E
Eric J. Friedman
Researcher at International Computer Science Institute
Publications - 113
Citations - 10214
Eric J. Friedman is an academic researcher from International Computer Science Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: Nash equilibrium & Combinatorial game theory. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 112 publications receiving 9765 citations. Previous affiliations of Eric J. Friedman include Cornell University & University of California, Berkeley.
Papers
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Reputation systems
TL;DR: Systems T he Internet offers vast new opportunities to interact with total strangers, but these interactions can be fun, informative, even profitable, but they also involve risk.
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Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures using measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders.
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Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries
TL;DR: In this article, the authors found that higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity, and that corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates.
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The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
Eric J. Friedman,Paul Resnick +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms, something that is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet.
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Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors found that higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity, suggesting that corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates.