Journal ArticleDOI
Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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TLDR
In this paper, a special case of the Stable Roommates problem is studied, where preferences are derived from a psychological model common in social choice literature. And when preferences are "single-peaked" and "narcissistic", there exists a unique stable matching, and it can be constructed in O(n) time.About:
This article is published in Operations Research Letters.The article was published on 1986-10-01. It has received 138 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Stable roommates problem & Single peaked preferences.read more
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Two-Sided Matching
Alvin E. Roth,Marilda Sotomayor +1 more
TL;DR: A comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching can be found in this paper, where the focus is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized.
Computational Social Choice
Felix Brandt,Ulle Endriss +1 more
TL;DR: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility and Computational Hardness of Manipulation as mentioned in this paper are two of the main obstacles in voting rule-based election process, and they have been studied extensively in the literature.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings
TL;DR: It is shown that the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match converges to a stable roommate matching with probability one as long as there are no odd rings.
Journal ArticleDOI
Linear programming brings marital bliss
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the convex hull of the incidence vectors of stable matchings and propose a linear program to solve the optimal stable marriage problem as a linear programming problem.
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The shield that never was: Societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
TL;DR: It is argued that when electorates follow the canonical political science model of societal preferences the complexity shield never existed in the first place and it is shown that for electorates having single-peaked preferences, many existing NP-hardness results on manipulation and control evaporate.
References
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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
David Gale,Lloyd S. Shapley +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between college admission and the stability of marriage in the United States, and found that college admission is correlated with the number of stable marriages.
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The theory of committees and elections
TL;DR: In this paper, Dodgson's Third Pamphlet 'A Method...' (1876) was used to discuss the Elasticity of Committee Decisions with an Altering Size of Majority.
Journal ArticleDOI
Testing for the consecutive ones property, interval graphs, and graph planarity using PQ-tree algorithms
TL;DR: The consecutive ones test for the consecutive ones property in matrices and for graph planarity is extended to a test for interval graphs using a recently discovered fast recognition algorithm for chordal graphs.