Showing papers by "Steffen Huck published in 1999"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derived theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects, and found that some subjects imitate successful behaviour if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive.
Abstract: This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behaviour if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behaviour, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behaviour.
273 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing unfair offers is an evolutionarily successful strategy if players interact in small groups, which leads players to split the resource equally almost always.
242 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors report on an experiment designed to find out whether observed cascades are indeed due to rational Bayesian updating, but they find little support for rational updating and the simple heuristic "follow your own signal" does much better in explaining their data than Bayesian rationality.
Abstract: Recently, the theory of informational cascades has been tested in an experiment by Anderson and Holt (1997) who report that their data support the theory amazingly well. In this note we report on an experiment designed to find out whether observed cascades are indeed due to rational Bayesian updating. However, we find little support for rational updating. The simple heuristic "follow your own signal" does much better in explaining our data than Bayesian rationality.
88 citations
TL;DR: The authors investigated the question which features of a decision task lead subjects to deviate from maximizing expected monetary value (EV), and found that risk avoidance occurs, but not consistently over all tasks.
84 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied ultimatum offer games with incomplete information, where the proposer always learns the outcome of the chance move whereas the responder only knows the priors.
64 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly was studied and it was shown that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device, this process converges to a collusive outcome.
Abstract: In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
5 citations
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on a rule by which individuals evaluate the consequences of their behavior, a rule specifying how to value outcomes of interaction, and they focus on how preferences may be learned over time.
Abstract: Most economic models of learning study how individuals adapt behavior over time. These models differ mainly in the rules according to which individuals determine to act and these rules are usually assumed to be stable. But, in general, learning is far more complicated than that since individuals also learn on the level of rules. In the present study we introduce an approach to this kind of learning. We will focus on a rule by which individuals evaluate the consequences of their behavior, a rule specifying how to value outcomes of interaction. In economic terms such rules are usually called preferences and, in fact, we will focus on how preferences may be learned over time.
2 citations