Showing papers in "Australasian Journal of Philosophy in 1996"
TL;DR: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 3, No 3, pp. 433-453 as mentioned in this paper has been used as the basis for this paper.
Abstract: (1996). All the world's a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 433-453.
214 citations
TL;DR: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, No 2, pp. 331-340 as mentioned in this paper has been used as a reference for this paper.
Abstract: (1996). Truthmakers, entailment and necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 331-340.
132 citations
101 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relationship between entities, absences and voids in the context of philosophy, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 74, No 1, pp 57-65
Abstract: (1996) How it is: Entities, absences and voids Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 74, No 1, pp 57-65
87 citations
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66 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss how to stand up for non-cognitivists in the context of non-convexity in philosophy, and propose an alternative approach.
Abstract: (1996). How to stand up for non-cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 275-292.
64 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Welfarism in moral theory Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 74, No 4, Vol 4, pp 598-613 is discussed. But the focus is on the relation between Welfarsism and moral theory.
Abstract: (1996) Welfarism in moral theory Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 74, No 4, pp 598-613
41 citations
Journal Article•
33 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss why Lucretius' symmetry argument fails and why death and deprivation can be explained by the symmetry argument, and present a solution to the problem.
Abstract: (1996). Death and deprivation; or, why Lucretius' symmetry argument fails. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 305-312.
31 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the prospect for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent-centred theories or norms, and show that such explanations are universalizable and in what way they are not.
Abstract: Non-cognitivists1 claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple and clear agent centred theory, egoism. The second section poses the difficulty faced by non-cognitivist analyses of such theories and norms, and runs briefly through a couple of abortive attempts to solve it. The third section offers a solution and explains it. The fourth section uses the account developed in the third section to show in what way agent centred judgments are universalizable and in what way they are not.
27 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Strict implication, supervenience, and physicalism are discussed in the context of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 244-257.
Abstract: (1996). Strict implication, supervenience and physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 244-257.
TL;DR: The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources as mentioned in this paper. But they do not make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up-to-date.
Abstract: This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution , reselling , loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
TL;DR: The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects as mentioned in this paper, but this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend.
Abstract: The Quine/Putnam indispensability argument is regarded by many as the chief argument for the existence of platonic objects. We argue that this argument cannot establish what its proponents intend. The form of our argument is simple. Suppose indispensability to science is the only good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects. Either the dispensability of mathematical objects to science can be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of platonic objects, or their dispensability cannot be demonstrated and, hence, there is no good reason for believing in the existence of mathematical objects which are genuinely platonic. Therefore, indispensability, whether true or false, does not support platonism. ! Mathematical platonists claim that at least some of the objects which are the subject matter of pure mathematics (e.g. numbers, sets, groups) actually exist. Furthermore, they claim that these objects differ radically from the concrete objects (trees, cats, stars, molecules) which inhabit the material world. ! We take the standard platonistic position to include the claim that platonic objects lack spatio-temporal location and causal powers. Many (perhaps most) mathematical platonists subscribe to this view.1 But some who call themselves (or might be called) mathematical platonists eschew the standard position.2 They maintain that mathematical objects do possess location and causality, although they retain some similarity to the kinds of things that Plato had in mind. We do not intend to enter into a terminological dispute as to which party of platonists truly deserves the name. Perhaps the people we shall call non-standard platonists are closer to the original Plato. After all, Plato himself was notoriously equivocal about the causal status of his Forms. However that may be, we take the majority (or perhaps the Anglo-American) view to be the standard view. On this 1
TL;DR: In this article, sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is made a term or condition of employment or participating in educational programs; or submission to or rejection of such conduct are used as a basis for employment or academic decisions affecting the individual; such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an employee's work performance or student's academic performance creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working or learning environment.
Abstract: Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: (1) submission to such conduct is made a term or condition of employment or participating in educational programs; or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for employment or academic decisions affecting the individual; or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an employee's work performance or student's academic performance creating an intimidating , hostile, or offensive working or learning environment.
TL;DR: In a series of papers, and now a book, Michael Smith has developed an account of value, more precisely, of what it is to value one's own potential actions as mentioned in this paper, and to value such an action is, he claims, to believe that it would be valuable; and to believe it would also be valuable to have a normative reason to perform it.
Abstract: In a series of papers, and now a book, Michael Smith has developed an account of value—more precisely, of what it is to value one’s own potential actions.1 To value such an action is, he claims, to believe that it would be valuable; and to believe it would be valuable is to believe that one has a normative reason to perform it. To believe that one has a normative reason to perform an action is, roughly, to believe that one would desire to do it if one were fully rational. Putting these things together, and adding a little precision, we get:
TL;DR: The hole in the ground of induction as mentioned in this paper is a well-known topic in the field of inductive logic. But it is not a well understood concept in the general field of philosophy.
Abstract: (1996). The hole in the ground of induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 423-432.
TL;DR: In this paper, Dretske's innate modesty is discussed in the context of Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 258-274, 1996.
Abstract: (1996). Dretske's innate modesty. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 258-274.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that a temporal God could not be the creator of time and that therefore God should be conceived as timeless, and that there is no time at which a temporalGod could act to create time, but instead, a temporal god could act at any time t to create t or, alternatively, act at t in such a way as to be responsible for time existing prior to t.
Abstract: Brian Leftow argues that a temporal God could not be the creator of time and that therefore God should be conceived as timeless. Leftow's first argument, that there is no time at which a temporal God could act to create time fails because God could act at any time t to create t or, alternatively, could act at t in such a way as to be responsible for time existing prior to t. Leftow's second argument, that a temporal God could not have decided at any time t whether time should have a beginning or not fails because Leftow erroneously presupposes that in order for God to be responsible for time's topological properties, there must have been a time at which He made such a decision.
TL;DR: The end of philosophy? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 1-19, 1996 as mentioned in this paper The End of philosophy: The end of the philosophy?
Abstract: (1996). The end of philosophy? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 1-19.
TL;DR: In this paper, Maudlin and modal mystery are discussed in the context of Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 683-684.
Abstract: (1996). Maudlin and modal mystery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 683-684.
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