In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

/pdf/the-colonial-origins-of-comparative-development-an-empirical-4a7vtfps9i.pdf

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned. Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur. An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

/pdf/this-time-is-different-eight-centuries-of-financial-folly-2nx8owhq9y.pdf

This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly

This paper summarizes and explains the main events of the liquidity and credit crunch in 2007-08. Starting with the trends leading up to the crisis, I explain how these events unfolded and how four different amplification mechanisms magnified losses in the mortgage market into large dislocations and turmoil in financial markets.

/pdf/deciphering-the-liquidity-and-credit-crunch-2007-08-3myt1ozynd.pdf

Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08

https://personal.lse.ac.uk/FERREIRD/gender.pdf

Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance

This paper links the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis to demand-side factors that contributed to the rapid expansion of the U.S. mortgage market. We show that denial rates were relatively lower in areas that experienced faster credit demand growth and that lenders in these high-growth areas attached less weight to applicants’ loan-to-income ratios. The results are robust to controlling for supply-side factors, including house price appreciation, mortgage securitization, and other economic fundamentals, and to several robustness tests controlling for endogeneity. The results are consistent with the notion that a relaxation of lending standards, triggered by an increased demand for loans, contributed to the boom and the ensuing crisis, together with other supply-side explanations. These findings shed new light on the relationship between credit booms and financial instability.

/pdf/credit-booms-and-lending-standards-evidence-from-the-4z30g88igi.pdf

Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market

We update the widely used banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) with new information on recent and ongoing crises, including updated information on policy responses and outcomes (i.e. fiscal costs, output losses, and increases in public debt). We also update our dating of sovereign debt and currency crises. The database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the period 1970-2011. The data show some striking differences in policy responses between advanced and emerging economies as well as many similarities between past and ongoing crises.

https://www.imf.org/-/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/_wp12163.ashx

Systemic Banking Crises Database; An Update

The financial crisis of 2007--2008 is rooted in a number of factors, some common to previous financial crises, others new. Analysis of post-crisis macroeconomic and financial sector performance for 58 advanced countries and emerging markets shows a differential impact of old and new factors. Factors common to other crises, like asset price bubbles and current account deficits, help to explain cross-country differences in the severity of real economic impacts. New factors, such as increased financial integration and dependence on wholesale funding, help to account for the amplification and global spread of the financial crisis. Our findings point to vulnerabilities to be monitored and areas of needed national and international reforms to reduce risk of future crises and cross-border spillovers. They also reinforce a (sad) state of knowledge: much of how crises start and spread remains unknown.

— Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan and Luc Laeven

Cross‐Country Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w10158/w10158.pdf

Luc Laeven

Papers

Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market

Systemic Banking Crises Database; An Update

Systemic Banking Crises Database; An Update

Cross‐Country Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis

Governance and Bank Valuation