There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.

Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

I and i

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

It is shown that, particularly for terrestrial cellular telephony, the interference-suppression feature of CDMA (code division multiple access) can result in a many-fold increase in capacity over analog and even over competing digital techniques. A single-cell system, such as a hubbed satellite network, is addressed, and the basic expression for capacity is developed. The corresponding expressions for a multiple-cell system are derived. and the distribution on the number of users supportable per cell is determined. It is concluded that properly augmented and power-controlled multiple-cell CDMA promises a quantum increase in current cellular capacity. >

On the capacity of a cellular CDMA system

There is considerable pressure to define the key requirements of 5G, develop 5G standards, and perform technology trials as quickly as possible. Normally, these activities are best done in series but there is a desire to complete these tasks in parallel so that commercial deployments of 5G can begin by 2020. 5G will not be an incremental improvement over its predecessors; it aims to be a revolutionary leap forward in terms of data rates, latency, massive connectivity, network reliability, and energy efficiency. These capabilities are targeted at realizing high-speed connectivity, the Internet of Things, augmented virtual reality, the tactile internet, and so on. The requirements of 5G are expected to be met by new spectrum in the microwave bands (3.3-4.2 GHz), and utilizing large bandwidths available in mm-wave bands, increasing spatial degrees of freedom via large antenna arrays and 3-D MIMO, network densification, and new waveforms that provide scalability and flexibility to meet the varying demands of 5G services. Unlike the one size fits all 4G core networks, the 5G core network must be flexible and adaptable and is expected to simultaneously provide optimized support for the diverse 5G use case categories. In this paper, we provide an overview of 5G research, standardization trials, and deployment challenges. Due to the enormous scope of 5G systems, it is necessary to provide some direction in a tutorial article, and in this overview, the focus is largely user centric, rather than device centric. In addition to surveying the state of play in the area, we identify leading technologies, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, and outline the key challenges ahead, with research test beds delivering promising performance but pre-commercial trials lagging behind the desired 5G targets.

5G : A tutorial overview of standards, trials, challenges, deployment, and practice

Simulation and the monte carlo method

Careful planning and optimization of wireless networks for indoor operation require site-specific propagation predictions for several possible antenna-configurations in reasonable running time. In this paper, we propose treating each room as a single entity, where estimations of the mean received power, as well as the minimum and maximum values of the mean are sought. It is shown that these metrics can be well estimated by calculating the transmitted field at the corners of each room, including losses due to wall penetration and excluding all other propagation mechanisms, such as reflections or diffractions. The proposed model is verified by measurements, carried out in a typical building. Furthermore, statistical margins, sizing the variations of the instantaneous received power around its mean are given. The model returned estimations in 8s for 97 candidate antenna sites in a complex 180m×180m indoor facility.

An efficient propagation model for automatic planning of indoor wireless networks

A reconstruction algorithm for microwave imaging based on the Modifled Pertur- bation Method (MPM) is proposed. Both the object conductivity (ae) and permittivity (") are reconstructed. The original Perturbation method developed for static problems was modifled in order to apply in time harmonic problem in higher frequency. The Jacobian matrix is now calculated in closed form employing an adjoint network theorem in conjunction with the reci- procity theorem of electromagnetics. A number of successful reconstructions were carried out for difierent complex permittivity proflles, but all of them based on a computer phantom approach.

https://www.piers.org/piersonline/pdf/Vol3No8Page1217to1221.pdf

A Sensitivity Matrix Based Microwave Tomography Exploiting an Adjoint Network Theorem

The input impedance of a probe-fed short-circuited microstrip antenna (SCMSA) is presented. The electric field expression under the microstrip patch by using the Wiener-Hopf technique is used and the electromotive force (EMF) method is applied. Analytical and experimental results for the impedance show the dependence on the dimensions and frequency.

Analysis of a probe-fed short-circuited microstrip antenna

The lack of models to aid the technical debt estimation and monitoring in cloud architectures motivates the need to develop a technical debt management (TDM) theory and practical approach for effective management decision making. The cloud is a marketplace in which services and resources are leased off based on the volume of data and the number of cloud-oriented users, which affect the accuracy of the technical debt measurement. In this research paper, we propose a game theoretic formulation of the technical debt management problem on cloud-based service level. A technical debt measurement game is constructed, parameterizing the current number of players per service, while each new end-user can choose any of the offered cloud-based services. In this direction, a technical debt-inspired throttling mechanism is also discussed for resource leasing optimization and scalability. The validation tests verify the effectiveness of our approach in real-world operations, avoiding accumulated technical debt and optimizing available resources in cloud-centric systems.

A game theoretic formulation of the technical debt management problem in cloud systems

A circular patch antenna tuned by a ferrite post is presented. The DC-biasing magnetic field is assumed perpendicular to the patch and the ferrite losses are taken into account. Both right- and left-hand circular polarizations are considered. The “perfect magnetic walls” approximation is employed and the resulting closed-form expressions can be used in the design of patch antennas. Also, this approximate but analytical study offers a clear physical insight with regard to the ferrite effects on the patch antenna's resonance characteristics. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Microwave Opt Technol Lett 46: 234–237, 2005; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/mop.20954

John N. Sahalos

Papers

An efficient propagation model for automatic planning of indoor wireless networks

A Sensitivity Matrix Based Microwave Tomography Exploiting an Adjoint Network Theorem

Analysis of a probe-fed short-circuited microstrip antenna

A game theoretic formulation of the technical debt management problem in cloud systems

Analysis of Circular Patch Antenna Tuned by a Ferrite Post