/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

https://www.uh.edu/%7Ebsorense/RestucciaRogersonRED2008.pdf

Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with heterogeneous establishments

relationship. All subsequent studies confirmed it (see for example King and Levine, 1993, and the review in: Pagano, 1993). Goldsmith used a sample of 35 countries for the period between 1860 and 1963 to show the relationship between income and financial depth measured by the ratio between bank's assets and GDP. He also showed that in periods of rapid growth, financial depth grows faster than income. More details about measuring financial depth can be found in this paper. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH Velimir Šonje

/pdf/financial-development-and-economic-growth-1933kuo17q.pdf

Financial development and economic growth

Explaining levels of economic development hinges on explaining TFP dierences across coun- tries. In poor countries, total factor productivity (TFP) is particularly low in sectors producing tradable goods. We document that an important dierence between tradable and non-tradable sectors is their average establishment size: Tradable establishments operate at much larger scales. We develop a model co-determining aggregate TFP, sectoral TFP, and scales across industrial sectors. In our model, …nancial frictions disproportionately aect TFP in tradable sectors where production requires larger …xed costs. Our quantitative exercises show that …- nancial frictions explain a substantial part of the observed cross-country relationship between aggregate TFP, sectoral TFP, and output per worker.

/pdf/finance-and-development-a-tale-of-two-sectors-3e9cu3ezir.pdf

Finance and Development: A Tale of Two Sectors †

We use producer-level data to evaluate the role of financial frictions in determining total factor productivity (TFP). We study a model of establishment dynamics in which financial frictions reduce TFP through two channels. First, finance frictions distort entry and technology adoption decisions. Second, finance frictions generate dispersion in the returns to capital across existing producers and thus productivity losses from misallocation. Parameterizations of our model consistent with the data imply fairly small losses from misallocation, but potentially sizable losses from inefficiently low levels of entry and technology adoption. (JEL E32, E44, F41, G32, L60, O33, O47)

/pdf/finance-and-misallocation-evidence-from-plant-level-data-ltsh4hed8n.pdf

Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from Plant-Level Data

Many economic activities are organized as partnerships. These ventures are formed with capital contributions by partnership members who obtain a share of ownership in exchange. The design of the partnership dictates how much of the profits is distributed among the mem- bers and how much is reinvested. In this paper, we study the optimal design of partnerships under the assumption that partners privately observe shocks to their liquidity needs. When the ownership share of a partner is large enough, his incentives to misreport vanish. This occurs because a fraction of the increase in his payouts after reporting high liquidity needs is financed by disinvesting in the partnership. When his ownership share is not big enough, the ownership structure of the partnership must vary over time to prevent misreporting. The limiting distri- bution of shares depends on the initial ownership structure. Under certain conditions, if the partnership starts with approximately equally distributed shares, both partners are too big to cheat and the ownership structure remains unchanged forever. Instead, if the initial ownership structure is such that one of the partners is too big to cheat but the other is not, the share of the initially larger partner ends up either reaching 100% (i.e., sole proprietorship forever) or decreasing to the point at which both partners are too big to cheat (i.e., shares are approximately equally distributed forever).

/pdf/too-big-to-cheat-efficiency-and-investment-in-partnerships-3xlebpsoy7.pdf

Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships

The decline in the number of cardholders in delinquency and the number of accounts per cardholder in delinquency are primary factors affecting the fall in the delinquency rate.

/pdf/why-is-credit-card-delinquency-declining-40q6r8oy34.pdf

Why Is Credit Card Delinquency Declining

This study develops a novel model of endogenous sovereign debt maturity choice that rationalizes various stylized facts about debt maturity and the yield spread curve: first, sovereign debt duration and maturity generally exceed one year, and co-move positively with the business cycle. Second, sovereign yield spread curves are usually non-linear and upward-sloped, and may become non-monotonic and inverted during a period of high credit market stress, such as a default episode. Finally, output volatility, sudden stops, impatience and risk aversion are key determinants of maturity, both in our model and in the data.

/pdf/sovereign-default-and-the-choice-of-mat-25f8u4ofex.pdf

Sovereign Default and the Choice of Mat

Although the unemployment rate is strong these days, other labor-related statistics are being called weak for this stage of an economic recovery. The downward trend in labor force participation, wage growth, job reallocation and other stats started a long time ago, however.

Labor Indicators: Some of Today's Trends Pre-Date the Great Recession

Anemic investment in residential and commercial real estate has been a significant factor contributing to slow growth in employment.

/pdf/why-is-employment-growth-so-low-18s8epuyjb.pdf

Juan M. Sánchez

Papers

Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships

Why Is Credit Card Delinquency Declining

Sovereign Default and the Choice of Mat

Labor Indicators: Some of Today's Trends Pre-Date the Great Recession

Why Is Employment Growth So Low