Due to the increasing number of end-of-life (EOL) products and their related environmental concerns, much attention has been paid to reverse logistics. In this paper, we consider a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) with one manufacturer and one retailer who try to improve sustainable consumption by increasing customers’ willingness to return used products through offering a discount or a direct fee in exchange for bringing back EOL products. Afterward, the model is extended to consider a closed loop supply chain (CLSC). Quantity discounts and increasing fee contracts are proposed to coordinate supply chains. Then, government role in improving coordinated supply chains through donating different incentives (tax exemption and subsidy) to supply chain members are analyzed. Results show that total channel profit in the coordinated case is improved. Also, in the proposed models, each member has enough motives to participate in the plan. In addition, results demonstrate that government-sponsored incentives to the manufacturer are preferred to the retailer.

Reverse and closed loop supply chain coordination by considering government role

Analyzing structure of two-echelon closed-loop supply chain for pricing, quality and recycling management

Research on low-carbon strategies in supply chain with environmental regulations based on differential game

Sustainable supply chain management towards disruption and organizational ambidexterity: A data driven analysis

A multi-objective robust optimization model for site-selection and capacity allocation of municipal solid waste facilities: A case study in Tehran

In this paper, a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is discussed. The manufacturer sells its products to its customers, becoming the rival of the retailers. In this case, we consider two scenarios in which the manufacturer holds either asymmetric or symmetric channel power as the retailer. According to the changing demand, we develop the dynamic game models for the two scenarios and analyze the models’ dynamic behavior. The corporations’ profits and system stability are compared under these two scenarios. We find that the manufacturer’s profit is greater with asymmetric channel power than that with symmetric channel power. For the retailer, it will get more profit if it holds a symmetric channel power compared with the manufacturer. The supply chain profit will increase as the internal competition increases. Besides, the system stability will be easier to maintain with asymmetric channel power and the market will be much easier to fall into chaos with symmetric channel power.

The comparison and complex analysis on dual-channel supply chain under different channel power structures and uncertain demand

This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a seller and a buyer. Considering the case where the buyer faces uncertain demand and yield, the paper investigates the buyback contra...

Supply chain coordination in the presence of uncertain yield and demand

Implications of stochastic demand and manufacturers’ operational mode on retailer's mixed bundling strategy and its complexity analysis

Study the complexity and control of the recycling-supply chain of China's color TVs market based on the government subsidy

The Stackelberg Dynamic Game Model for a multi-channel supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and two retailers has been analyzed in this research as manufacturer provides a single product to traditional retailer, online retailer and direct channel. The complexity of the multi-channel system of such is therefore analyzed under the aid of the methods including stability domain, bifurcation diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent, attractor, and time series. The results indicate that a great adjustment of supply order quantity in direct channels, retailer's order quantity, consumers’ channel preference, and sales effort will cause the system to lose stability and trap into complexity. On condition that customer didn't prefer the channel, the speed to adjust the order quantity would influence less on the system. Otherwise, when consumers’ channel preference too strong, the players on supply chain players would not see a profit increase, no matter how hard they'd improved their sales effort. And, so will it exhibit such a meagre influence on the profits of the whole supply players chain. During the period when sales efforts being adjusted, retailers, as the rule followers, will be confronted by more limitations than the rule maker the manufacturer. Then, to further analyze, parameters adjustment control method is utilized to control the chaos of the multi-channel supply chain. Furthermore, to investigate the influence of the delay decision on the stability domain and the profits. The research findings of this study can provide a great reference for managers and decision-making process in their supply chain management.

Lei Xie

Papers

The comparison and complex analysis on dual-channel supply chain under different channel power structures and uncertain demand

Supply chain coordination in the presence of uncertain yield and demand

Implications of stochastic demand and manufacturers’ operational mode on retailer's mixed bundling strategy and its complexity analysis

Study the complexity and control of the recycling-supply chain of China's color TVs market based on the government subsidy

Coordination and control of multi-channel supply chain driven by consumers’ channel preference and sales effort