Journal ArticleDOI
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court
TLDR
In this paper, an "overcoming obstructions" account of why judicial review might be supported by existing power holders is presented. But it is not clear why current officeholders might tolerate an activist judiciary.Abstract:
The exercise of constitutional review by an independent and active judiciary is commonly regarded as against the interest of current government officials, who presumably prefer to exercise power without interference. In this article, I advance an “overcoming obstructions” account of why judicial review might be supported by existing power holders. When current elected officials are obstructed from fully implementing their own policy agenda, they may favor the active exercise of constitutional review by a sympathetic judiciary to overcome those obstructions and disrupt the status quo. This provides an explanation for why current officeholders might tolerate an activist judiciary. This dynamic is illustrated with case studies from American constitutional history addressing obstructions associated with federalism, entrenched interests, and fragmented and cross-pressured political coalitions.read more
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The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt
TL;DR: The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) as discussed by the authors was established by the Egyptian parliament in 1979 and has been used for the enforcement of law and democracy in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Journal ArticleDOI
Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how threats of noncompliance and legislative override influence decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and find that the preferences of member-state governments have a systematic and substantively important impact on ECJ decisions.
Posted Content
Political Instability: Its Effects on Financial Development, Its Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality
Mark J. Roe,Jordan I. Siegel +1 more
TL;DR: This article showed that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world, even when controlling for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of financial development.
Journal ArticleDOI
Political instability: Effects on financial development, roots in the severity of economic inequality
Mark J. Roe,Jordan I. Siegel +1 more
TL;DR: This paper showed that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world, even when controlling for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of financial development.
Posted Content
The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts
TL;DR: In recent years, the judicialization of politics worldwide has expanded its scope to encompass what we may term "mega-politics" -matters of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole polities.
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Journal ArticleDOI
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
TL;DR: The authors argue that Congress does not neglect its oversight responsibility, and that what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight over another form of police-patrol oversight.
Book
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: Cox and McCubbins as mentioned in this paper view the majority parties in the House as a species of "legislative cartel" and argue that the majority party has all the structural advantages.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
TL;DR: The authors argue that voters' tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains results from their negative bias, which leads politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, passing the buck and defection, that are different from those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities.
Book
The logic of congressional action
TL;DR: Arnab et al. as mentioned in this paper examined the influence of citizens' potential preferences, and argued that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems, and showed how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens.