世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf

The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?

This paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital. It is shown that in the presence of credit markets' imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital, the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run, as there are multiple steady states. This paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per-capita output across countries. Furthermore, the paper shows that cross-country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed, among other factors, to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries.

/pdf/income-distribution-and-macroeconomics-1a56oblrfr.pdf

Income Distribution and Macroeconomics

We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

Intuition tells us that the scarcity of space on the earth's surface should be closely tied both to population growth and to economic growth. Population growth should make land more scarce by raising the demand for food and private space and by raising the supply of labor, a factor of production that must cooperate with land. Intuition says that economic growth should tend to do the same, all things considered. The demand for food, a prime land-using product, would be expanded little by a rise in per capita incomes, but the rent on land should be bid up somewhat by the growth of other inputs into production, such as skills and man-made equipment. Intuition also suggests that land scarity should in turn retard the growth of population and per capita incomes. If space, privacy, and food are expensive, children should seem relatively costly. At the same time, higher space rents should mean slower economic growth than would be experienced if man could manufacture extra land cheaply.

Land Scarcity and American Growth

What happened to the inequality of real income and wealth before, during, and after the Industrial Revolution? Just as the usual Industrial Revolution era (1750-1850) has been revised by historians of economic growth, so too the articles in this issue follow the lead of Van Zanden (1995) in opening up a new inequality history for earlier eras and other continents. Three of them offer new evidence on European wealth and income inequality movements in pre-industrial and industrial epochs. The fourth offers a new perspective on Latin American experience since the late nineteenth century, reporting a twentieth-century experience quite unlike the Great Leveling that Kuznets and others saw in Europe and the USA from World War 1 to the 1970s.

Inequality in the very long run: Malthus, Kuznets, and Ohlin

© 1996 by ?JA.E. Shcorpe, Inc. they may differ on the magnitude, politicians and scholars agree that serious economic costs arise from today's social spending, particularly progressive taxes and transfer programs. The expansion of tax-based social transfers, and indeed social spending in general, costs a significant part of a country's national product. ] Even worse, professionals guess that each dollar of transfer payments costs the rest of society not only that dollar but an additional $0.50 to $1.30. The most extravagant published guess puts the total cost at $2.49 for each dollar transferred.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/40721677

Does Social Spending Deter Economic Growth

American Fertility Patterns since the Civil War

Building what we call social tables, this paper quantifies the level and inequality of American incomes from 1774 to 1860. In 1774 the American colonies had average incomes exceeding those of the Mother Country, even when slave households are included in the aggregate. Between 1774 and 1790, this income advantage over Britain was lost, due to the severe dislocation caused by the fight for Independence. Then between 1790 and 1860 US income per capita grew even faster than previous scholars have estimated. We also find that the South was initially much richer than the North on the eve of Revolution, but then suffered a severe reversal of fortune, so that by 1840 its white population was already poorer than free Northerners. In terms of inequality, our estimates suggest that American colonists had much more equal incomes than did households in England and Wales around 1774. Indeed, New England and the Middle Colonies appear to have been more egalitarian than anywhere else in the measureable world. Income inequality rose dramatically between 1774 and 1860, especially in the South. The paper uses an open-source style, since our data processing is posted on http://gpih.ucdavis.edu (click on the folder "American incomes 1774-1870"). Detailed defense of the 1774 and 1800 benchmarks can be found in our previous NBER working paper (17211, July 2011), although the estimates reported here are revised. The 1860 estimates are completely new.

Peter H. Lindert

Papers

Land Scarcity and American Growth

Inequality in the very long run: Malthus, Kuznets, and Ohlin

Does Social Spending Deter Economic Growth

American Fertility Patterns since the Civil War

American Incomes 1774-1860