다중혈관 관상동맥 환자에서 y-문합을 이용하여 양쪽 내흉동맥만을 사용한 우회술의 조기 성적

[신간의 별자리x] 우리/미술, 그리고 ‘슬픔의 박물관’

Fractional Differential Equations

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

http://www.irrec.ifas.ufl.edu/IRSWS/History%20Publications/2/JTEMBHe2005.pdf

Trace elements in agroecosystems and impacts on the environment

The invention provides a method for determining the occurrence state of movable oil in a dense oil reservoir micro/nano pore throat system. The method comprises the following steps: (1) selecting a core sample; (2), setting an observation parameter of a field emission-environment scanning electron microscope, and observing a movable oil film in the rock sample; (3) determining the element content of the observed mobile oil film by an energy disperse spectroscopy, and if the carbon content is 50-90%, determining the observed movable oil film to be movable oil; and (4) expanding the peripheral area of the movable oil film, repeating the step (3), and if the carbon content is gradually reduced to below 30%, representing that the occurrence of the movable oil film is small, so as to determine the distribution range of the observed movable oil. By adopting the method disclosed by the invention, the difficulty that the movable oil is easy to volatilize and not easy to identify can be overcome, the problem that the resolution ratio in a conventional method cannot meet the requirements of crude oil observation in the micro/nano pore throat system is solved, and the occurrence state and the distribution range of the movable oil in the micro/nano pore throat can be accurately observed.

Method for determining occurrence state of movable oil in dense oil reservoir micro/nano pore throat system

Extraction of 2-chloroethanol from aqueous solutions by trioctylamine

In an island Microgrid (MG), energy storage system (ESS) is required to balance the power generation and load demand. Battery is the most commonly used energy storage device, but it has its longevity adversely affected by accumulated depth of discharge (DOD). This paper presents a cooperative control strategy for a battery-supercapacitor based hybrid ESS (HESS) for both improving the transient performance of MG bus voltage and reducing the battery loss. In this control strategy, the power generated by different devices in HESS are distributed as that battery is controlled to provide the balanced power in steady-state, while supercapacitor (SC) is controlled to generate transient and unbalanced power for a single phase load demand. Simulations are implemented in the PSCAD/EMTDC software environment, and the results show that the transient response of MG bus voltage has been improved under the unbalanced load disturbance. Simultaneously, the battery loss is reduced by the proposed control strategy with lower DOD, less internal power loss, and higher entire efficiency than the conventional control method for battery on the base of frequent charging and discharging conditions in MG applications.

Coordinated control for battery and supercapacitor in hybrid energy storage system in Microgrid

This paper presents a novel observer-based nonlinear controller for the coordinated control of generators and thyristor controlled series compensators (TCSCs) in multi-machine power systems. The observer-based nonlinear control is basically on the input/output feedback linearizing control of a nonlinear system but using output feedback and perturbation estimation. A robust sliding mode observer is introduced to estimate system states and a fictitious state which is introduced to represent the combinatorial effect of system uncertainties and nonlinearities. The successful estimation of states and perturbation allows the input/output linearization of the nonlinear system without requiring an accurate system model. This constitutes a real-time compensation against the perturbations. Therefore, it is able to de-couple the global system into subsystems, include the external dynamics of subsystems for local control and provide satisfactory control performance in coordination with other machines or controlled equipment. Simulations studies are undertaken in a three-machine power system to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed nonlinear controller. The simulation results show that the local controllers can coordinate each other to improve the power system stability.

Nonlinear coordinated control of multi-machine power systems

Multi-period optimal power flow (OPF) is a basic tool to achieve optimal operation of a power system with energy storages devices and renewable sources. A novel convex relaxation based decomposeition algorithm is proposed in this paper to solve the full AC multi-period OPF with energy storages and renewable sources. Based on alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), the original time-correlated non-convex optimization problem is decomposed into two subproblems. The first subproblem is non-convex and separable among different time slots. Moment relaxation can be constructed and solved for each time slot in parallel. The second subproblem is a convex quadratic program (QP) and separable among different buses, which can be solved in parallel by standard interior point (IPM) solver. Case study on a benchmark system demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

Lin Jiang

Papers

Method for determining occurrence state of movable oil in dense oil reservoir micro/nano pore throat system

Extraction of 2-chloroethanol from aqueous solutions by trioctylamine

Coordinated control for battery and supercapacitor in hybrid energy storage system in Microgrid

Nonlinear coordinated control of multi-machine power systems

Multi-period OPF with energy storages and renewable sources: A parallel moment approach