/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.

Game Theory and Economic Modelling

Review of real-time electricity markets for integrating Distributed Energy Resources and Demand Response

Here, Matthew Turk considers the tradeoffs and drawbacks between providing a full stack, versus components, when vertically integrating developments into scientific software.

Vertical Integration

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/18156.pdf

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: A game theory approach

In this paper we investigate the impact of firms' pricing policies upon entry and welfare under duopoly price competition and product differentiation. We consider a model where an incumbent serves two distinct and independent geographical markets and an entrant may enter in one of the markets. Our results show that discriminatory pricing may be either more, less or equally favorable to entry than uniform pricing. The welfare effect of banning price discrimination is also ambiguous. However, the case for banning price discrimination is much weaker than under monopoly. Interestingly, discriminatory pricing may yield higher welfare even when entry occurs only under uniform pricing.

/pdf/does-banning-price-discrimination-promote-entry-and-increase-sul626qb4w.pdf

Does banning price discrimination promote entry and increase welfare? a model of differentiated‐product duopoly with asymmetric markets

This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant offering a differentiated product. The most reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium is either the least-cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low-cost monopoly prices. This equilibrium may involve a downward distortion in the pre-entry prices of both markets. Our model has interesting implications for antitrust regulation as well as for international trade policy. First, predatory tests based on a single market are inadequate for a multimarket incumbent. Second, a lower price in a foreign market is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of entry deterrence in a foreign market.

/pdf/limit-pricing-under-third-degree-price-discrimination-28ejzhrx9l.pdf

Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination

The fight against money laundering has taken center stage in the global arena. The European Union (EU), in line with various international organizations, plays an active role in the fight against this crime and promotes anti money laundering directions to its member states. The statistics regarding Portugal (a member of the EU since 1986) indicate that it lags behind most of the EU members in terms of reporting of suspicions of money laundering. This paper adopts a game theory approach to study the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal, both with regard to the financial and the non financial sector of the economy. Additionally, the paper studies the impact of the increase of sanctions, as recommended by the 4th Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20th May of 2015, on that combat. The results show that the low probability of the institutions being caught (and fined) for not complying with their reporting duties, coupled with the low conviction rates for money laundering crimes, justifies the reduced number of suspicious transactions reported. The findings highlight that an increase of sanctions, on both financial and non financial institutions, would tend to augment the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal.

/pdf/portuguese-anti-money-laundering-policy-a-game-theory-5buup6uphq.pdf

Portuguese Anti-money Laundering Policy: a Game Theory Approach

India is one of the fastest growing economies and becoming a key player in the global business arena. The Indian economic landscape is dominated by family firms which range from small corner shops to global diversified conglomerates. A large majority of these firms are fast approaching the critical stage of succession. The way the challenge of executive succession is addressed is influenced by the cultural setting. The older generations are rooted in the traditional cultural norms whereas the younger generations are in closer contact with western values and more permeable to these. This paper uses a game theory approach to analyze the impact that culture has on successor selection in family firms, focusing on the younger generation’s cultural alignment with the underlining norms and values of the Indian society. The results emphasize that the younger generation’s cultural misalignment can jeopardize intergenerational succession and risk family harmony. The findings highlight the importance of promoting cultural congruence in the family firm.

http://repositorio.uportu.pt:8080/bitstream/11328/1825/1/Cultural%20dimension%20of%20Indian%20FF_SS_final.pdf

Sílvia Ferreira Jorge

Papers

Effects of sibling competition on family firm succession: A game theory approach

Does banning price discrimination promote entry and increase welfare? a model of differentiated‐product duopoly with asymmetric markets

Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination

Portuguese Anti-money Laundering Policy: a Game Theory Approach

Cultural dimension of Indian family firms: Impact on Successor Selection