Showing papers by "Helen V. Milner published in 1997"

Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations

Abstract: Presents a theory of domestic politics, showing how it affects international outcomes. In developing this rational choice theory, the text argues that any explanation that treats states as unitary actors is misleading. It describes all states as polyarchic, where decision-making power is shared between two or more actors (such as legislature and executive). A model is constructed based on two-level game theory, reflecting the political activity at both the domestic and international levels. The model is illustrated by the question of co-operation between nations.

Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: Elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization

Abstract: Elections affect both the probability of successful ratification and the terms of international trade agreements; domestic politics in its simplest form shapes international negotiations. Without elections, the extent of protection in a trade agreement increases with the degree of divided government, and the Schelling conjecture—whereby an international negotiator can point to a hawkish legislature to extract greater concessions from the foreign country—holds only when the legislature is not too hawkish. An election (where the executive anticipates the preferences of the legislature imperfectly) implies that when divisions in government rise, the probability of ratification failure increases, the expected outcome becomes more protectionist, and the executive's influence vis-a-vis the foreign country declines, thus challenging the Schelling conjecture.

The political economy of regionalism

Abstract: AcknowledgmentsContributorsThe Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview, by Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. MilnerRegionalism in Asia and the Americas, by Stephen HaggardThe Political Economy of Currency Regions, by Benjamin J. CohenIndustries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs, by Helen V. MilnerRegional Agreements as Clubs: The European Case, by Pier Carlo PadoanDispute Settlement in International Trade: Regionalism and Procedural Coordination, by Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. YarbroughSystematic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas, by Joseph M. GriecoThe Political Economy of Major-Power Trade Flows, by Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel BronsonRegionalizing Europe's Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa, by Charles A. KupchanBibliographyIndex