다중혈관 관상동맥 환자에서 y-문합을 이용하여 양쪽 내흉동맥만을 사용한 우회술의 조기 성적

[신간의 별자리x] 우리/미술, 그리고 ‘슬픔의 박물관’

Fractional Differential Equations

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

http://www.irrec.ifas.ufl.edu/IRSWS/History%20Publications/2/JTEMBHe2005.pdf

Trace elements in agroecosystems and impacts on the environment

Air quality indices and cleanroom ventilation equations, and their application in a cleanroom HVAC system, Part one: theoretical considerations

Developing distributed control systems requires tools that can deal with high complexity, integrating design information from multiple domains and allowing analysis of the overall design in terms of technical and commercial performance. Currently, no integrated multidisciplinary design tools exist which can do this. Thus, the ability to simulate and assess system performance and rapidly prototype systems is critical. The FLEXICON project aimed to solve these issues and for this a toolset for Marine, Automotive and Aerospace (MAA) applications was created. This paper presents a way to reduce the development process time in the production of a marine application using the MAA toolset and the concept of co-simulation adopted in the FLEXICON project by the University of Sheffield. A reduction of 30% in development was achieved for the Marine application. Information on these results was obtained during the Marine demonstrators activities.

http://www.wseas.us/e-library/conferences/2006cavtat/papers/529-118.pdf

FLEXICON development process with co-simulation for a marine application

Exploring the nonlinear partitioning mechanism of volatile organic contaminants between soil and soil vapor using machine learning.

This article examines the stability problem of systems with interval time-varying delays. In the derivation of Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional (LKF), non-convex higher-degree polynomials may arise with respect to interval time-varying delays, making it difficult to determine the negative definiteness of LKF’s derivative. This study was conducted to obtain stability conditions that can be described as linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). By considering the idea of matrix transition and introducing the delay-dependent augmented vector, a novel higher-degree polynomial inequality is proposed under the condition that the lower bound of the polynomial function variable is non-zero, which encompasses the existing lemmas as its special cases. Then, benefiting from this inequality, a stability criterion is derived in terms of LMIs. Finally, several typical examples are presented to verify the availability and strength of the stability condition.

A Sufficient Condition on Polynomial Inequalities and its Application to Interval Time-Varying Delay Systems

Since multi-energy microgrid (MEMG) can coordinate various resources to operate as a virtual power plant (VPP), it is an important way to maintain the stable and economic operation of the power systems and decrease the impact of intermittence of distributed energy resources (DERs). However, the potential of MEMG as a VPP has not been thoroughly explored since auxiliary service (AS) market is not fully open for MEMG at present. The relevant challenges include balancing conflict of interests among multiple energy entities, motivating users to adjust flexible loads, integrating multiple flexible resources in energy supply/demand sides and formulating specific policies, etc. To handle these tasks, an optimal operation strategy for MEMG participating in AS is proposed by considering Stackelberg game theory and integrated demand response (IDR). The feasibility of the proposed strategy is validated by a practical MEMG in Hunan, China. The results show that the economic benefits of energy entities are effectively raised and the peak-shaving AS is realized while user satisfaction is also maintained. This work would give reference to the constructor of future AS market to formulate polices about the operation modes and pricing schemes of MEMG. 

Lin Jiang

Papers

Air quality indices and cleanroom ventilation equations, and their application in a cleanroom HVAC system, Part one: theoretical considerations

FLEXICON development process with co-simulation for a marine application

Exploring the nonlinear partitioning mechanism of volatile organic contaminants between soil and soil vapor using machine learning.

A Sufficient Condition on Polynomial Inequalities and its Application to Interval Time-Varying Delay Systems

Optimal Operation Strategy for Multi-Energy Microgrid Participating in Auxiliary Service