What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

We define higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. Researchers use many proxies for audit quality, with little guidance on choosing among them. We provide a framework for systematically evaluating their unique strengths and weaknesses. Because it is inextricably intertwined with financial reporting quality, audit quality also depends on firms’ innate characteristics and financial reporting systems. Our review of the models commonly used to disentangle these constructs suggests the need for better conceptual guidance. Finally, we urge more research on the role of auditor and client competency in driving audit quality.

A Review of Archival Auditing Research

https://www.dejongeaccountants.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1-s2.0-S0165410114000536-main.pdf

A review of archival auditing research

机构投资者作为证券市场中的重要力量,越来越受到理论界和实务界的关注。论文对宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院会计学教授布赖恩-布希（Brian Bushee）的论文＂The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior＂（机构投资者对企业短视研发投资行为的影响,以下简称Bushee（1998））进行评价并提出相关的建议和研究方向。

《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

While recent literature has documented that U.S. family firms differ markedly from their non-family counterparts, there is a paucity of evidence on how these firms differ in terms of their cost of capital or financial structure. In this paper, we show that family and non-family firms differ in their debt maturity and leverage ratios in a manner consistent with the higher expropriation potential of family firms. Moreover, while more transparency causes both family and non-family firms to increase the maturity structure of their debt and reduce leverage ratios, the effects are stronger for family firms.

/pdf/transparency-and-financing-choices-of-family-firms-29ddko8ucm.pdf

Transparency and Financing Choices of Family Firms

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock-return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going-concern audit opinions (GCO).

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Financial Analyst Coverage and Corporate Social Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments

We examine the economic impact of analysts’ cash flow forecasts by looking at how external auditors respond to financial analysts’ issuance of cash flow forecasts. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find that financial analysts’ initiation of cash flow forecasts leads to reduced auditor fees and audit report lags. Moreover, after cash flow forecast initiation, firms report fewer Section 404(b) internal control weakness disclosures. These findings suggest that cash flow forecasts constrain earnings manipulation and improve management accounting behavior, thereby reducing inherent and control risk and strengthening firms’ internal control over financial reporting

Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts, Audit Effort, and Audit Opinions on Internal Control

While firm-initiated compensation recovery (or clawback) provisions are gaining popularity and the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act seeks to make the clawback of erroneously awarded compensation mandatory for all listed companies, little is known about their effectiveness. We find that the incidence of accounting restatements declines after firms initiate such provisions. In addition, we show that investors and auditors view such provisions as associated with increased accounting quality and lower audit risk. Specifically, we find that firms’ earnings response coefficients increase after the adoption of clawback provisions. Further, for firms that adopt clawbacks, auditors are less likely to report material internal control weaknesses, charge lower audit fees, and issue audit reports with a shorter lag.

/pdf/the-effects-of-firm-initiated-clawback-provisions-on-4ibfcc2qfi.pdf

Yangxin Yu

Papers

Transparency and Financing Choices of Family Firms

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Financial Analyst Coverage and Corporate Social Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments

Analysts' Cash Flow Forecasts, Audit Effort, and Audit Opinions on Internal Control

The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior