Luc Laeven

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors estimate the cost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14 economies to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and their corporate governance structure and find that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the greatest risks and those with dispersed ownership engage in a relatively low level of risk taking.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms and identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand conditions.

TL;DR: This article provided a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013 and created a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks' balance sheets.

TL;DR: In this paper, a composite index of corporate governance quality, which measures the evolution from 1994 through 2003 in selected emerging and developed economies, was constructed, and the authors investigated its impact on aggregate and corporate growth and productivity.

TL;DR: Laeven and Woodruff as mentioned in this paper examined the extent to which the distribution of firm size is related to the quality of the legal system using data from Mexico and found that Mexican states with more effective legal systems have larger firms.