J
Jennifer Cole Wright
Researcher at College of Charleston
Publications - 38
Citations - 1380
Jennifer Cole Wright is an academic researcher from College of Charleston. The author has contributed to research in topics: Moral disengagement & Moral psychology. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 37 publications receiving 1209 citations. Previous affiliations of Jennifer Cole Wright include University of British Columbia & University of Wyoming.
Papers
More filters
Journal Article
Moral heuristics. Commentaries. Author's reply
Cass R. Sunstein,Matthew D. Adler,Christopher J. Anderson,Elizabeth Anderson,Jonathan Baron,Karen Bartsch,Jennifer Cole Wright,William D. Casebeer,Pablo Fernández-Berrocal,Natalio Extremera,Barbara H. Fried,Richard J. Gerrig,Michael E. Gorman,Ulrike Hahn,John-Mark Frost,Greg Maio,Jonathan Haidt,Marc D. Hauser,Harold Herzog,Gordon M. Burghardt,Robert A. Hinde,Jonathan J. Koehler,Andrew D. Gershoff,John Mikhail,David A. Pizarro,Eric Luis Uhlmann,Liana Ritov,Peter Singer,Edward Stein,Philip E. Tetlock,Elke U. Weber,Jessica S. Ancker +31 more
TL;DR: The idea of error-prone heuristics is especially controversial in the moral domain, where agreement on the correct answer may be hard to elicit; but in many contexts, they are at work and they do real damage.
Journal ArticleDOI
Folk Moral Relativism
TL;DR: The authors found that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Cognitive and Affective Dimensions of Moral Conviction: Implications for Attitudinal and Behavioral Measures of Interpersonal Tolerance
TL;DR: The studies show that the cognitive dimension is sufficient to produce many forms of interpersonal intolerance, and that the interaction pattern between moral beliefs and affect was specific to emotional intensity and not other measures of attitude strength.
Journal ArticleDOI
On intuitional stability: the clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic.
TL;DR: Data is introduced from two studies that suggest not only that people's concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also that people have introspective awareness of this stability, providing a promising means by which to assess the epistemic value of the authors' intuitions.
Journal ArticleDOI
The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism
TL;DR: This paper explored people's meta-ethical commitments more deeply, asking them to provide verbal explanations for their judgments, and found that while people think they are relativists, this may not always be the case.