Showing papers in "American Political Science Review in 2005"

Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina

Abstract: Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call this accountability. I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.

Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics

Abstract: Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.

Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research

Abstract: Despite repeated calls for the use of “mixed methods” in comparative analysis, political scientists have few systematic guides for carrying out such work. This paper details a unified approach which joins intensive case-study analysis with statistical analysis. Not only are the advantages of each approach combined, but also there is a synergistic value to the nested research design: for example, statistical analyses can guide case selection for in-depth research, provide direction for more focused case studies and comparisons, and be used to provide additional tests of hypotheses generated from small-N research. Small-N analyses can be used to assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables, to generate theoretical insights from outlier and other cases, and to develop better measurement strategies. This integrated strategy improves the prospects of making valid causal inferences in cross-national and other forms of comparative research by drawing on the distinct strengths of two important approaches.

Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success

Abstract: What accounts for variation in the electoral success of niche parties? Although institutional and sociological explanations of single-issue party strength have been dominant, they tend to remove parties from the analysis. In this article, I argue that the behavior of mainstream parties influences the electoral fortunes of the new, niche party actors. In contrast to standard spatial theories, my theory recognizes that party tactics work by altering the salience and ownership of issues for political competition, not just party issue positions. It follows that niche party support can be shaped by both proximal and non-proximal competitors. Analysis of green and radical right party vote in 17 Western European countries from 1970 to 2000 confirms that mainstream party strategies matter; the modified spatial theory accounts for the failure and success of niche parties across countries and over time better than institutional, sociological, and even standard spatial explanations.

Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted

Abstract: Why do people think and act politically in the manner they do? Despite the foundational nature of this question, answers are unfortunately incomplete and unnecessarily tentative, largely because political scientists do not take seriously the possibility of nonenvironmental influences. The suggestion that people could be born with political predispositions strikes many as far-fetched, odd, even perverse. However, researchers in other disciplines—‐ notably behavioral genetics—‐have uncovered a substantial heritable component for many social attitudes and behaviors and it seems unlikely that political attitudes and behaviors are completely immune from such forces. In this article, we combine relevant findings in behavioral genetics with our own analysis of data on a large sample of twins to test the hypothesis that, contrary to the assumptions embedded in political science research, political attitudes have genetic as well as environmental causes. 1

The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust

Abstract: Does incivility in political discourse have adverse effects on public regard for politics? If so, why? In this study we present a theory suggesting that when viewers are exposed to televised political disagreement, it often violates well-established face-to-face social norms for the polite expression of opposing views. As a result, incivility in public discourse adversely affects trust in government. Drawing on three laboratory experiments, we find that televised presentations of political differences of opinion do not, in and of themselves, harm attitudes toward politics and politicians. However, political trust is adversely affected by levels of incivility in these exchanges. Our findings suggest that the format of much political television effectively promotes viewer interest, but at the expense of political trust.

Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties

Abstract: In much of the political economy literature, social democratic governments are assumed to defend the interests of labor The main thrust of this article is that labor is divided into those with secure employment (insiders) and those without (outsiders) I argue that the goals of social democratic parties are often best served by pursuing policies that benefit insiders while ignoring the interests of outsiders I analyze Eurobarometer data and annual macrodata from 16 OECD countries from 1973 to 1995 I explore the question of whether strategies prevalent in the golden age of social democracy have been neglected and Left parties have abandoned the goal of providing equality and security to the most vulnerable sectors of the labor market By combining research on political economy, institutions, and political behavior, my analysis demonstrates that insider–outsider politics are fundamental to a fuller explanation of government partisanship, policy-making, and social democracy since the 1970s

A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective

Abstract: Both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. In this article, I propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as a process, (2) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporates policy feedback effects. I argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure this evolution in the four largest Latin American countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (Colombia and Argentina). I show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.

Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance

Abstract: Much recent research has found that states generally comply with the treaties they sign. The implications of this finding, however, are unclear: do states comply because the legal commitment compels them to do so, or because of the conditions that led them to sign? Drawing from previous research in this Review on Article VIII of the IMF Treaty (Simmons 2000a), I examine the problem of selection bias in the study of treaty compliance. To understand how and whether international legal commitments affect state behavior, one must control for all sources of selection into the treaty—including those that are not directly observable. I develop a statistical method that controls for such sources of selection and find considerable evidence that the unobservable conditions that lead states to make the legal commitment to Article VIII have a notable impact on their propensity to engage in compliant behavior. The results suggest that the international legal commitment has little constraining power independent of the factors that lead states to sign.

Racial orders in American political development

Abstract: American political science has long struggled to deal adequately with issues of race. Many studies inaccurately treat their topics as unrelated to race. Many studies of racial issues lack clear theoretical accounts of the relationships of race and politics. Drawing on arguments in the American political development literature, this essay argues for analyzing race, and American politics more broadly, in terms of two evolving, competing “racial institutional orders”: a “white supremacist” order and an “egalitarian transformative” order. This conceptual framework can synthesize and unify many arguments about race and politics that political scientists have advanced, and it can also serve to highlight the role of race in political developments that leading scholars have analyzed without attention to race. The argument here suggests that no analysis of American politics is likely to be adequate unless the impact of these racial orders is explicitly considered or their disregard explained.

When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections

Abstract: This work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way institutions convert votes to policy into their choices. Since policy is often the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining and thus votes are watered down by power-sharing, voters often compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions differ from (and are often more extreme than) their own. I use this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between proximity and directional theories of voting, showing that voters prefer parties whose positions differ from their own views insofar as these parties pull policy in a desired direction. Utilizing data from four parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design, I test my theory and show how institutional context affects voter behavior.

Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy

Abstract: Research in international relations has identified a variety of actors who appear to influence U.S. foreign policy, including experts and “epistemic communities,” organized interests (especially business and labor), and ordinary citizens or “public opinion.” This research, however, has often focused on a single factor at a time, rather than systematically testing the relative importance of alternative possible influences. Using extensive survey data gathered over three decades we conduct a comparative test, attempting to account for the expressed foreign policy preferences of policy makers by means of the preferences of the general public and those of several distinct sets of elites. The results of cross-sectional and time-lagged analyses suggest that U.S. foreign policy is most heavily and consistently influenced by internationally oriented business leaders, followed by experts (who, however, may themselves be influenced by business). Labor appears to have significant but smaller impacts. The general public seems to have considerably less effect, except under particular conditions. These results generally hold over several different analytical models (including two-observation time series) and different clusters of issues (economic, military, and diplomatic), with some variations across different institutional settings (the U.S. House, Senate, and executive branch).

Contracting around International Uncertainty

Abstract: International cooperation is plagued by uncertainty. Although states negotiate the best agreements possible using available information, unpredictable things happen after agreements are signed that are beyond states' control. States may not even commit themselves to an agreement if they anticipate that circumstances will alter their expected benefits. Duration provisions can insure states in this context. Specifically, the use of finite duration depends positively on the degree of uncertainty and states' relative risk aversion and negatively on the cost. These formally derived hypotheses strongly survive a test with data on a random sample of agreements across all four of the major issue areas in international relations. Not only do the results, highlighting evidence on multiple kinds of flexibility provisions, strongly suggest that the design of international agreements is systematic and sophisticated; but also they call attention to common ground among various subfields of political science and law.

To Trust an Adversary: Integrating Rational and Psychological Models of Collaborative Policymaking

Abstract: How can interpersonal trust be cultivated among policy elites engaged in long-term face-to-face negotiations? This article seeks to identify the precursors of interpersonal trust in high-stakes disputes where opposing sides have long histories of animosity and differ on fundamental values and perceptions. What are the beliefs and personal circumstances that predispose one policy actor to trust another? What are the institutional arrangements that foster trust during protracted multiparty policy deliberations? How can policymakers break the vicious cycle of distrust and noncooperative behavior and initiate a “virtuous cycle” of trust and cooperation (Putnam 2000)? Understanding how policy elites build mutually trusting relationships is crucial in several contexts, with a unifying theme being that all politics is personal. Resolving conflicts through political means usually boils down to cooperation among two or more individual persons who, though they are political adversaries, must eventually achieve a rough consensus on disputes over policy or procedure. These face-to-face negotiations can last many months or years, such that personal relationships are likely to evolve over the course of negotiations, and can have a major influence on whether

The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods

Abstract: Serious researchers in political science are finally beginning to take international legal agreements as worthy of sustained and rigorous analysis. Within the last several years, a growing group of scholars is making progress toward understanding the extent to which international law—‐and most specifically, the highly public and legal form of commitment represented in treaties—‐can actually shape the decisions governments make as well as broader outcomes of normative concern. The theory these studies draw on is becoming more refined: increasingly scholars are willing to analyze international legal agreements as a specific kind of commitment device. Treaties are the mostformal“language”governmentshavetofocusthe expectations of individuals, firms, and other states that they seriously intend to keep their word in a particular policy area. Treaties enhance the reputational effects thatmayinhereingeneralpolicydeclarations,precisely because they link performance to a broader principle that underlies the entire edifice of international law: pacta sunt servanda—‐treaties are to be observed. By choosing to become a treaty party, governments ante up a greater reputational stake than would otherwise be the case. Estimatingtreatyeffectsisnosimplething,however. Despite terrific progress in supplementing case studies with quantitative models that test the generality of the claim that legal commitments matter, the evidentiary hurdles and methodological issues are highly contested. The most common worry is that treaty effects are merely reflections of underlying state preferences

Using Geographic Information Systems to Study Interstate Competition

Abstract: Scholars have proposed two distinct explanations for why policies diffuse across American states: (1) policymakers learn by observing the experiences of nearby states, and (2) states seek a competitive economic advantage over other states. The most common empirical approach for studying interstate influence is modeling an indicator of a state's policy choice as a function of its neighbors' policies, with each neighbor weighted equally. This can appropriately specify one form of learning model, but it does not adequately test for interstate competition: when a policy diffuses due to competition, states' responses to other states vary depending on the size and location of specific populations. We illustrate with two substantive applications how geographic information systems (GIS) can be used to test for interstate competition. We find that lottery adoptions diffuse due to competition—rather than to learning—but find no evidence of competition in state choices about welfare benefits. Our empirical approach can also be applied to competition among nations and local jurisdictions.

“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court

Abstract: The exercise of constitutional review by an independent and active judiciary is commonly regarded as against the interest of current government officials, who presumably prefer to exercise power without interference. In this article, I advance an “overcoming obstructions” account of why judicial review might be supported by existing power holders. When current elected officials are obstructed from fully implementing their own policy agenda, they may favor the active exercise of constitutional review by a sympathetic judiciary to overcome those obstructions and disrupt the status quo. This provides an explanation for why current officeholders might tolerate an activist judiciary. This dynamic is illustrated with case studies from American constitutional history addressing obstructions associated with federalism, entrenched interests, and fragmented and cross-pressured political coalitions.

Policy and the Dynamics of Political Competition

Abstract: Informed discussions of political competition— –by journalists, pundits, novelists, country specialists, or indeed practicing politicians— –usually describe a system in perpetual motion. Perpetual motion is seen as a normal state of affairs, not a manifestation of chaotic instability. And it is usually seen as having an endogenous dynamic; what the actors do at cycle c of the political process feeds back to affect the entire process at cycle c + 1. These informed discussions thus see politics as a complex dynamic system evolving under its own steam, a system unlikely to reach steady state. In stark contrast, mainstream models of political competition are usually static, with key model parameters and rules of interaction fixed exogenously. Although static models do not necessarily imply equilibrium, almost invariably the core intellectual approach is to specify a model and solve for equilibrium. Authors of such models are typically driven by what Cederman describes as a “metaphysical conviction that equilibria are always ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered,” a conviction that can “blind the analyst to the possibility of adjustments never settling” (Cederman, 1997, 34– 35). But if common sense tells us party competition is a complex dynamic process, then it also tells us party competition may never achieve equilibrium. This paper addresses the striking disjuncture between the static nature of most formal models of party competition and the dynamic way in which informed observers, who hardly ever talk about politics in terms of equilibrium, think about the political process. While many theorists would willingly concede in general terms that real political competition is a complex dynamic process, the hard question concerns how to model this in a way that is both theoretically tractable and substantively plausible. In what follows, I set out

Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace

Abstract: Sebastian Rosato (2003) finds the logic of the “democratic peace” flawed in his “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” and he cites my work and other studies as examples of the flawed logic. Some of the logic he describes is flawed, and it may characterize some of the literature in the wide field of “democratic peace,” but it is not the logic underlying the core of liberal peace theory. Indeed, the persuasive core of the logic underlying the theory of liberal democratic peace is missing from Rosato's account. Republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence are the three pillars of the explanation. The logic underlying the peace among liberal states rests on a simple and straightforward proposition that connects those three causal mechanisms as they operate together and only together, and not separately as Sebastian Rosato claims.

Ambivalence, information, and electoral choice

Abstract: Conventional wisdom views voter choice in House elections as preordained by party identification, incumbency, and perceptions of national conditions. In an analysis of voter behavior in House elections between 1990 and 2000, we find instead that voters are quite heterogeneous. Voters who hold ambivalent partisan attitudes, who typically constitute 30% of the electorate, reduce their reliance on party identification; this effect is entirely independent of the strength of identification. Individuals holding ambivalent partisan attitudes that both lack political knowledge and are presented with little campaign stimulus are more likely to engage in economic voting. Individuals holding ambivalent partisan attitudes that either are knowledgeable about politics or are presented with stimulating campaigns are more likely to engage in ideological voting. Thus, campaign competition and national partisan competition each play a role in assuring that ordinary voters may participate meaningfully in the political process.

Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review

Abstract: Do legislatures in parliamentary democracies play a significant role in policymaking? If so, arealllegislativeactorsequallyabletoexercise policy influence? In what circumstances will those who can affect legislative outcomes actually choose to do so? These questions are central to an understanding of representative government in parliamentary democracies. In parliamentary systems, legislatures are typically the only political institutions at the national level thataredirectlyelectedby—‐andthusaccountableto—‐ citizens. Furthermore, with only rare exceptions, parliaments must approve all major policy initiatives. And yet, scholars know remarkably little about the extent to which legislatures in parliamentary systems matter. Instead, political scientists with an interest in policymaking in these systems have placed primary emphasis on understanding politics at the government (cabinet) level (see Gamm and Huber 2002, 323). In one sense,thisfocusongovernmentsisnatural.Thegovernment appears dominant in the policymaking process, at least with respect to the introduction of legislation (Andeweg and Nijzink 1995, 171). Moreover, since electionsusuallydonotyieldalegislativemajorityfora single party, political elites must engage in a process of complex bargaining that typically results in the formation of multiparty coalitions, which must then strive to retain the confidence of a majority of legislators for the remainder of the parliamentary term. This combination of facts readily suggests that to understand policymakinginparliamentarysystems,onemustunderstand aboveallelsetheformationanddissolutionofcoalition governments. Thus, over the last four decades, increasingly sophisticated theoretical and empirical accounts of the “birth” and “death” of coalitions have come to dominate the literature on parliamentary politics.

Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry

Abstract: Why are some democratic governments more successful than others? What impact do various political institutions have on the quality of governance? This paper develops and tests a new theory of democratic governance. This theory, which we label centripetalism, stands in contrast to the dominant paradigm of decentralism. The centripetal theory of governance argues that democratic institutions work best when they are able to reconcile the twin goals of centralized authority and broad inclusion. At the constitutional level, our theory argues that unitary, parliamentary, and list-PR systems (as opposed to decentralized federal, presidential, and nonproportional ones) help promote both authority and inclusion, and therefore better governance outcomes. We test the theory by examining the impact of centripetalism on eight indicators of governance that range across the areas of state capacity, economic policy and performance, and human development. Results are consistent with the theory and robust to a variety of specifications.

Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention

Abstract: In this paper, I develop a career concerns model of government policy choice within a dynamic optimal stopping framework to predict the degree of surfing (opportunistic timing) and manipulation (politically motivated economic intervention) under alternate institutional structures and voter characteristics. Among other results, I find that the likelihood of opportunistic elections rises with exogenous economic performance, with longer maximum term lengths, with future electoral uncertainty, and with economic volatility but diminishes in the value of office-holding; manipulation increases with the maximum term length and with the value of office-holding but decreases with exogenous economic performance and with economic volatility. The model suggests that single-party governments should be highly opportunistic in calling elections and that countries that allow opportunistic election timing should experience less economically distortionary political intervention than their fixed-timing counterparts.

Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure

Abstract: The increased “legalization” embodied in the revised Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shown to be an institutional innovation that increases the opportunities for states to temporarily suspend their obligations in periods of unexpected, but heightened, domestic political pressure for protection. This increased flexibility in the system reduces per-period cooperation among states but also reduces the possibility that the regime may break down entirely. There is shown to be a trade-off between rigidity and stability in international institutional design in the face of unforeseen, but occasionally intense, domestic political pressure. In a model with a WTO that serves both an informational and adjudicatory role, it is established that agreements with DSPs are self-enforcing, are more stable, and are more acceptable to a wider variety of countries than agreements without DSPs. Evidence drawn from data on preferential trading agreements supports the key hypotheses.

Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy

Abstract: When corporations and their employees spend money in the political arena, to what extent are they purchasing special treatment? Complaints about the deleterious effects of corporate money in politics are ubiquitous in American political discourse. However, in order to pinpoint the place of these expenditures in American democracy, and to appreciate fully the consequences of various reform proposals,itiscriticaltoidentifytheprecisemechanism through which any preferential treatment might occur. In this spirit, scholars have suggested that corporations make political expenditures because they hope to influence government behavior, through either explicit quid pro quos with legislators for constituency service or favorable votes (Baron 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994, 2001), improved access to legislators (Hall and Wayman 1990; Langbein 1986), or enhancement of the electoral prospects of sympathetic incumbents(PooleandRomer1985).Empiricalevidenceverifying a definitive relationship between expenditures and specific policy change, unfortunately, has proven elusive. In a recent review essay, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003, 116) conclude, “Contributions explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the U.S. Congress.” They suggest thatcontributionsarebetterthoughtofasconsumption goods that fulfill a desire to participate in politics than as investment in a political marketplace.

Do Get-Out-The-Vote Calls Reduce Turnout? The Importance of Statistical Methods for Field Experiments

Abstract: In their landmark study of a field experiment, Gerber and Green (2000) found that get-out-the-vote calls reduce turnout by five percentage points. In this article, I introduce statistical methods that can uncover discrepancies between experimental design and actual implementation. The application of this methodology shows that Gerber and Green’s negative finding is caused by inadvertent deviations from their stated experimental protocol. The initial discovery led to revisions of the original data by the authors, and retraction of the numerical results in their article. Analysis of their revised data, however, reveals new systematic patterns of implementation errors. Indeed, treatment assignments of the revised data appear to be even less randomized than before their corrections. To adjust for these problems, I employ a more appropriate statistical method, and demonstrate that telephone canvassing increases turnout by five percentage points. This article demonstrates how statistical methods can find and correct complications of field experiments.

Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity

Abstract: Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: the recognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and the dialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments to collective identity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the particularist thesis's falsehood. The ideology of indivisible state sovereignty makes sovereignty as such appear particularistic by fusing “internal” with “external” sovereignty; nationalism imagines national identity as particularistic by linking it to sovereignty. But the concatenation of internal sovereignty, external sovereignty, and nation is contingent. Schmitt's thesis that “the political” presupposes an other conflates internal and external sovereignty, while Mouffe's neo-Schmittianism conflates difference (Derrida) with alterity. A shared global identity may face many obstacles, but metaphysical impossibility and conceptual confusion are not among them.

Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia

Abstract: The willingness to trust strangers has been associated with a variety of public benefits, from greater civic-mindedness and more honest government to higher rates of economic growth, and more. But a growing body of research finds that such generalized trust is far more common in ethnically homogeneous than in more diverse societies. Ethnic difference is believed to breed more particularistic, ingroup ties, thus undermining both generalized and cross-ethnic trust. We argue that this image is too narrow, and we propose a broader model to identify the factors that give rise to cross-ethnic trust. Using data from two minority regions of Russia, we find considerable support for the model. We also find that high ingroup or particularistic trust is no barrier to faith in another ethnic group.

Military coercion in interstate crises

Abstract: In an international crisis, states make demands backed by threats to use force. Although these threats can be explicit in diplomatic communications, they will not generally carry much weight unless substantiated by some show of force— –military measures designed to convey the commitment to resort to arms if one’s demands are not satisfactorily met. To have an impact, this commitment must be credible; it must be in one’s interest to carry out the threat if the opponent refuses to comply. In an environment where states possess private information about their valuations, capabilities, or costs, credibility can be established by actions that a state unwilling to fight would not want, or would not dare, to take. Military moves, such as arms buildups, troop mobilizations, and deployments to the potential zone of operations, can alter incentives in a crisis by changing one’s expected payoff from the use of force. These are tacit bargaining moves that can restructure the strategic context thereby creating and possibly signaling one’s commitments while undermining those of the opponent. How can states use the military instrument to establish commitments, and how does the nature of the instrument affect their ability to communicate them credibly to their adversaries? There are two distinct mechanisms for credible signaling. In economic models, information can be transmitted reliably by sinking costs— –actors burn money to reveal that they value the disputed issue even more. In contrast, theories of interstate crisis bargaining usually rely on choices that increase the difference between backing down and fighting— –actors tie their hands by running higher risks of war to reveal their resolve. The first mechanism involves costs that actors pay regardless of outcome, and the second involves costs that actors pay only if they fail to carry out some threat or promise.

An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation

Abstract: This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.