D
Daniel Holcomb
Researcher at University of Massachusetts Amherst
Publications - 86
Citations - 2667
Daniel Holcomb is an academic researcher from University of Massachusetts Amherst. The author has contributed to research in topics: Field-programmable gate array & Computer science. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 79 publications receiving 2156 citations. Previous affiliations of Daniel Holcomb include Yale University & University of Michigan.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Power-Up SRAM State as an Identifying Fingerprint and Source of True Random Numbers
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that a 512-byte SRAM fingerprint contains sufficient entropy to generate 128-bit true random numbers and that the generated numbers pass the NIST tests for runs, approximate entropy, and block frequency.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
PUFs at a glance
Ulrich Rührmair,Daniel Holcomb +1 more
TL;DR: This paper provides a brief and easily accessible overview of the typical security features, implementations, attacks, protocols uses, and applications of Physical Unclonable Functions.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
FPGA Side Channel Attacks without Physical Access
Chethan Ramesh,Shivukumar B. Patil,Siva Nishok Dhanuskodi,George Provelengios,Sébastien Pillement,Daniel Holcomb,Russell Tessier +6 more
TL;DR: This work presents the first successful attack on an unsuspecting circuit in an FPGA using information passively obtained from neighboring long-lines, and demonstrates that the attack can recover encryption keys from AES circuits running at 10MHz, and has the capability to scale to much higher frequencies.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Low-power sub-threshold design of secure physical unclonable functions
TL;DR: This work optimize the PUF supply voltage for the minimum power-delay product and investigates the trade-offs on PUF uniqueness and reliability and demonstrates that such a design optimization does not compromise the security of PUFs regarding modeling attacks and side-channel analysis attacks.
Proceedings Article
TARDIS: time and remanence decay in SRAM to implement secure protocols on embedded devices without clocks
TL;DR: Three proof-of-concept implementations that use the TARDIS to enable privacy-preserving RFID tags, to deter double swiping of contactless credit cards, and to increase the difficulty of brute-force attacks against e-passports are presented.