Showing papers in "American Psychologist in 1986"

Motivational processes affecting learning.

Abstract: Motivational processes influence a child's acquisition, transfer, and use of knowledge and skills, yet educationally relevant conceptions of motivation have been elusive. Using recent research within the social-cognitive framework, Dweck describes adaptive and maladaptive motivational patterns and presents a research-based model of motivational processes. This model shows how the particular goals children pursue on cognitive tasks shape their reactions to success and failure and influence the quality of their cognitive performance. Dweck argues that this approach has important implications for practice and the design of interventions to change maladaptive motivational processes. She presents a compelling proposal for explaining motivational influences on gender differences in mathematics achievement and observes that empirically based interventions may prevent current achievement discrepancies.--The Editors Most research on effective learning and performance of cognitive tasks analyzes the particular cognitive skills required to succeed at those tasks. In contrast, the focus here is on motivational processes that affect success on cognitive tasks. That is, the focus is on psychological factors, other than ability, that determine how effectively the individual acquires and uses skills. It has long been known that factors other than ability influence whether children seek or avoid challenges, whether they persist or withdraw in the face of difficulty, and whether they use and develop their skills effectively. However, the components and bases of adaptive motivational patterns have been poorly understood. As a resuit, commonsense analyses have been limited and have not provided a basis for effective practices. Indeed, many \"commonsense\" beliefs have been called into question or seriously qualified by recent research--for example, the belief that large amounts of praise and success will establish, maintain, or reinstate adaptive patterns, or that \"brighter\" children have more adaptive patterns and thus are more likely to choose personally challenging tasks or to persist in the face of difficulty. In the past 10 to 15 years a dramatic change has taken place in the study of motivation. This change has resulted in a coherent, replicable, and educationally relevant body of findings--and in a clearer understanding of motivational phenomena. During this time, the emphasis has shifted to a social-cognitive approachwaway from external contingencies, on the one hand, and global, internal states on the other. It has shifted to an emphasis on cognitive mediators, that is, to how children construe the situation, interpret events in the situation, and process information about the situation. Although external contingencies and internal affective states are by no means ignored, they are seen as part of a process whose workings are best penetrated by focusing on organizing cognitive variables. Specifically, the social-cognitive approach has allowed us to (a) characterize adaptive and maladaptive patterns, (b) explain them in terms of specific underlying processes, and thus (c) begin to provide a rigorous conceptual and empirical basis for intervention and practice. Adaptive and Maladaptive Motivational Patterns The study of motivation deals with the causes of goaloriented activity (Atkinson, 1964; Beck, 1983; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Hull, 1943; Veroff, 1969). Achievement motivation involves a particular class of goals--those involving competence--and these goals appear to fall into two classes: (a) learning goals, in which individuals seek to increase their competence, to understand or master something new, and (b) performance goals, in which individuals seek to gain favorable judgments of their competence or avoid negative judgments of their competence (Dweck & Elliott, 1983; NichoUs, 1984; Nicholls & Dweck, 1979). l Adaptive motivational patterns are those that promote the establishment, maintenance, and attainment of personally challenging and personally valued achievement goals. Maladaptive patterns, then, are associated with a failure to establish reasonable, valued goals, to maintain effective striving toward those goals, or, ultimately, to attain valued goals that are potentially within one's reach. Research has clearly documented adaptive and maladaptive patterns of achievement behavior. The adaptive (\"mastery-oriented\") pattern is characterized by challenge seeking and high, effective persistence in the face of obstacles. Children displaying this pattern appear to enjoy exerting effort in the pursuit of task mastery. In contrast, the maladaptive (\"helpless\") pattern is characterized by challenge avoidance and low persistence in the face of difficulty. Children displaying this pattern tend to evidence negative affect (such as anxiety) and negative self-cogniCorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carol S. Dweck, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel, Champaign, IL 61820. l The word performance will be used in several ways, not only in connection with performance goals. It will also be used to refer to the child's task activity (performance of a task) and to the product of that activity (level of performance). The meaning should be clear from the context. 1040 October 1986 9 American Psychologist Copyrisht 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/86/$00.75 Vol. 41, No. 10, 1040-1048 Table 1 Achievement Goals and Achievement Behavior Confidence in Theory of intelligence Goal orientation present ability Behavior pattern Entity theory (Intelligence is fixed) Incremental theory (Intelligence is malleable) > Performance goal (Goal is to gain positive judgments/avoid negative judgments of competence) > Learning goal (Goal is to increase competence) If high ---> Mastery-oriented Seek challenge but High persistence If low ~ Helpless Avoid challenge Low persistence If high > Mastery-oriented ioOr ~ ' Seek challenge (that fosters learning) High persistence tions when they confront obstacles (e.g., Ames, 1984; C. Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973; Nicholls, 1975). Although children displaying the different patterns do not differ in intellectual ability, these patterns can have profound effects on cognitive performance. In experiments conducted in both laboratory and classroom settings, it has been shown that children with the maladaptive pattern are seriously hampered in the acquisition and display of cognitive skills when they meet obstacles. Children with the adaptive pattern, by contrast, seem undaunted or even seem to have their performance facilitated by the increased challenge. If not ability, then what are the bases of these patterns? Most recently, research has suggested that children's goals in achievement situations differentially foster the two patterns. That is, achievement situations afford a choice of goals, and the one the child preferentially adopts predicts the achievement pattern that child will display. Table 1 summarizes the conceptualization that is emerging from the research. BasieaUy, children's theories of intelligence appear to orient them toward different goals: Children who believe intelligence is a fixed trait tend to orient toward gaining favorable judgments of that trait (performance goals), whereas children who believe intelligence is a malleable quality tend to orient toward developing that quality (learning goals). The goals then appear to set up the different behavior patterns. 2 Learning and Performance Goals Contrasted How and why do the different goals foster the different patterns? How do they shape task choice and task pursuit to facilitate or impede cognitive performance? The research reviewed below indicates that with performance goals, the entire task choice and pursuit process is built around children's concerns about their ability level. In contrast, with learning goals the choice and pursuit processes involve a focus on progress and mastery through 2 See M. Bandura and Dweck (1985), Dweck and Elliott (1983), and Leggett (1985) for a more extensive treatment of children's theories of intelligence. The present article will focus on achievement goals and their allied behavior patterns. effort. Further, this research shows how a focus on ability judgments can result in a tendency to avoid and withdraw from challenge, whereas a focus on progress through effort creates a tendency to seek and be energized by challenge. Although relatively few studies as yet have explicitly induced and compared (or measured and compared) learning versus performance goals (see M. Bandura & Dweck, 1985; Elliott & Dweck, 1985; FarreU & Dweck, 1985; Leggett, 1985, 1986), many have manipulated the salience and value of performance goals, and hence the relative value of the two types of goals. This has been done, for example, by instituting a competitive versus individual reward structure (e.g., Ames, 1984; Ames, Ames, & Felker, 1977), by varying the alleged diagnosticity of the task vis vis important abilities (e.g., Nicholls, 1975), by introducing an audience or evaluator versus allowing the individual to perform privately or focusing his or her attention on the task (e.g., Brockner & Hulton, 1978; Carver & Scheier, 1981; E. Diener & SruU, 1979), and by presenting the task with \"test\" instructions versus \"game\" or neutral instructions (e.g., Entin & Raynor, 1973; Lekarczyk & Hill, 1969; McCoy, 1965; Sarason, 1972). Taken together, the results suggest that highlighting performance goals relative to learning goals can have the following effects on achievement behavior. Goals and Task Choice Appropriately challenging tasks are often the ones that are best for utilizing and increasing one's abilities. Recent research has shown that performance goals work against the pursuit of challenge by requiring that children's perceptions of their ability be high (and remain high) before the children will desire a challenging task (M. Bandura & D

Approach, avoidance, and coping with stress.

Abstract: The study of stress and coping points to two concepts central to an understanding of the response to trauma: approach and avoidance. This pair of concepts refers to two basic modes of coping with stress. Approach and avoidance are simply metaphors for cognitive and emotional activity that is oriented either toward or away from threat. An approach-avoidance model of coping is presented in the context of contemporary theoretical ap- proaches to coping. The research literature on coping ef- fectiveness, including evidence from our laboratory, is dis- cussed, and speculations are made about the implications for future research. The study of stress and coping has become quite popular in recent years, particularly in regard to traumatic life events. Although the area is broad and the coping process is complex, there is a striking coherence in much of the literature. This coherence is based on two concepts central to an understanding of coping with trauma: approach and avoidance. In its simplest form, this pair of concepts refers to two basic orientations toward stressful infor- mation, or two basic modes of coping with stress. Ap- proach and avoidance are shorthand terms for the cog- nitive and emotional activity that is oriented either toward or away from threat. In this article we will present the case for utilizing the concepts of approach and avoidance to provide a co- herent theoretical structure to our understanding of cop- ing with stress. Several different formulations of the ap- proach-avoidance dimension will be reviewed, followed by a brief review of the coping effectiveness literature. Several studies from our laboratory will be used to illus- trate the relationship between coping and outcome. Fi- nally, a general approach-avoidance model of coping will be presented, with suggestions for further research to cor- roborate or extend the theory. The study of coping with stress has been split into two areas: anticipation of future stressful events and re- covery from trauma. These areas have been kept re- markably distinct in both theory and research on coping. Although there are clearly important differences between the two cases, we have chosen not to emphasize this dis- tinction. For any given stress, anticipation and recovery are not always clearly separable; dealing with a trauma involves coming to terms with the event itself and with the threat of recurrence in the future. More important, Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Susan

A conception of adult development.

Abstract: Adult development is becoming an important field of study for psychology and other disciplines. Little has been done, however, to conceptualize the nature of adult development and to define the major issues in this field. The author summarizes his own formulations of life course, life cycle, life structure, and the adult development of the life structure in early and middle adulthood. He then discusses six major issues that must be dealt with by every structural approach to adult development: What are the alternative ways of defining a structural stage or period? What relative emphasis is given to the structures as compared to the transitional periods? How can we make best use of the distinction between hierarchical levels and seasons of development? Are there age-linked developmental periods in adulthood? What are the relative merits and limitations of various research methods? How can we bring together the developmental perspective and the socialization perspective? The study of adult development is, one might say, in its infancy. It has been taken seriously in the human sciences for only the past 30 years or so, largely under the impact of Erikson's (1950, 1958, 1969) germinal writings. Erikson's most obvious contribution was his theory of stages in ego development. What is less obvious is that his view of development is deeply grounded in his conceptions of the life cycle and the life course. Each ego stage has its primacy at a particular age level or segment of the life cycle, from infancy to old age. The sequence of age segments and ego stages thus provides a representation of the life cycle as a whole; the meaning of a stage is defined in part by its place in the total sequence. In addition, his developmental concepts arose out of his primary concern with the individual life course: the process of living, the idea of life history rather than case history, the use of biography rather than therapy or testing as his chief research method. Without abandoning the distinction between self (psyche, personality, inner world) and external world (society, culture, institutions, history), he gave first consideration to the life course--the engagement of self with world. Although a good deal has been learned since the 1950s about specific features of adult life, very little has been done to advance the general theory of adult development. At the same time, various fields of psychology (such as child development, gerontology, personality, social, clinical, and counseling psychology), as well as the social sciences and humanities, are becoming more aware that they need--and lack--an adult development perspective. Adult development is, in short, a significant problem for psychology as a discipline and an important link between psychology and other disciplines, including sociology, biology, and history. I have two primary aims here. First, I will present my conception of adulthood and of a developmental process within it. My intention is to explicate a theoretical position, not to prove it nor to argue for its superiority over others. The theory originated in my initial study of men's lives (Levinson, 1977, 1978). It has evolved over the last few years, particularly through my current research on women's lives (Levinson, in press). It is supported by a number of other studies (e.g., Gooden, 1980; Holt, 1980; Kellerman, 1975; Levinson, 1984; Stewart, 1976), but a great deal must yet be done to test and modify it. The theory includes the following elements: (a) The concepts of life course and life cycle, which provide an essential framework for the field of adult development; within this framework, studies of one process or age level can be connected to others, but without it, we have a miscellany of findings and no integrated domain of inquiry; (b) the concept of the individual life structure, which includes many aspects of personality and of the external world but is not identical with any of these and evolves in its own distinctive way; and (c) a conception of adult development--the evolution of the life structure in early and middle adulthood. Life structure development is different from, and should not be confused with, the development of personality, social roles, or other commonly studied processes. Second, I will discuss adult development as a field of study. I will consider six major issues that help to define what the field is about and what work must be done to establish it more securely. The list is not complete, but it provides a useful starting point. Reference will be made to the work of others, but the main goal is to clarify my own position. Let it be clear that my aim is not to give a comprehensive review of the work in this field nor to seek consensus among the disparate approaches. I hope that others will be stimulated to present contrasting views.

Performance models for antisocial boys.

Abstract: VioLit summary: OBJECTIVE: This article by Patterson tested and analyzed three structural equation models designed to examine antisocial behavior in children. METHODOLOGY: A quasi-experimental design was used for this study. The author conducted a literature review of material on antisocial behavior. In addition, the research utilized secondary data to test and analyze the study's models. FINDINGS/DISCUSSION: The research rested on three assumptions of antisocial children: aggression scores for children are stable; antisocial behavior covaries with peer rejection, academic problems, and low self-esteem; and parents of antisocial children lack effective family management skills. The author hypothesized that poor family management skills lead to antisocial behavior in children. He argued that this behavior leads to peer rejection, school failure, and rejection by the parents. It was stated that these factors produce low self-esteem. The study further hypothesized that low self-esteem, peer rejection, and school failure put the child at risk for greater problems. To test these hypotheses the study developed performance models and built component constructs. The study presented the findings from the three structural equation models. The first model was the basic training model. It was shown that this model assumes that antisocial behavior is learned and the initial basic training ground is the home. It focused on parents' discipline techniques and parenting skills and their relation to children's antisocial behavior. It was argued that parents who fail to punish coercive behavior start a coercion process. The study presumed that more effective discipline would decrease antisocial behavior. The findings supported this model. The author felt confident that the model was reliable and robust. It was shown that the data provided a fit to the theory-driven model. The second model focused on the relationship between antisocial behavior and disruptions with peers, school, and self-esteem. The study posited that antisocial behavior's coercive and noncompliant core creates these disruptions. It was shown that normal peer relations, academic progress, and self-esteem levels suffer because of noncompliance and coercive exchanges. The author stated that this is a simplistic model as it is simply testing if indeed antisocial behavior is related to low self-esteem, lack of peer acceptance, and academic incompetence. The research reported that the findings supported this model. The third model discussed variables related to disruptions in parenting skills. The study placed these variables into "early onset" and "late starters" categories. The early onset variables included difficult child temperament, families with social disadvantages, and inept training in parenting. For the late starters category the variables included two problems in parents' family management skills. These two disruptors were stressors and parent substance abuse. Stressors included factors such as divorce, unemployment, medical problems, and daily hassles. It showed that parents' ineffective family management skills initiate the process of peer, school, and self-esteem problems for children. The author stated that the findings also supported this model. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS: The author noted that the third model was effective for analysis of single-parent families but not for intact families. He recommended that a new, more complex model be developed to fit intact families. The study suggested that the new model include multiple indicators of support or buffering and family problem-solving skills. The researcher noted that these variables are being considered in current studies. (CSPV Abstract - Copyright © 1992-2007 by the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, Institute of Behavioral Science, Regents of the University of Colorado) Male Behavior Male Aggression Male Antisocial Behavior Model Child Antisocial Behavior Child Aggression Child Behavior Child Male Child Problem Behavior Behavior Causes Family Relations Parent Child Relations Parental Rejection Peer Relations Peer Rejection Child Self-Esteem School Achievement School Performance Parenting Skills Aggression Causes 03-05

Understanding and preventing relapse.

Abstract: This chapter examines relapse by integrating knowledge from the disorders of alcoholism, smoking, and obesity in an attempt to emphasize in a prototypical manner the overlap in etiological mechanisms and treatment rationales for disorders with powerful, underlying biological self-regulation components. Commonalities across these areas suggest at least three basic stages of behavior change: motivation and commitment, initial change, and maintenance. A distinction is made between the terms lapse and relapse, with lapse referring to the process (slips or mistakes) that may or may not lead to an outcome (relapse). The natural history of relapse is discussed, as are the consequences of relapse for patients and the professionals who treat them. Information on determinants and predictors of relapse is evaluated, with the emphasis on the interaction of individual, environmental, and physiological factors. Methods of preventing relapse are proposed and are targeted to the three stages of change. Specific research needs in these areas are discussed.

Cognitive science and science education.

Abstract: " The quality of science education, like mathematics education, is a pervasive concern in educational improvement efforts. The cognitive orientation to the teaching of subject matter provides the context for Carey" s discussion of science education. This orientation begins with the idea that to understand something, one must integrate it with already existing knowledge schemata. The paradox of science education is that its goal is to impart new schemata to replace the student's extant ideas, which differ from the scientific theories being taught. The resolution of this paradox sets the stage for current research in science education. Carey reviews studies that illustrate the extent of the mismatch between the student's schemata and the expert's schemata. She draws out their implications for instruction and for cognitive theories of learning. Several characterizations of the differences between naive and scientific explanations are contrasted: the view from .the cognitive science literature on the novice-expert shift, from the history of science on theory change, and from science educators, as well as from the works of Piaget. -The Editors Many articles in this issue call for a minirevolution in education; indeed, they show that it is already under way, especially in the teaching of reading and writing (see Beck & Carpenter, this issue, pp. 1098-1105; Hayes & Flower, this issue, pp. 1106-1113). The key word in this revolution is understanding. The goal of reading is gaining understanding from texts; teaching reading, then, involves teaching techniques for gaining understanding and monitoring one's current understanding. This may hardly seem the stuff of revolution, but against the backdrop of concern with how to teach the mechanics of decoding texts (a still important goal in the early grades), the addition of this new emphasis and the demonstration that the techniques work even for young and poor readers are indeed revolutionary (e.g., see Palincsar & Brown, 1984). Part of this shift of emphasis is due to the cognitive revolution within psychology, which provides a general account of what it is to understand a text. To understand some new piece of information is to relate it to a mentally represented schema, to integrate it with already existing knowledge. This may also seem self-evident, but a simple demonstration from over a decade ago might show the force of this idea. Try to make sense of the following text (from Bransford & Johnson, 1973): If the balloons popped the sound wouldn't be able to carry since everything would be too far away from the correct floor. A closed window would also prevent the sound from carrying, since most buildings tend to be well insulated. Since the whole operation depends on a steady flow of electricity, a break in the middle of the wire would also cause problems. Of course, the fellow could shout, but the human voice is not loud enough to carry that far. An additional problem is that a string could break on the instrument. Then there could be no accompaniment to the message. It is clear that the best situation would involve less distance. Then there would be fewer potential problems. With face to face contact, the least number of things could go wrong. (pp. 392-393). If understanding of this passage eludes you, turn the page and look at Figure 1, a context that provides a key. Bransford and Johnson (1973) showed that subjects who were denied access to the context rated the text as fairly incomprehensible and, when asked to recall the text, remembered very little of it. Apparently, the figure allows access to a known schema (the serenade), which, in turn, provides a framework for comprehension. Simple demonstrations such as these set the stage for analyses of the schemata people have for understanding the world and for techniques that ensure that many different types of connections are made between what is being read and what is already known. What does all this have to do with science education? Surely, understanding should also be at the core of the science curriculum. Our scientific heritage has provided us with deep and counterintuitive understanding of the physical, biological, and social worlds, and we want to teach at least some aspects of that understanding to youngsters. We also want them to grasp the nature of the scientific process, especially how it yields scientific understanding of the natural world. The immediate lessons of the research on reading are clear. Students reading a science text or listening to a science teacher must gain understanding by relating what they are reading (hearing) to what they know, and this requires active, constructive work. This is the cognitive rationale (as opposed to the motivational rationale) for making science lessons relevant to students' concerns. But the serenade example is fundamentally misleading as applied to the problem of gaining understanding of a science text. In the case of science learning, students do not already have the schemata, such as the schema of the serenade, available to form the basis of their understanding. We have arrived at a paradox: To understand text or spoken language, one must relate it to schemata for understanding the world. But the goal of science teaching is imparting new schemata for understanding, schemata not yet in the student's repertoire. So how is the student to understand the texts and lessons that impart the new information? This paradox is real, and failure to grasp October 1986 9 American Psychologist Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/86/$00.75 Vol. 41, No. 10, 1123-113

Are all psychotherapies equivalent

Abstract: Despite clear demonstrations by process researchers of systematic differences in therapists' techniques, most reviews of psychotherapy outcome research show little or no differential effectiveness of different psychotherapies. This contradiction presents a dilemma to researchers and practitioners. Numerous possible solutions have been suggested. Some of these challenge the apparent equivalence of outcome, arguing that differential results could be revealed by more sensitive reviewing procedures or by more differentiated outcome measures. Others challenge the seeming differences among treatments, arguing that, despite superficial technical diversity, all or most therapies share a common core of therapeutic processes. Still others suggest that the question of equivalence is unanswerable as it is usually posed but that differential effectiveness of specific techniques might be found at the leve ! of brief events within therapy sessions. In spite of their diversity, many of the proposed solutions converge in calling for greater precision and specificity of theory and method in psychotherapy research. Despite the ple thora of purpor tedly distinct psychotherapeutic t rea tments (Parloff, 1976, 1984), influential reviews of comparat ive outcome research (Luborsky, Singer, & Luborsky, 1975; Smith, Glass, & Miller, i 980) together with frequently cited studies (e.g., Sloane, Staples, Cristol, Yorkston, & Whipple, 1975) appear to suppor t the conclusion that ou tcomes o f diverse therapies are generally similar. Efforts to base public policy r ecommenda t ions concerning menta l health care service provisions on scientific evidence have yielded only "a consensus, o f sorts, . . . on the question o f the efficacy of psychotherapy as a generic t r ea tment p r o c e s s . . , that psychotherapy is more effective than no t r ea tmen t " (VandenBos & Pino, 1980, p. 36). N o such consensus exists concerning the relative effectiveness of diverse therapies (e.g., DeLeon, VandenBos, & Cummings , 1983; Kiesler, 1985; Office of Technology Assessment, 1980). The verdict o f the Dodo bird in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll, 1865/ 1962), used as a subtitle by Luborsky et al. (1975), "Eve rybody has won and all must have prizes," captures this si tuation mos t vividly x and invites the question o f our present title: "Are all psychotherapies equivalent?" The s ta tement that two (or more) therapies are equivalent could have three quite different meanings. The first is equivalence o f o u t c o m e t h a t t rea tments yield ou tcomes that cannot be distinguished (the " D o d o bird verdict"). The second is equivalence of c o n t e n t t h a t the behavior o f part icipants in different therapies cannot be distinguished. The third is equivalence o f m e c h a n i s m that different psychotherapies employ c o m m o n principles o f psychological change. In this article, we first delineate the apparen t paradox: the lack o f differential effectiveness contrasted with evident technical diversity, that is, ou tcome equivalence contrasted with content nonequivalence. We then consider the resolutions o f the paradox that have been put forward, along with the a rguments and evidence that have been adduced in their support . We believe that considering alongside one another the traditionally separated research domains of therapy process and ou tcome brings into clearer focus the current strategic issues for psychotherapy

The development of children's knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction.

Abstract: Recent research on the acquisition of knowledge about the important and pervasive appearance-reality distinction suggests the following course of development. Many 3-year-olds seem to possess little or no understanding of the distinction. They fail very easy-looking tests of this understanding and are unresponsive to training. At this age level, skill in solving simple appearancereality tasks is highly correlated with skill in solving simple visual perspective-taking tasks. This and other findings are consistent with the hypothesis that what helps children finally grasp the distinction is an increased cognizance of the fact that people are sentient subjects who have mental representations of objects and events. It does so by allowing them to understand that the selfsame stimulus can be mentally represented in two different, seemingly contradictory ways: (a) in the appearance-reality case, how it appears to the self versus how it really is,\" and (b) in the perspective-taking case, how it presently appears to self versus other. In contrast to young preschoolers, children of 6 to 7 years manage simple appearance-reality tasks with ease. However, they have great difficulty reflecting on and talking about such appearance-reality notions as \"looks like,\" \"really and truly, '\" and especially, \"looks different from the way it really and truly is. \"' Finally, children of 11 to 12 years, and to an even greater degree college students, give evidence of possessing a substantial body of rich, readily available, and explicit knowledge in this area. Suppose someone shows a three-year-old and a six-yearold a red toy car covered by a green filter that makes the car look black, hands the car to the children to inspect, puts it behind the filter again, and asks, \"What color is this car? Is it red or is it black?\" (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1985; cf. Braine & Shanks, 1965a, 1965b). The threeyear-old is likely to say \"black,\" the six-year-old, \"red.\" The questioner is also apt to get the same answers even if he or she first carefully explains and demonstrates the intended difference in meaning, for illusory displays, between \"looks like to your eyes right now\" and \"really and truly is,\" and then asks what color it \"'really and truly is.\" At issue in such simple tasks is the distinction between how things presently appear to the senses and how or what they really and enduringly are, that is, the familiar distinction between appearance and reality. The six-yearold is clearly in possession of some knowledge about this distinction and quickly senses what the task is about. The three-year-old, who is much less knowledgeable about the distinction, does not. For the past half-dozen years my co-workers and I have been using these and other methods to chart the developmental course of knowledge acquisition in this area. That is, we have been trying to find out what children of different ages do and do not know about the appearance-reality distinction and related phenomena. In this article I summarize what we have done and what we think we have learned (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Flavell et al., 1985; Flavell, Zhang, Zou, Dong, & Qi, 1983; Taylor & Flavell, 1984). The summary is organized around the main questions that have guided our thinking and research in this area. Why Is This Development Important To Study? First, the distinction between appearance and reality is ecologically significant. It assumes many forms, arises in many situations, and can have serious consequences for our lives. The relation between appearance and reality figures importantly in everyday perceptual, conceptual, emotional, and social activity--in misperceptions, misexpectations, misunderstandings, false beliefs, deception, play, fantasy, and so forth. It is also a major preoccupation of philosophers, scientists, and other scholars; of artists, politicians, and other public performers; and of the thinking public that tries to evaluate what they say and do. It is, in sum, \"the distinction which probably provides the intellectual basis for the fundamental epistemological construct common to science, 'folk' philosophy, religion, and myth, of a real world 'underlying' and 'explaining' the phenomenal one\" (Braine & Shanks, 1965a, pp. 241-242). Second, the acquisition of at least some explicit knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction is probably a universal developmental outcome in our species. This knowledge seems so necessary to everyday intellectual and social life that one can hardly imagine a society in which normal people would not acquire it. To 418 April 1986 9 American Psychologist Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/86/$00.75 Vol. 41, No. 4, 418-425 cite an example that has actually been researched, a number of investigators have been interested in the child's command of the distinction as a possible developmental prerequisite for, and perhaps even mediator of, Piagetian conservations (e.g., Braine & Shanks, 1965a, 1965b; Murray, 1968). Third, knowledge about the distinction seems to presuppose the explicit knowledge that human beings are sentient, cognizing subjects (cf. Chandler & Boyce, 1982; Selman, 1980) whose mental representations of objects and events can differ, both within the same person and between persons. In the within-person case, for example, I may be aware both that something appears to be A and that it really is B. I could also be aware that it might appear to be C under special viewing conditions, or that I pretended or fantasized that it was D yesterday. I may know that these are all possible ways that I can represent the very same thing (i.e., perceive it, encode it, know it, interpret it, construe it, or think about i t--although inadequate, the term \"represent\" will have to do). In the between-persons case, I may be aware that you might represent the same thing differently than I do, because our perceptual, conceptual, or affective perspectives on it might differ. If this analysis is correct, knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction is but one instance of our more general knowledge that the selfsame object or event can be represented (apprehended, experienced, etc.) in different ways by the same person and by different people. In this analysis, then, its development is worth studying because it is part of the larger development of our conscious knowledge about our own and other minds and, thus, of metacognition (e.g., Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Flavell, 1985; Wellman, 1985) and of social cognition (e.g., Flavell, 1985; Shantz, 1983). I will return to this line of reasoning in another section of the article. How Can Young Children's Knowledge About the Appearance-Reality Distinction Be Tested? The development of appearance-reality knowledge in preschool children has been investigated by Braine and Editor's note. This article is based on a Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award address presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, California, August 1985. Award addresses, submitted by award recipients, are published as received except for minor editorial changes designed to maintain American Psychologist format. This reflects a policy of recognizing distinguished award recipients by eliminating the usual editorial review process to provide a forum consistent with that employed in delivering the award address. Author's note. The work described in this article was supported by National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (NICHO) Grant HD 09814. I am very grateful to my research collaborators, Eleanor Flavell and Frances Green, and to Carole Beat, Gary Bonitatibus, Susan Carey, Sophia Cohen, Rochel Gelman, Suzanne Lovett, Eleanor Maceoby, Ellen Markman, Bradford Pillow, Qian Man-jun, Marjorie Taylor, Zhang Xiao-dong, and other colleagues and students for their invaluable help with this research. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John H. Flavell, Department of Psychology, Jordan Hall, Building 420, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Shanks (1965a, 1965b), Daehler (1970), DeVries (1969), Elkind (1966), King (1971), Langer and Strauss (1972), Murray (1965, 1968), Tronick and Hershenson (1979) and, most recently and systematically, by our research group. In most of our studies we have used variations of the following procedure to assess young children's ability to think about appearance and reality (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983). First, we pretrain the children briefly on the meaning of the distinction and associated terminology by showing them (for example) a Charlie Brown puppet inside a ghost costume. We explain and demonstrate that Charlie Brown \"'looks like a ghost to your eyes right now\" but is \"really and truly Charlie Brown,\" and that \"sometimes things look like one thing to your eyes when they are really and truly something else.\" We then present a variety of illusory stimuli in a nondeceptive fashion and ask about their appearance and their reality. For instance, we first show the children a very realistic looking fake rock made out of a soft sponge-like material and then let them discover its identity by manipulating it. We next ask, in random order: (a) \"What is this really and truly? Is it really and truly a sponge or is it really and truly a rock?\" (b) \"When you look at this with your eyes right now, does it look like a rock or does it look like a sponge?\" Or we show the children a white stimulus, move it behind a blue filter, and similarly ask about its real and apparent color. (Of course its \"real color\" is now blue, but only people who know something about color perception realize this.) Similar procedures are used to assess sensitivity to the distinction between real and apparent size, shape, events, and object presence. How Do Young Children Perform on Simple Appearance-Reality Tasks? Our studies have consistently shown that threeto fouryear-old children pre

Teaching Thinking and Problem Solving.

Abstract: ABSTRACT This discussion of some of the research literature that is relevant to the issue of teaching thinking provides descriptions of hypothetical, ideal thinkers, and problem solvers; considers the problem of teaching thinking and problem solving; and explores the issue of evaluating programs so that they can be revised and improved. Following Bransford and Stein's \"The IDEAL Problem Solver\" (1984), this discussion elaborates upon five components of thinking that are applicable to a wide variety of situations. These include the ability to: (1)identify problems, (2) define and represent them with precision, (3) explore possible strategies, (4) act on these strategies, and (5) look at their effects. Creativity is introduced as a means of re-defining a problem in such a way as to suggest simpler and more workable strategies, and examples of cognitive solutions to problems are explained. Also included are descriptions of ways to enhance the teaching of thinking and problem solving through the use of educational strategies and the development of conceptual tools. The concluding section contains suggestions for implementing evaluation techniques for thinking skills programs, and the summary emphasizes the importance of student use of various tools for thinking and problem solving so that these can be evaluated and defined. (JB)

Fearful expectations and avoidant actions as coeffects of perceived self-inefficacy.

Abstract: are caused by signs of progress early in a course of therapy. In the history of psychotherapy research , the expectancy construct emerged prematurely and without the empirical support necessary to establish its validity (Wilkins, 1973). In the absence of validating empirical evidence, subjective ex-pectancies remain interesting epiphe-nomena, rather than valid, causal mechanisms of placebo responses and fear reduction. (1975). The facilitative effect of muscle tension-release in the relaxation treatment of sleep disturbance.parison of heart rate biofeedback and systematic desensitization in reducing speech anxiety: Short-and long-term effectiveness, (1977). Comparative effectiveness of voluntary heart rate control and muscular relaxation as active coping skills for reducing speech anxiety. Cognition and desen-sitization in the group treatment of test anxiety. A comparison of EMG biofeedback and a credible pseudotherapy in treating tension headache.sign and assessment of nonspecific control groups in behavior modification research. Therapy outcome questions requiring control of credibility and treatment-generated expectancies. (1981). Comparison of cue-controlled desen-sitization, rational restructuring, and a credible placebo in the treatment of speech anxiety. Expectancy, false galvanic skin response feedback, and systematic desensi-tization in the modification of phobic behavior. Development and evaluation of a placebo for studies of op-erant behavioral intervention. Experimental desen-sitization following three types of instructions. (1973). The role of attention placebo influences in the efficacy of sys-tcmatic desensitization. A comparison of three fear reduction procedures. (1982). Cue-controlled relaxation and systematic desensiti-zation versus nonspecific factors in treating test anxiety. (1979). Differential outcome from automated assertion training as a function of locus of control. (1978). Influence of contextual cues on the efficacy of desen-sitization and a credible placebo in alleviating public speaking anxiety. (1973). Placebo versus social earning effects in parent training procedures designed to alter the behavior of aggressive boys. Effects of false feedback on avoidance behavior: \"Cognitive\" desen-sitization revisited. The belief that fear controls avoidance behavior dies hard, despite growing evidence to the contrary. In a recent article, Kirsch (November, 1985) argued in favor of this view in his comments regarding the role of perceived self-efficacy in phobic dys-functions. According to Kitsch, people take avoidant action because of expected fear. A large body of evidence disputes the notion that anticipatory fear regulates Such behavior is often performed without anticipatory fear arousal, and avoidance can persist long after fear of threats has been eliminated (Black, 1965; Reseorla & Solomon, 1967). No consistent relations have been found between changes in fear arousal and phobic behavior during the …

Teaching Thinking Skills

Abstract: A course was developed to teach cognitive skills that apply to learning and intellectual performance independently of subject matter, stressing observation and classification, reasoning, critical use of language, problem solving, inventiveness, and decision making. With pretests and posttests, it was taught experimentally to over 400 Venezuelan seventh graders, whose classes were matched to those of a control group. Although evaluation of such a course is conceptually difficult and long-term effects have not been assessed, standard and special objective tests and various subjective tests indicate consistently that the course had sizable, beneficial effects on its students. Interest in classroom teaching of generally useful thinking skills has increased markedly. The prospects of improving intellectual competence have been discussed in several conferences and workshops, and intervention programs developed in several countries have recently been reviewed under the auspices of the National Institute of Education (Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 1985). This article de- scribes one such program that was distinguished by an eclectic approach to the conceptual structure of the cur- riculum and a relatively extensive evaluation of results. The program described here was initiated by the Venezuelan government, which requested the assistance of Harvard University. From the onset, the collaboration also included researchers at Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc. and in the Venezuelan Ministry of Education. The larger program in Venezuela of which this project was a part was described in Science (Walsh, 1981) and in the APA Monitor (Cordes, 1985). Although the course ma- terials were developed for Venezuelan schools, in partic- ular the seventh grade, and much attention was given to ensuring the appropriateness of the materials to that cul- ture, they have since been published in English (Adams, 1986a). The course was designed to enhance performance on a wide variety of tasks that require careful observation and classification, deductive or inductive reasoning, crit- ical use of language, hyiaothesis generation and testing, problem solving, inventiveness, and decision making. The focus was on cognitive skills that apply to learning and intellectual performance independently of subject matter, rather than conventional academic content. Skills that can reasonably be considered to be components of intel- ligence and that are sufficiently well defined to lend themselves to explicit instruction were the targets of the course. The design and preparation of the course material began in the fall of 1980. About a dozen experienced Venezuelan teachers worked with the project staff during part of the summer of 1981, becoming familiar with the material and suggesting modifications. Some of these teachers later trained the Venezuelan teachers who would actually teach the course in its final form, at which time they supervised the classroom teaching. During the sec- ond academic year, 1981-1982, some of the material was tested in Venezuelan classrooms and evaluated informally by the teachers, after which the material was further modified. Also during that year the remainder of the course was prepared, as were the testing instruments that were to be used for formal evaluation of the course during the academic year 1982-1983. Various tests of mental abilities were adapted, de- veloped, and used during the second year. Two main pur- poses were served by the testing at this stage: The first was to assess the feasibility of the tests and to adapt them where necessary for Venezuelan seventh graders. The sec- ond purpose was to find schools in which the distributions of test scores were sufficiently similar to permit the se- lection of comparable experimental and control groups for the third year. Besides several standard tests of general aptitude, some 500 test items reflecting the evolving con- tent of the experimental course were written, of which about 70% were administered to samples of schoolchil- dren. The resulting Target Abilities Tests, as well as the final set of standard mental abilities tests, are described later.

Etiology of alcoholism reconsidered. The case for a biopsychosocial process.

Abstract: The etiology of alcoholism is best understood within the context of a longitudinal-developmental framework that includes physiological behavioral and sociocultural variables. The recently reported Vaillant fol- low-up study, although ostensibly set within such a frame- work, in fact understates the role of personality influences and dismisses childhood effects out of hand. We review these data and offer a different set of conclusions about the roles of childhood influences, personality, and cultural factors in the etiologic process. An alternative integrative review of the existing longitudinal literature is presented that sets these findings in the context of a biopsychosocial process. Alcoholism is a profoundly damaging disorder whose im- pact spreads far beyond the one who suffers from it. The problem of understanding its causes is also an especially interesting one. Recent evidence suggests that the char- acteristics that lead an individual to begin drinking may only be tied loosely to influences on later stage drinking and problem drinking phenomena. The factors connected with beginning a pattern of problem use are not neces- sarily the same as those pharmacological and behavioral characteristics that contribute to the maintenance of the alcohol use pattern or to the later build-up of a habitual problem involving alcohol abuse or dependency. Given this state of affairs, it is also likely that different orderings of the importance of etiologic factors will be needed to adequately describe cause and effect at different stages in the process. Thus, Korsakoff's syndrome, one end-state phenomenon of chronic alcohol abuse, is a pathology best described in neuropathological terms; the direction of ef- fect is best understood as going from brain dysfunction to behavior (Wilkinson & Carlen, 1981). In contrast, the onset of alcohol use is best understood as a phenomenon predicted by individual difference variables and social in- fluences (Jessor & Jessor, 1975; Margulies, Kessler, & Kandel, 1977). The theoretical models and data language used to describe these multiple phenomena of onset, maintenance, and dependency involve radically different levels of explanation and different orderings of physio- logical, behavioral, and socioenvironmental variables at different points in the life cycle. It is not surprising, there- fore, that such a complex multidisciplinary problem has in earlier times generated simplistic and reductionistic explanations in an effort to describe its process. In the past decade, several etiologically focused lon- gitudinal studies have been carried out with a broad enough data set and a multivariate analytic strategy that begins to allow for the partitioning of variance contri- butions. However, all of those that have moved far enough along to warrant publication have been concerned with the early stages of drinking and problem drinking ac- quisition (Huba & Bentler, 1984; Jessor & Jessor, 1977; Kandel & Logan, 1984), or have dealt with a group of subjects who have had largely normal or at worst episod- ically disturbed drinking patterns (Fillmore, 1975; Fill- more, Bacon, & Hyman, 1979). None have dealt with frankly alcoholic respondents, and none have been suf- ficiently comprehensive to allow for the evaluation of the extent of effect contributed by biological (including ge- netic), psychological, social, and cultural factors. It is, therefore, a significant event for the field when a data set is presented that promises to address the etiological ques- tion of how alcoholism evolves, with a prospective method and a sufficiently broad array of variables such that the potential biopsychosocial nature of the disorder can be examined. This is the importance of a recent report by Vaillant and Milofsky (1982). Since its publication, this study has received sub- stantial attention in the literature. Given the significant disagreement we have with the authors' interpretation of their own data as well as their interpretation of earlier longitudinal work in the area, we felt that an alternative interpretation of their findings and of the earlier studies was in order. In the present article, we examine very closely the details of Vaillant and Milofsky's study with particular attention to the role of personality and of childhood influences on alcoholic behavior, reach a dif- ferent set of conclusions, and find significant support for an alternative position based on our own integrative re- view of the prospective literature on alcoholic etiology that substantially differs from Vaillant and Milofsky's ac- count. Vaillant's Follow-up Study

Stamp collecting versus science: Validation as hypothesis testing.

Abstract: There have been continuing arguments with respect to the unitarian versus trinitarian view of the validation process. An emerging position is that the threefold distinction among validation models presented by Cronbach and Meehl is not as useful as it once was. This article joins in the unitarian argument and suggests that the validation process be considered nothing more and nothing less than traditional hypothesis testing. The issue of the role of constructs in psychological measurement is considered, as is the general status of construct-validation strategies in employment testing. In addition, the unique knowledges, skills, and abilities that psychologists bring to the discussion of validity and inference are discussed. During the past 15 years, there have been many occasions to regret the simple taxonomy of validity strategies suggested by the American Psychological Association in their "Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests and Diagnostic Techniques" (1954). Cronbach and Meehl were members of the APA committee that developed those recommendations. They further elaborated on the notion of construct validity in a subsequent publication in 1955 (Cronbaeh & Meehl, 1955). The "Technical Recommendations" proposed a four-category taxonomy of validity models. The taxonomy consisted of predictive, concurrent, content, and construct validity. The predictive and concurrent models are usually combined into a category known as "criterion-related validation strategies." Thus, it is common to hear reference made to three "types" of validity. This view of validity has been aptly labeled the trinitarian view (Guion, 1980). At the time that the "Technical Recommendations" were published, the taxonomy was quite valuable. It provided order where before there was chaos. It added the preliminary structure necessary for progress. For some time, this taxonomy proved a useful tool for validity discussions. The taxonomy represented a point of departure. Prior to that point, validity was considered a correlation between a predictor and a criterion. It was a literalist view directed toward the technology of prediction.Such a positivist view was (and remains) only minimally helpful in developing theories of behavior or a basic understanding of what was being measured by the tests in question. The introduction of the "Technical Recommendations" and the concepts of content-oriented and construct validation represented an attempt to correct the past excesses of dust-bowl empiricism and focus attention on understanding rather than on the simpler and less meaningful search for predictability. The value of that reorientation has been substantially blunted in the past 15 years as a result of a reification of the validity taxonomy that was introduced in 1954. This result is unfortunate because the emphasis on the meaning of test scores rather than the predictive value of those scores is as important today as it was 30 years ago. As a result of the efforts of practitioners (lawyers, judges, expert witnesses, and personnel administrators) to make the taxonomy into something it was never intended to be, the point of departure suggested by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) has become a point of arrival. The three types of validity that were originally proposed as a method for broadening the appreciation of the inferential limits of test scores have become an orthodoxy. Because forensic activity is usually deductive in nature, there has been the tendency in Title VII litigation to try to identify the validity model most appropriate for a given situation. Once the validity model has been identified, the case revolves around whether the requirements of the model have been met. In principle, this is no different from the way in which any court case is approached: Determine which principle covers the issue under scrutiny, and then determine if that particular principle has been violated. This approach can be quite effective if the principles are clear and distinct from one another and if all the parameters of the principles are accepted by all the parties involved. In psychology, an example of the value of this approach has been the development of the DSM-III for the diagnosis of psychological disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Although it is not without its detractors, the DSM-III is a useful way of determining from a set of observable symptoms what might be responsible for those symptoms and how those symptoms might be best treated. The parameters of the diagnostic model are clearly defined and understood (the five "axes" of the DSM-III), and there is a clear listing of the symptoms that warrant one diagnosis as opposed to another. Many would like to use the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978) in a similar manner. Unfortunately, there is substantial disagreement about the meaning and the independence of the principles involved in determining the legality of certain classes of employment decisions. The principles are, for the most part, validity "models." However, if these models are accepted as "principles" in a literal sense, the result is a November 1986 9 American Psychologist Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/86/$00.75 Vol. 41, No. 11, 1183-1192 1183 form of forensic and scientific myopia in which all parties wittingly or unwittingly agree to limit their discussion to the boundaries suggested by the validity models. Viewed from another perspective, this willingness to accept a small and fixed set of validity models is nothing more than a procrustean worldview in which some aspects of the conceptual issue are lopped off and thrown away and other natural conceptual limits are stretched well beyond their elasticity index. Tenopyr (1984) recently bemoaned this

The concept of activity in Soviet psychology : Vygotsky, his disciples and critics

Abstract: The concept of activity is deeply ingrained in Soviet psychological theory, and exactly for that reason contemporary Soviet psychologists have found it extremely difficult to define it clearly This concept was first suggested by Lev Vygotsky as a theoretical remedy for psychological systems that tautologically "explained" phenomena of consciousness through the concept of consciousness Vy- gotsky' s disciples, notably Alexei Leontiev, departed from the original concept of their teacher The demarcation line separating Vygotsky's theory from that of Leontiev oc- curred in the evaluation of the relative importance of se- miotic mediation and practical actions for the development of intelligence Currently there is a revival of interest in the problem of activity both in the Soviet Union and in the United States The concept of activity plays as important and ambiguous a role in Soviet psychology as did the concept of behavior in American studies circa 1920 to 1950 and the concept of consciousness in European psychology of the late 19th century Activity has been the chief category of psycho- logical research in contemporary Soviet psychology since the beginning; and exactly for that reason, the concept of activity has been extremely difficult for Soviet psy- chologists to define clearly Since the time of its inception in the 1920s, this category has undergone a metamor- phosis and has been the subject of so many disputes that it cannot be adequately comprehended out of the context of its history The goal of this article is to provide a historical- theoretical analysis of the evolution of the concept of ac- tivity in Soviet psychology The origin of this concept can be found in the early writings of Lev Vygotsky (1896- 1934), who suggested that socially meaningful activity (Tdtigkeit) may serve as an explanatory principle in re- gard to, and be considered as a generator of, human con- sciousness Further, I review the process of incorporating the concept of activity into Vygotsky's cultural-historical theory of higher mental functions and discuss its relevance for Vygotsky's studies in the development of language and concept formation The most dramatic event in the history of the concept of activity occurred in the mid- 1930s when a group of Vygotsky's disciples came up with a "revisionist" version of activity theory that put practical (material) actions at the forefront while simultaneously playing down the role of signs as mediators of human activity This revisionist position was elaborated theoret- ically by Alexei Leontiev, who subsequently gained the status of official interpreter of Vygotsky's ideas Thus the myth of succession between Vygotsky's and Leontiev's schools of psychology was born Only in the late 1970s has this myth been subjected to a critical scrutiny, and Vygotsky's genuine views have attracted a renewed in- terest For a long period of time, the concept of activity has remained a local affair of Soviet psychology In his clas- sical book The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Raymond Bauer (1952) neglected entirely the concept of activity More recent studies, such as those of Ted Payne (1968), Levy Rahmani (1973), and Luciano Mecacci (1979), mentioned this problem but hardly made it a center of their work The major breakthrough occurred when a volume of translations, The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology, edited by James Wertsch, appeared in 1981 Since then, there has been a growing interest among American psychologists in the problem of activity To comprehend this problem properly, one should, however, be cognizant of its complex history and the current re- evaluation of it by the younger generation of Soviet psy- chologists Activity as a n Explanatory Principle

Contrasting the Hassles Scale and the Perceived Stress Scale: Who's really measuring appraised stress?

Abstract: This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Research Showcase@ CMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of Research Showcase @ CMU. For moreinformation, please contactresearch-showcase@andrew.cmu.edu.

Sexual attraction to clients: The human therapist and the (sometimes) inhuman training system.

Abstract: ABSTIL 4CT: Although we currently possess considerable in tbrmation about the incidence and consequences of sexually intimate relationships between psychotherapists and clients, there is virtually no documentation of the extent to which ps)rhotherapists are sexually attracted to clients, how they react to and handle such fi, elings, and the degree to which their training is adequate in this regard "Feelings" toward clients are generally relegated to vague and conflicting discussions of countertransference, without benefit of systematic research Survey data from 5 75 psychotherapists reveal that 8 7% (95% of men, 76% of wometO have been sexually attracted to their clients, at least on occasion, and that, although only a minorio' (94% of men and 25% of women) have acted out such feelings, many (63% )Jkel guilt)', anxious, or confitsed about the attraction About half of the respondents did not receive an)' guidance or training concerning this issue, and only 9% reported that their training or supervision was adequate, hnplications fi~r the development of educational resources to address this subject are discussed

Psychological theory and the study of learning disabilities.

Abstract: Psychological theories have long had a pronounced effect on the diagnosis and instruction o ldren with learning problems Traditional theorists emphasized the centrality of gobal processes assumed to be common to most if not all cognitive tasks These processes were quite distant from those involved in traditional academic activities, making it difficult to proceed from diagnosis to instruction--the "leap to instruction" problem In contrast, comtemporary theorists concentrate on identifying the specific knowledge and skills underlying performance in academically relevant fields such as reading, writing, math, and science This trend toward domain specificity has made the task of diagnosis and remediation of school problems more tractable, as the processes thus identified are those needed for successful performance, thereby reducing the magnitude of the leap to instruction At the same time, alternative methods of diagnosis, such as dynamic asessment, have been developed that supplement more traditional approaches by assessing domain-specific processes in action, rather than inferring their operation from the products of prior learning These advances make it easier to specify the processes that need to be the targets of instruction Furthermore, current attempts to characterize optimal learning environments have fueled the development of a theory of instruction Learning Disabilities