https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/downloads/Isolation2007.pdf

2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Health Care Settings.

146. In: 16th Annual Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America. Chicago, Ill; 2006. 950. Harvey MA. Critical-care-unit bedside design and furnishing: impact on nosocomial infections. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1998;19(8):597­ 601. 951. Srinivasan A, Beck C, Buckley T, et al. The ability of hospital ventilation systems to filter Aspergillus and other fungi following a building implosion. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2002;23(9):520-4. 952. Maragakis LL, Bradley KL, Song X, et al. Increased catheter-related bloodstream infection rates after the introduction of a new mechanical valve intravenous access port. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2006;27(1):67-70. 953. Organizations JCoAoH. Comprehensive Accredication Manual for Hospitals: The Official Handbook. Oakbrook Terrace: JCAHO; 2007. 954. Peterson LR, Noskin GA. New technology for detecting multidrug­ resistant pathogens in the clinical microbiology laboratory. Emerg Infect Dis 2001;7(2):306-11. 955. Diekema DJ, Doebbeling BN. Employee health and infection control. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1995;16(5):292-301. 956. Rutala WA, Weber DJ, Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). Guideline for Disinfection and Sterilization in Health-Care Facilities. In preparation. 957. Weems JJ, Jr. Nosocomial outbreak of Pseudomonas cepacia associated with contamination of reusable electronic ventilator temperature probes. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1993;14(10):583-6. 958. Berthelot P, Grattard F, Mahul P, et al. Ventilator temperature sensors: an unusual source of Pseudomonas cepacia in nosocomial infection. J Hosp Infect 1993;25(1):33-43. 959. 959. CDC. Bronchoscopy-related infections and pseudoinfections--New York, 1996 and 1998. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1999;48(26):557­ 60. 960. Heeg P, Roth K, Reichl R, Cogdill CP, Bond WW. Decontaminated single-use devices: an oxymoron that may be placing patients at risk for cross-contamination. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2001;22(9):542-9. 961. www.fda.gov/cdrh/reprocessing/ 962. CDC. Prevention and Control of Influenza: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report 2003;52(RR08):1-36.

Guideline for isolation precautions: preventing transmission of infectious agents in healthcare settings 2007.

The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) produced guidelines for community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) in immunocompetent adults in 1998 and again in 2000 [1, 2]. Because of evolving resistance to antimicrobials and other advances, it was felt that an update should be provided every few years so that important developments could be highlighted and pressing questions answered. We addressed those issues that the committee believed were important to the practicing physician, including suggestions for initial empiric therapy for CAP. In some cases, only a few paragraphs were needed, whereas, in others, a somewhat more in-depth discussion was provided. Because many physicians focus on the tables rather than on the text of guidelines, it was decided that all of the information dealing with the initial empiric treatment regimens should be in tabular format with footnotes (tables 1–3). The topics selected for updating have been organized according to the headings used in the August 2000 CAP guidelines pub-

Update of Practice Guidelines for the Management of Community-Acquired Pneumonia in Immunocompetent Adults

http://cardiacanaesthesia.in/assets/img/guidelines/Perioperative-Blood-Transfusion-and-Blood-Conservation-in-Cardiac-Surgery.pdf

Perioperative blood transfusion and blood conservation in cardiac surgery: the Society of Thoracic Surgeons and The Society of Cardiovascular Anesthesiologists clinical practice guideline.

The 1918 influenza pandemic killed 20-40 million people worldwide, and is seen as a worst-case scenario for pandemic planning. Like other pandemic influenza strains, the 1918 A/H1N1 strain spread extremely rapidly. A measure of transmissibility and of the stringency of control measures required to stop an epidemic is the reproductive number, which is the number of secondary cases produced by each primary case. Here we obtained an estimate of the reproductive number for 1918 influenza by fitting a deterministic SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model to pneumonia and influenza death epidemic curves from 45 US cities: the median value is less than three. The estimated proportion of the population with A/H1N1 immunity before September 1918 implies a median basic reproductive number of less than four. These results strongly suggest that the reproductive number for 1918 pandemic influenza is not large relative to many other infectious diseases. In theory, a similar novel influenza subtype could be controlled. But because influenza is frequently transmitted before a specific diagnosis is possible and there is a dearth of global antiviral and vaccine stores, aggressive transmission reducing measures will probably be required.

Transmissibility of 1918 pandemic influenza

ObjectiveTo review and update consensus-based recommendations for medical and
public health professionals following a Bacillus anthracis attack against a civilian population.ParticipantsThe working group included 23 experts from academic medical centers,
research organizations, and governmental, military, public health, and emergency
management institutions and agencies.EvidenceMEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to January 2002, using
the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Reference review identified
work published before 1966. Participants identified unpublished sources.Consensus ProcessThe first draft synthesized the gathered information. Written comments
were incorporated into subsequent drafts. The final statement incorporated
all relevant evidence from the search along with consensus recommendations.ConclusionsSpecific recommendations include diagnosis of anthrax infection, indications
for vaccination, therapy, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the
environment, and suggested research. This revised consensus statement presents
new information based on the analysis of the anthrax attacks of 2001, including
developments in the investigation of the anthrax attacks of 2001; important
symptoms, signs, and laboratory studies; new diagnostic clues that may help
future recognition of this disease; current anthrax vaccine information; updated
antibiotic therapeutic considerations; and judgments about environmental surveillance
and decontamination.

/pdf/anthrax-as-a-biological-weapon-2002-updated-recommendations-ebw79qjamb.pdf

Jerome Hauer

Papers

Anthrax as a biological weapon, 2002: updated recommendations for management.

Autotransfusion of shed mediastinal blood after cardiac surgery: A prospective study

Routine Use of Autotransfusion Following Cardiac Surgery: Experience in 700 Patients

Autotransfusion in cardiac surgical patients after operation.

Acute supravalvular stenosis following replacement of the aortic valve and ascending aorta in a patient with Marfan's syndrome: Report of a case