世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf

The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?

This paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital. It is shown that in the presence of credit markets' imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital, the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run, as there are multiple steady states. This paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per-capita output across countries. Furthermore, the paper shows that cross-country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed, among other factors, to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries.

/pdf/income-distribution-and-macroeconomics-1a56oblrfr.pdf

Income Distribution and Macroeconomics

We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

19 October 2002 draft VOICE AND GROWTH: WAS CHURCHILL RIGHT? Peter H. Lindert University of California - Davis ABSTRACT The debate over whether political democracy is the least bad regime, as Churchill once said, remains unresolved because history has been ignored or misread, and because recent statistical studies have not chosen the right tests. Using too little historical information, and mistaking formal democratic rules for true voice, has understated the gains from spreading political voice more equally. This paper draws on a deeper history, reinterpreting five key experiences to show how the institutional channels linking voice and growth are themselves evolving with the economy. Up to about the early nineteenth century, the key institutional link was property rights and contract enforcement. Since the early nineteenth century, the human-investment channel has assumed an ever-greater role. This trend will probably continue. A telltale sign of damage to growth from elite rule is the under-investment of public funds in egalitarian human capital, especially primary schooling, relative to historical norms for successful economies. On the afternoon of November 11th, 1947, the Opposition leader Winston Churchill gave the House of Commons, and posterity, his famous defense of democracy: No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters....” 1 In fact, Churchill was trying to block the advance of democracy on that November day. He was defending the power of the House of Lords to block measures advanced by a “Voice and Growth,” Page 1

/pdf/voice-and-growth-was-churchill-right-49p3am66ml.pdf

Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?

Three factors help to explain why school enrollments in the Northern United States were higher than those in the South and in most of Europe by 1850. One was affordability: the northern schools had lower direct costs relative to income. The second was the greater autonomy of local governments. The third was the greater diffusion of voting power among the citizenry in much of the North, especially in rural communities. The distribution of local political voice appears to be a robust predictor of tax support and enrollments, both within and between regions. Extra local voice raised tax support without crowding out private support for education.

The Uneven Rise of American Public Schools to 1850

Key currencies and gold, 1900-1913

An eclectic array of quantitative data sketches public and private poor relief in the century before 1880, and invites new interpretations Church and secular charity was meagre in the eighteenth century, and probably earlier While richer countries transferred a higher share of national income to the poor than did poorer countries, the trend in this share failed to march upward with income across the nineteenth century Some explanations are proposed for the differences between countries and the decline in poor relief's share of national income in England-Wales and the Low Countries before 1880 It may be that the newly franchised had stronger reasons to oppose tax-based relief than the elites who had voice at the start of the century Changes in voice partly explain the movements of English poor relief over time and space So do movements in the chances that the disenfranchised would exit from cooperating and supplying labour

Poor relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780–1880

List of Illustrations ix Preface xv 1 Persistent Debate, a New Approach, More Data, Rich Findings 1 2 Colonial Incomes on the Eve of the Revolution 13 3 When Did Colonial America Get Rich? 43 4 Losing the Lead: Th e Cost of Revolution and Independence 77 5 Unequal Economic Growth, 1800- 1860 96 6 The Civil War: Growth Lost, Freedom Gained, Inequality Maintained 142 7 Contending Forces: American Incomes across the Late Nineteenth Century 166 8 The Greatest Leveling of All Time 194 9 Rising Inequality Once More, since the 1970s 219 10 Inequality and Growth: History Lessons for the Future 242 Appendix A A Guide to the 1774 and 1800 Income Estimates 263 Appendix B Salaries, Payment in Kind, and Workdays 279 Appendix C Estimating Slaves' Retained Earnings, Colonial Times to 1860 287 Appendix D American versus British Prices, 1640- 1875 304 Appendix E A Guide to the 1860 Income Estimates, and Some Modifications for 1850 311 Appendix F A Guide to the 1870 Income Estimates 320 Appendix G Farm Operators' Incomes in 1870 327 Appendix H Sources and Notes to Tables and Figures in Main Text 349 References 369 Index 391

Peter H. Lindert

Papers

Voice and Growth: Was Churchill Right?

The Uneven Rise of American Public Schools to 1850

Key currencies and gold, 1900-1913

Poor relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780–1880

Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality since 1700