There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.

Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

I and i

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

It is shown that, particularly for terrestrial cellular telephony, the interference-suppression feature of CDMA (code division multiple access) can result in a many-fold increase in capacity over analog and even over competing digital techniques. A single-cell system, such as a hubbed satellite network, is addressed, and the basic expression for capacity is developed. The corresponding expressions for a multiple-cell system are derived. and the distribution on the number of users supportable per cell is determined. It is concluded that properly augmented and power-controlled multiple-cell CDMA promises a quantum increase in current cellular capacity. >

On the capacity of a cellular CDMA system

There is considerable pressure to define the key requirements of 5G, develop 5G standards, and perform technology trials as quickly as possible. Normally, these activities are best done in series but there is a desire to complete these tasks in parallel so that commercial deployments of 5G can begin by 2020. 5G will not be an incremental improvement over its predecessors; it aims to be a revolutionary leap forward in terms of data rates, latency, massive connectivity, network reliability, and energy efficiency. These capabilities are targeted at realizing high-speed connectivity, the Internet of Things, augmented virtual reality, the tactile internet, and so on. The requirements of 5G are expected to be met by new spectrum in the microwave bands (3.3-4.2 GHz), and utilizing large bandwidths available in mm-wave bands, increasing spatial degrees of freedom via large antenna arrays and 3-D MIMO, network densification, and new waveforms that provide scalability and flexibility to meet the varying demands of 5G services. Unlike the one size fits all 4G core networks, the 5G core network must be flexible and adaptable and is expected to simultaneously provide optimized support for the diverse 5G use case categories. In this paper, we provide an overview of 5G research, standardization trials, and deployment challenges. Due to the enormous scope of 5G systems, it is necessary to provide some direction in a tutorial article, and in this overview, the focus is largely user centric, rather than device centric. In addition to surveying the state of play in the area, we identify leading technologies, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses, and outline the key challenges ahead, with research test beds delivering promising performance but pre-commercial trials lagging behind the desired 5G targets.

5G : A tutorial overview of standards, trials, challenges, deployment, and practice

Simulation and the monte carlo method

Aperture Coupled Microstrip Antennas: A Design Approach

The orthogonal method is presented for synthesis and optimization problems of arrays of straight nonparallel thin-wire antennas. First, by the moment method, the far-zone field and the performance indices of the away are represented by expressions useful for applying the orthogonal method. By a procedure similar to the Gram-Schmidt method, the far-zone field and the indices of the array are modified. The new expressions, by a suitable procedure, give helpful formulas for synthesis and optimization. Several examples for possible uses are included.

Synthesis and optimization for arrays of nonparallel wire antennas by the orthogonal method

The exact solution for the electromagnetic field diffracted by a perfectly conducting slotted elliptic cone is determined. The solution is presented in the form of a dyadic Green's function, which is the most general form of a possible solution. Some numerical results are presented and compared with others given in the past for simpler geometries. >

The electromagnetic field of a slotted elliptic cone

The isolation of two different feed networks for antennas is presented. This is quantitatived by the reappearing voltage at the antenna elements due to the reflection at the network junctions. The voltage is formulated for the general case of antenna arrays. From the comparison of the isolation between the corporate and the modified corporate feed network a better isolation to the modified one is found. >

A study of the isolation of two different feed networks for antenna arrays

In this work, a mobile atenna of a UHF RFID reader for searching tagged items on the shelves is presented. The antenna consists of a microstrip array of alternating orthogonal double dipoles which are fed in series by a meander microstrip line. The individual dipoles are designed such as to provide high bandwidth. The distance between the double dipoles is adjusted in order to excite them in phase at 867MHz and create two orthogonal electric-field components. The number of dipoles and the inter-element distance create beams with direction diversity. Based on the analysis of the pattern and the radiated field in the near-field zone, it was found that a semicylindrical area around the axis of the antenna is sufficiently covered.

John N. Sahalos

Papers

Aperture Coupled Microstrip Antennas: A Design Approach

Synthesis and optimization for arrays of nonparallel wire antennas by the orthogonal method

The electromagnetic field of a slotted elliptic cone

A study of the isolation of two different feed networks for antenna arrays

A UHF RFID reader antenna for searching tagged items