In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

/pdf/the-colonial-origins-of-comparative-development-an-empirical-4a7vtfps9i.pdf

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned. Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur. An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

/pdf/this-time-is-different-eight-centuries-of-financial-folly-2nx8owhq9y.pdf

This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly

This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.

/pdf/deciphering-the-liquidity-and-credit-crunch-2007-08-3myt1ozynd.pdf

Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08

https://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/gender.pdf

Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance

We evaluate the impact of firm-level corporate governance provisions on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we distinguish between governance provisions that are set at the country-level and those that are adopted at the firm-level. We find that governance provisions adopted by firms beyond those imposed by regulations and common practices among firms in the country have a strong, positive effect on firm valuation. Our results indicate that, despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond what can be considered the norm in the country, and these improvements in corporate governance have a positive effect on firm valuation. These findings contribute to the current debate on the extent to which corporate governance reform can be left to the “invisible hand” of the market or requires government interference.

The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance

Systemic Financial Crises: Introduction and Overview

New Challenges for Regulatory Policy

We review the literature on resolving bank and corporate sector crises to identify government policies that affect the depth of a crisis and the ease and sustainability of recovery, and to analyze their fiscal cost. A consistent framework - including sufficient resources for loss-absorption and private agents facing the right framework of sticks and carrots - is the, although often missing key to successful bank and corporate restructuring. Sustainability of restructuring calls for deeper structural reforms, which often requires dealing with political economy factors up-front. Using data for 687 corporations from eight crisis countries, we find empirically that a package of specific resolution measures can help accelerate the recovery from a crisis. These policies, however, come with significant fiscal costs.

Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate Sector Crises: What Policies to Pursue?

/pdf/crisis-management-and-resolution-3jopwwjslo.pdf

Luc Laeven

Papers

The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance

Systemic Financial Crises: Introduction and Overview

New Challenges for Regulatory Policy

Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate Sector Crises: What Policies to Pursue?

Crisis Management and Resolution