Showing papers by "John Augustine published in 2012"

Towards robust and efficient computation in dynamic peer-to-peer networks

Abstract: Motivated by the need for robust and fast distributed computation in highly dynamic Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, we study algorithms for the fundamental distributed agreement problem. P2P networks are highly dynamic networks that experience heavy node churn (i.e., nodes join and leave the network continuously over time). Our goal is to design fast algorithms (running in a small number of rounds) that guarantee, despite high node churn rate, that almost all nodes reach a stable agreement. Our main contributions are randomized distributed algorithms that guarantee stable almost-everywhere agreement with high probability even under high adversarial churn in a polylogarithmic number of rounds. In particular, we present the following results:1. An O(log2n)-round (n is the stable network size) randomized algorithm that achieves almost-everywhere agreement with high probability under up to linear churn per round (i.e., en, for some small constant e > 0), assuming that the churn is controlled by an oblivious adversary (that has complete knowledge and control of what nodes join and leave and at what time and has unlimited computational power, but is oblivious to the random choices made by the algorithm).2. An O(log m log3n)-round randomized algorithm that achieves almost-everywhere agreement with high probability under up to e√n churn per round (for some small e > 0), where m is the size of the input value domain, that works even under an adaptive adversary (that also knows the past random choices made by the algorithm).Our algorithms are the first-known, fully-distributed, agreement algorithms that work under highly dynamic settings (i.e., high churn rates per step). Furthermore, they are localized (i.e., do not require any global topological knowledge), simple, and easy to implement. These algorithms can serve as building blocks for implementing other non-trivial distributed computing tasks in dynamic P2P networks.

Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies

Abstract: The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.