Institution
CEMFI
About: CEMFI is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Unemployment & Estimator. The organization has 71 authors who have published 499 publications receiving 46553 citations. The organization is also known as: Center for Monetary and Financial Studies.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: This article found that most differences in unemployment dynamics arise from differences in responses to shocks, and that the US labour market is quicker to adjust than the European Community, which implies that EEC economies might be dynamically "sclerotic" even if the size of the steady-state labour market flows give the impression that European labour markets are quite active.
64 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the distribution of any portfolio whose components jointly follow a location-scale mixture of normals can be characterised solely by its mean, variance and skewness.
63 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement, and explain when and why the combination of some degree of entrenchment and a sizeable severance package is desirable.
Abstract: This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the CEO's compensation package and on the CEO's influence on the board of directors regarding his own replacement (i.e., entrenchment). We explain when and why the combination of some degree of entrenchment and a sizeable severance package is desirable. The analysis offers predictions about the correlation between entrenchment, severance pay, and incentive compensation.
62 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, where banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms, and decide their exposure to systemic shocks by trading off risk shifting gains with the value of preserving their capital after a systemic shock.
Abstract: We analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model. Banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms. Banks are owned by risk-neutral bankers who provide the equity needed to comply with capital requirements. Bankers decide their (unobservable) exposure to systemic shocks by trading off risk-shifting gains with the value of preserving their capital after a systemic shock. Capital requirements reduce credit and output in
62 citations
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TL;DR: In the context of medieval Venice circa 800-1600, a small group of particularly wealthy merchants blocked political and economic competition: they made parliamentary participation hereditary and erected barriers to participation in the most lucrative aspects of long-distance trade as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: International trade can have profound effects on domestic institutions. We examine this proposition in the context of medieval Venice circa 800–1600. Early on, the growth of long-distance trade enriched a broad group of merchants who used their newfound economic muscle to push for constraints on the executive, that is, for the end of a de facto hereditary Doge in 1032 and the establishment of a parliament in 1172. The merchants also pushed for remarkably modern innovations in contracting institutions that facilitated longdistance trade, for example, the colleganza. However, starting in 1297, a small group of particularly wealthy merchants blocked political and economic competition: they made parliamentary participation hereditary and erected barriers to participation in the most lucrative aspects of long-distance trade. Over the next two centuries this led to a fundamental societal shift away from political openness, economic competition, and social mobility and toward political closure, extreme inequality, and social stratification. We document this oligarchization using a unique database on the names of 8,178 parliamentarians and their families’ use of the colleganza in the periods immediately before and after 1297. We then link these families to 6,959 marriages during 1400–1599 to document the use of marriage alliances to monopolize the galley trade. Monopolization led to the rise of extreme inequality, with those who were powerful before 1297 emerging as the undisputed winners. JEL Codes: D02, F10, N43.
62 citations
Authors
Showing all 71 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Juan J. Dolado | 53 | 240 | 19084 |
Luis Servén | 52 | 182 | 10163 |
Diego Puga | 47 | 101 | 17073 |
Javier Suarez | 37 | 115 | 5501 |
Manuel Arellano | 36 | 85 | 45041 |
Samuel Bentolila | 32 | 85 | 7037 |
David Dorn | 31 | 60 | 9395 |
Enrique Moral-Benito | 30 | 113 | 2701 |
Rafael Repullo | 30 | 90 | 6363 |
Marco Becht | 29 | 72 | 4851 |
Nezih Guner | 29 | 112 | 3416 |
Enrique Sentana | 26 | 53 | 4156 |
Claudio Michelacci | 24 | 68 | 2752 |
Jorge Padilla | 24 | 90 | 2294 |
Gabriele Fiorentini | 22 | 73 | 1506 |