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Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

Economics Of Discrimination

China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure. ( JEL O17, O18, O43, P21, P25, P26)

/pdf/the-fundamental-institutions-of-china-s-reforms-and-o9kbft6df0.pdf

The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

A substantial literature over the past thirty years has evaluated tradeoffs between money and fatality risks. These values in turn serve as estimates of the value of a statistical life. This article reviews more than 60 studies of mortality risk premiums from ten countries and approximately 40 studies that present estimates of injury risk premiums. This critical review examines a variety of econometric issues, the role of unionization in risk premiums, and the effects of age on the value of a statistical life. Our meta-analysis indicates an income elasticity of the value of a statistical life from about 0.5 to 0.6. The paper also presents a detailed discussion of policy applications of these value of a statistical life estimates and related issues, including risk-risk analysis.

/pdf/the-value-of-a-statistical-life-a-critical-review-of-market-4vq0tnp3xu.pdf

The value of a statistical life: A critical review of market estimates throughout the world

This paper applies the recently developed econometric methods of panel unit root tests and nonlinear mean reversion to investigate price convergence in China—the largest transitional economy in the world. We find that prices did converge to the law of one price in China for an overwhelming majority of goods and services, based on a large panel data set. The finding sheds light on the extent of the market economy in China, and casts doubt on Young's proposition that the economic reform has led to the fragmentation of Chinese domestic markets.

/pdf/the-law-of-one-price-evidence-from-the-transitional-economy-hsew0dfdbo.pdf

The law of one price: evidence from the transitional economy of china

https://cyberleninka.org/article/n/1188111.pdf

Does parental absence reduce cognitive achievements? Evidence from rural China

In initial cross-section estimates using data from the 1991–94 British Household Panel Study, the authors find that union members had lower overall job satisfaction than non-union members, and public sector workers had higher satisfaction than private sector workers. Controlling for individual worker effects (sorting) using panel methods confirms the lower satisfaction of union members, but eliminates the higher satisfaction of public sector workers. These results suggest that unions do not simply attract the dissatisfied, as previously suggested. By contrast, the greater satisfaction expressed by public sector workers seems largely a consequence of sorting, with those who are more easily satisfied being drawn to the public sector. Additional analysis of particular aspects of satisfaction, including satisfaction with pay, the work itself, and relations with the boss, generally supports these conclusions.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3270624.pdf

Worker Sorting and Job Satisfaction: The Case of Union and Government Jobs:

This article estimates the direct effect of performance pay schemes on job satisfaction for a representative sample of US workers. Both individual performance pay and profit sharing are routinely associated with higher satisfaction even as the level of pay and a long list of other determinants are held constant. This result holds in panel estimates designed to control for fixed effects. When individual performance pay is disaggregated into five specific schemes, all but one associate with higher satisfaction and piece rates associate with lower satisfaction. The role of gender is explored as an explanation for the results.

Performance Pay and Job Satisfaction

The Freeman–Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non‐union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under‐perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.

/pdf/worker-participation-and-firm-performance-evidence-from-4jnpzkmj2f.pdf

Xiangdong Wei

Papers

The law of one price: evidence from the transitional economy of china

Does parental absence reduce cognitive achievements? Evidence from rural China

Worker Sorting and Job Satisfaction: The Case of Union and Government Jobs:

Performance Pay and Job Satisfaction

Worker participation and firm performance : evidence from Germany and Britain