and technical reports in English. 4 Formula 4 in Seifert (1991) is in error—a multiplier of n, of cell size, is missing in the numerator. 5 Unfortunately, the technique of meta-analysis cannot be applied, at present time, to such effects because the distribution of dis based on a sampling of people, whereas the statistics of techniques such as ARIMA are based on the distribution of a sampling of observations in the time domain regardless of the size of the people sample involved (i.e., there is no way to compare a sample of 100 points in time with a sample of 100 people). That is, a sample of 100 points in time has the same degrees of freedom if it were based on an observation of 1 person or of 1,000 people. 258 KLUGER AND DENISI From the papers we reviewed, only 131 (5%) met the criteria for inclusion. We were concerned that, given the small percentage of usable papers, our conclusions might not fairly represent the larger body of relevant literature. Therefore, we analyzed all the major reasons to reject a paper from the meta-analysis, even though the decision to exclude a paper came at the first identification of a missing inclusion criterion. This analysis showed the presence of review articles, interventions of natural feedback removal, and papers that merely discuss feedback, which in turn suggests that the included studies represent 1015% of the empirical FI literature. However, this analysis also showed that approximately 37% of the papers we considered manipulated feedback without a control group and that 16% reported confounded treatments, that is, roughly two thirds of the empirical FI literature cannot shed light on the question of FI effects on performance—a fact that requires attention from future FI researchers. Of the usable 131 papers (see references with asterisks), 607 effect sizes were extracted. These effects were based on 12,652 participants and 23,663 observations (reflecting multiple observations per participant). The average sample size per effect was 39 participants. The distribution of the effect sizes is presented in Figure 1. The weighted mean (weighted by sample size) of this distribution is 0.41, suggesting that, on average, FI has a moderate positive effect on performance. However, over 38% of the effects were negative (see Figure 1). The weighted variance of this distribution is 0.97, whereas the estimate of the sampling error variance is only 0.09. A potential problem in meta-analyses is a violation of the assumption of independence. Such a violation occurs either when multiple observations are taken from the same study (Rosenthal, 1984) or when several papers are authored by the same person (Wolf, 1986). In the present investigation, there were 91 effects derived from the laboratory experiments reported by Mikulincer (e.g., 1988a, 1988b). This raises the possibility that the average effect size is biased, because his studies manipulated extreme negative FIs and used similar tasks. In fact, the weighted average d in Mikulincer's studies was —0.39; whereas in the remainder of the

The effects of feedback interventions on performance: A historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory.

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfield of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

Risk as Feelings

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

Risk as feelings.

This research investigates a particular type of preference reversal (PR), existing between joint evaluation, where two stimulus options are evaluated side by side simultaneously, and separate evaluation,where these options are evaluated separately.I first examine how this PR differs from other types of PRs and review studies demonstrating this PR. I then propose and explanation,called the evaluability hypothesis, and report experiments that tested this hypothesis. According to this hypothesis,PRs between joint and separate evaluations occur because one of the attributes involved in the options is hard to evaluate independently and another attribute is relatively easy to evaluate inependently.I conclude by discussing prescriptive implications of this research.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID930092_code666755.pdf?abstractid=930092&rulid=5205832&mirid=1

The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives

https://pages.ucsd.edu/~cmckenzie/Hsee1996OBHDP.pdf

The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives☆

In this study, respondents from the P.R.C., U.S.A., Germany, and Poland were found to differ in risk preference, as measured by buying prices for risky financial options. Chinese repondents were significantly less risk-averse in their pricing than Americans when risk preference was assessed in the traditional expected-utility framework. However these apparent differences in risk preference were associated primarily with cultural differences in the perception of the risk of financial options rather than with cultural differences in attitude towards perceived risk. In all cultures, and equal proportion(the majority) of respondents was willing to pay more for options perceived as less risky, i.e., were perceived-risk averse. These results are most natually explained within a risk-return conceptualization of risky choice. They have practical implications for cross-cultural negotiation and commerce by suggesting the locus of cultural differences in risky choice that may allow for the creation of joint gains.

Christopher K. Hsee

Papers

Risk as Feelings

Risk as feelings.

The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives

The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives☆

Cross-cultural Differences in Risk Perception,but Cross-cultural Similarities in Attitudes Towards Perceived Risk