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Showing papers in "Contemporary Accounting Research in 2016"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper found that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crash, and that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry.
Abstract: Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm-fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.

456 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk and found that firms with overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating.
Abstract: This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.

325 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts using both the "overoptimism" and "miscalibration" dimensions of overconfidence to generate their predictions, and found support for all three research questions.
Abstract: This paper examines how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts. Using both the “over-optimism” and “miscalibration” dimensions of overconfidence to generate our predictions, we examine three research questions. First, we examine whether overconfidence increases the likelihood of issuing a forecast. Second, we examine whether overconfidence increases the amount of optimism in management forecasts. Third, we examine whether overconfidence increases the precision of the forecast. Using both options- and press-based measures to proxy for individual overconfidence, we find support for all three research questions.

257 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness was investigated and it was shown that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggression, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected.
Abstract: This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand-collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk-taking tendencies induced by political connections.

217 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, auditors' and investors' views, definitions, and indicators of audit quality were obtained from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide a perspective on audit quality.
Abstract: Projects seeking to define, measure, and evaluate audit quality are on the agendas of auditing standards setters as well as audit firms. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) currently provides information regarding audit quality through the release of inspection reports, and the Board intends to establish and report audit quality indicators. To provide additional perspective on audit quality, we obtain auditors' and investors' views, definitions, and indicators of audit quality. We find that investors' definitions of audit quality focus more on inputs to the audit process than do auditors', and that investors view the number of PCAOB deficiencies as an indicator of overall firm quality. We find a consensus that auditor characteristics may be the most important determinants of audit quality, and that restatements may be the most readily available signal of low audit quality. We relate responses to a general audit quality framework, provide support for archival audit research, and identify additional disclosures that participants suggest could signal audit quality. Taken together, we provide evidence regarding the construct of audit quality in the post-SOX environment, evaluate many of the audit quality indicators proposed by the PCAOB, and suggest avenues for future research.

159 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors investigated the effect of trapped cash trapped overseas on US multinational corporations' foreign acquisitions and found that firms with high trapped cash make less profitable acquisitions of foreign target firms using cash consideration (lower announcement window returns, lower buy and hold returns, decreased ROA).
Abstract: Current US reporting and tax laws create an incentive for some US firms to avoid the repatriation of foreign earnings, as the US government charges additional corporate taxes on these transfers Prior research suggests that the combined effect of these incentives leads some US multinational corporations to hold a significant amount of cash overseas In this study, we investigate the effect of cash trapped overseas on US multinational corporations' foreign acquisitions Consistent with expectations, we observe firms with high levels of trapped cash make less profitable acquisitions of foreign target firms using cash consideration (lower announcement window returns, lower buy and hold returns, decreased ROA) The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) reduced this effect by allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings held as cash abroad at a much lower tax cost Our study has implications for current proposals to change the tax laws related to foreign earnings

113 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory and argue that causality can be attributed to the APB-audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002-04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels.
Abstract: Contemporaneous studies generally find a negative relationship between audit partner busyness (APB), measured as the number of clients in an audit partner's portfolio, and audit quality. Their argument is that a busy partner does not devote sufficient time to properly audit his average client. Contrary to these studies, we argue that when busyness is optimally chosen by the partner, in equilibrium, there is no causal relationship between APB and audit quality. Using Australian data for the 1999–2010 period, we show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory. We argue that causality can be ascribed to the APB-audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002–04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels. Supporting this disequilibrium view, we find that higher APB reduces a partner's propensity to issue first-time going-concern opinions during this period. Our evidence highlights the importance of the equilibrium condition in testing empirical associations between audit outcomes and endogenous auditor attributes, and shows that the detrimental effect of APB on audit quality is not as pervasive as contemporaneous studies suggest.

92 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the extent to which shareholders of U.S. companies are affected by any such rent extraction, and find no evidence that tax-avoidance activities relate positively to either overinvestment or higher executive compensation.
Abstract: Two influential papers in the tax-avoidance literature (Desai and Dharmapala ; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales ) argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance employ technologies that complement managerial rent extraction, and provide supporting evidence from firms in Russia. Several papers rely on this theory to motivate and interpret tests in a U.S. setting, but these tests are open to multiple interpretations. This paper investigates the extent to which shareholders of U.S. companies are affected by any such rent extraction. The evidence is inconsistent with the tax-avoidance technologies employed by U.S. firms allowing managers to extract sufficient rents to negatively affect future performance. Additional tests on poorly governed U.S. firms find no evidence that tax-avoidance activities relate positively to either overinvestment or higher executive compensation, and no evidence that either complexity or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act moderates the relation between future performance and tax avoidance. The evidence suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting evidence according to this theory in a U.S. setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

90 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Kevin Markle1
TL;DR: In this article, the tax-motivated income-shifting behaviors of multinationals subject to different systems of taxing foreign earnings are compared and compared to those subject to worldwide tax regimes.
Abstract: This paper tests for differences in the tax-motivated income-shifting behaviors of multinationals subject to different systems of taxing foreign earnings. I find that, on average, multinationals subject to territorial tax regimes shift more income than those subject to worldwide tax regimes. The difference in shifting, however, is driven by a difference in the subset of shifting that involves the parent country; multinationals in the two groups appear to shift equally among their foreign affiliates. In additional tests, I find that the shifting of worldwide firms is sensitive to reinvestment in the recipient countries, while that of territorial firms is not.

89 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics, and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality.
Abstract: During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effective in form but is not in substance. We construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality. Since all the firms in our sample have completely independent audit committees, we use financial expertise to examine the impact of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness. We find that, when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with the incidence of internal control weaknesses. However, as CEO power increases, this association monotonically weakens. When CEO power reaches a sufficiently high level, this association is no longer negative. The moderating effect of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness is more prominent when the CEO extracts more rents from the firm through insider trading. Our results are not driven by the CEO's involvement in director selection. Our paper suggests that more expert audit committees in form do not automatically translate into more effective monitoring. Rather, the substantive monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is contingent on CEO power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

84 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and find that firms with a tax-related ICW have a 4 percent higher three-year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses.
Abstract: I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax-related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial reporting objectives. Results indicate that, on average, firms with a tax-related ICW have a 4 percent higher three-year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses. Further estimates reveal that this negative relation stems from pervasive, company-level tax ICWs. Analysis of remediation suggests a causal link. I find that after remediating tax-related ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax avoidance in the future. Broadly, these findings support that internal control quality represents a proxy for internal governance, and thus the strength of alignment between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, tax-related internal controls represent an important underlying determinant of tax avoidance with significant cash flow effects, and implications beyond financial reporting.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined how corporate reliance on budgets is affected by major changes in the economic environment and found that budgeting became more important for planning and resource allocation but less important for performance evaluation in companies affected more strongly by the 2008 economic crisis.
Abstract: This article examines how corporate reliance on budgets is affected by major changes in the economic environment. We combine survey and archival data from the economic crisis that began in 2008. The results indicate that budgeting became more important for planning and resource allocation but less important for performance evaluation in companies affected more strongly by the 2008 economic crisis. Additional evidence from interviews and data gathered in a focus group further illustrate these results and show the changes organizations have introduced to respond to the economic crisis. Taken together, and contrary to more general conclusions from the literature such as an overall increase or decrease in the importance of budgeting, we find that companies emphasize certain budgeting functions over others during economic crises.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined a sample of 17,062 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 and found a consistent negative relation between changes in volume of audit work and audit quality.
Abstract: This study provides evidence on how local office growth affects audit quality. We predict that significant recent growth will temporarily stress office resources, leading to a negative relation between office-level growth and audit quality. To test this prediction, we examine a sample of 17,062 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010. Results indicate a consistent negative relation between changes in volume of audit work and audit quality. Specifically, clients of offices that experience increases in workload over the prior year have greater absolute discretionary accruals as well as an increased likelihood of restatement. Our tests also indicate that the effect of office growth is transient and vanishes after one year. We find limited evidence that the size of the auditor's national network of offices partially mitigates the negative effects of office growth on audit quality. We further show that proxies for audit quality are negatively related to office-level growth from new and existing clients. These findings are robust to controls for client and auditor characteristics as well as alternative specifications of growth. Taken together, evidence indicates that while larger offices provide higher audit quality, the benefits of office size are not realized immediately and rapid growth temporarily impairs audit quality. These results are informative to regulators concerned with audit quality and to practitioners charged with adjusting to office growth.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the best available information can often leave decision makers less certain about future events, and for those cases where information indeed brings great certainty, conventional mean-variance asset-pricing models imply that more certain estimates of future cash payoffs can sometimes bring a higher cost of capital.
Abstract: It is widely held that better financial reporting makes investors more confident in their predictions of future cash flows and reduces their required risk premia. The logic is that more information leads necessarily to more certainty, and hence lower subjective estimates of firm “beta” or covariance with other firms. This is misleading on both counts. Bayesian logic shows that the best available information can often leave decision makers less certain about future events. And for those cases where information indeed brings great certainty, conventional mean-variance asset-pricing models imply that more certain estimates of future cash payoffs can sometimes bring a higher cost of capital. This occurs when new or better information leads to sufficiently reduced expected firm payoffs. To properly understand the effect of signal quality on the cost of capital, it is essential to think of what that information says, rather than considering merely its “precision,” or how strongly it says what it says.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors exploit a field setting in Korea, where the disclosure of audit hours is required in company annual reports, and find that ISAs charge significantly higher total audit fees but also expend significantly greater audit hours than non-ISAs.
Abstract: Higher audit fees associated with auditor industry specialization could represent higher unit price charged by industry specialist auditors (ISAs) or the provision of a greater quantity of audit services. This study exploits a field setting in Korea, where the disclosure of audit hours is required in company annual reports, and finds that ISAs charge significantly higher total audit fees but also expend significantly greater audit hours than non-ISAs. When audit fees and hours are considered together, the unit audit price of ISAs is significantly lower than that of non-ISAs. This indicates that higher total audit fees associated with ISAs are likely to be attributable to greater audit hours associated with ISAs. However, greater audit hours for ISAs may suggest higher audit quality or may simply indicate that the additional audit work performed by ISAs is conducted by relatively cheaper junior auditors. Our work provides an alternative explanation for the higher total audit fees documented in the previous studies.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report the results of an experiment where auditors assess the materiality of audit differences in the same magnitude for both a financial audit and a sustainability (water) assurance engagement.
Abstract: With increased interest in voluntary sustainability reports from investors and other stakeholders, more companies are having these reports assured. The issue of what is considered material in these assurance engagements is important, and yet research on materiality has focused only on financial statement audits. This article reports the results of an experiment where auditors assess the materiality of audit differences in the same magnitude for both a financial audit and a sustainability (water) assurance engagement. Two factors, the risk of breaching a contract and community impact, are manipulated between-subjects. We find that auditors assess the materiality of an audit difference significantly higher for a financial case than for a water case. This difference is significantly greater when there is no risk of breaching a contract than when there is a risk of breaching a contract. The risk of breaching a contract has a stronger effect on the difference in auditors' materiality assessments when there is no community impact than when there is a community impact. Overall our findings suggest that qualitative factors have a greater impact on sustainability (water) materiality assessments than on financial statement materiality assessments when an audit difference is between 5 percent and 10 percent of a relevant base. Understanding the factors that impact material judgments in sustainability reports is important as these factors affect the reliability of the reported disclosures.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined whether firms decrease tax reserves to meet analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the period prior to FIN 48, and whether that behavior changed following FIN 48 and found no evidence that firms use changes in tax reserve to manage earnings to meet analyst's forecasts.
Abstract: We examine whether firms decrease tax reserves to meet analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the period prior to FIN 48, and whether that behavior changed following FIN 48. We use analysts' forecasts of pretax and after-tax income to impute premanaged earnings, or earnings before any tax manipulation. Pre- FIN 48, we observe that firms reduce their tax reserves (i.e., increase income) when premanaged earnings are below analysts' forecasts. Specifically, 78 percent of firm-quarters that would have missed the analyst forecast if not for the tax reserve decrease, meet that target when the decrease is included. Furthermore, we find a significant positive association between the decrease in tax reserves and the deviation of premanaged earnings from analysts' forecasts. In contrast, post- FIN 48, we find no evidence that firms use changes in tax reserves to manage earnings to meet analysts' forecasts. Thus, our results suggest that FIN 48 has, at least initially, curtailed firms' use of tax reserves to manage earnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated whether differences in accounting standards across countries create information costs that inhibit firms from investing in foreign markets and found that the aggregate volume of M&A activity across country pairs is larger for pairs of countries with similar Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Abstract: This study investigates whether differences in accounting standards across countries create information costs that inhibit firms from investing in foreign markets. Using the frequency and dollar magnitude of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 32 countries over the period 1998-2004, we find that the aggregate volume of M&A activity across country pairs is larger for pairs of countries with similar Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ( GAAP), and that this increased volume of M&A activity is driven by target countries that also have strong enforcement. We also find that the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard ( IFRS) attracted more cross-border M&As among IFRS-adopting countries, and that this increase in M&A activity within the IFRS countries is more pronounced for country pairs with low similarity in GAAP in the pre- IFRS adoption period. Overall, our results highlight the role of accounting standards and enforcement in shaping cross-border M&A activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether cultural dimensions such as individualism and uncertainty avoidance can explain the variation in the profitability of the earnings momentum strategies in international markets, and they found that the level of individualism in a country is positively associated with earnings momentum profits.
Abstract: This study examines whether cultural dimensions such as individualism and uncertainty avoidance can explain the variation in the profitability of the earnings momentum strategies in international markets. Using the time-varying cultural indices of Tang and Koveos (2008) for 30,383 firms from 41 countries over the period 1995–2008, we show that the level of individualism in a country is positively associated and the level of uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with earnings momentum profits. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive set of control variables and alternative cultural metrics. The central message is that we emphasize the necessity to go beyond the assumption of perfect rationality and to account for innate differences among international investors to explain how accounting information is incorporated into stock prices. We recommend that cultural dimensions be included in cross-country research to account for innate differences among international investors.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether March Madness influences the market response to earnings by diverting investor attention away from earnings news and find that the price reaction to earnings news released during March Madness is muted.
Abstract: Each year, the NCAA basketball tournament (March Madness) is a daytime distraction for millions of people, providing a largely exogenous shock to investor attention. We investigate whether March Madness influences the market response to earnings by diverting investor attention away from earnings news. We find that the price reaction to earnings news released during March Madness is muted. This result generally holds across several samples and additional analyses. We also find that the result is more muted for low institutional ownership firms, consistent with the effect being driven by less-sophisticated investors. Furthermore, we find that it takes the market 30 to 60 days to correct for the distraction effect. Overall, we provide a unique test of the theory of limited attention by documenting that extraneous events can have a significant impact on the pricing of earnings.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the importance of Big Four audits in reducing agency costs evident in corporate debt maturity worldwide and find that the role that auditor choice plays in debt maturity is concentrated in firms from countries with strong legal institutions governing property rights and creditor rights.
Abstract: We examine the importance of Big Four audits in reducing agency costs evident in corporate debt maturity worldwide. Analyzing a large sample of public firms from 42 countries reveals that the fraction of long-term debt in firms' capital structures rises with the presence of a Big Four auditor, suggesting that higher-quality audits substitute for short-term debt for monitoring purposes. In additional analyses, we find that the role that auditor choice plays in debt maturity is concentrated in firms from countries with strong legal institutions governing property rights and creditor rights. Collectively, our research implies that Big Four audits matter to corporate debt maturity, although the impact is isolated in firms operating in countries with more protective legal regimes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test whether internal control weaknesses (ICWs) endanger cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash and find that investors value liquid assets in ICW firms substantially less than they do in non-ICW firms.
Abstract: We test whether internal control weaknesses (ICWs) endanger cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash. Our results indicate that investors value liquid assets in ICW firms substantially less than they do in non-ICW firms. The negative valuation effect of weak internal control mainly concentrates on ICWs related to the control environment or overall financial reporting process. While firms remediating ICWs reverse the value loss from holding cash, firms whose internal control deteriorates or remains ineffective exhibit a lower value of cash. The marginal effect of ICWs on the value of cash remains significant after controlling for existing governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism, highlighting a unique governance role of internal control in mitigating unresolved agency problems and safeguarding corporate resources.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine whether the reported performance of one firm affects the discretionary reporting behavior of another firm by identifying the leader within each industry, defined as the first large announcing firm, and find that the discretionary performance of followers (those firms announcing after the leader) relates positively to the leader's reported performance.
Abstract: In this study we examine whether the reported performance of one firm affects the discretionary reporting behavior of another firm. We do this by identifying the leader within each industry, defined as the first large announcing firm. We find that the discretionary performance of followers (those firms announcing after the leader) relates positively to the leader's reported performance. Specifically, when the leader misses analysts’ expectations, followers report lower discretionary accruals, have fewer income-decreasing special items, and are less likely to meet analysts’ expectations. In contrast, when leaders report good news, followers report higher discretionary accruals and are more likely to meet expectations (although we do not find evidence of a positive association between leaders’ good news and followers’ income-decreasing special items). Overall, the results are consistent with managers of followers perceiving that earnings news of the leader will affect investors’ and others’ performance expectations for their firms.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that managers honor their nonbinding collusive agreements and successfully collude more often in an open versus closed internal reporting environment, leading to lower firm welfare in the open environment.
Abstract: Firms have increasingly adopted open work environments. Although openness is thought to have benefits, it could also expose firms to an unanticipated cost. An open (closed) internal reporting environment makes it more (less) likely that managers will observe a colleague's communications with senior executives. This increase in what one manager knows about another manager's communication to senior executives could facilitate employee collusion to extract resources from the firm. To test whether internal reporting openness results in more collusion, we conduct an experiment in which two managers each make separate reports to the firm about cost information they know in common but that remains unknown by the firm. Because both managers face the same truth-inducing contract, conventional economic theory predicts that they will not collude to misreport costs regardless of reporting openness. However, using behavioral theory involving trust and reciprocity, we predict and find that managers honor their nonbinding collusive agreements and successfully collude more often in an open versus closed internal reporting environment, leading to lower firm welfare in the open environment. These results suggest that firms should consider how the cost of collusion compares to the benefits of openness.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors found that the effectiveness of piece-rate compensation relative to fixed pay in a laboratory letter-search task hinges on the presence or absence of a nonbinding statement to participants that the experimenter values correct responses.
Abstract: We find that the effectiveness of piece-rate compensation relative to fixed pay in a laboratory letter-search task hinges on the presence or absence of a nonbinding statement to participants that the experimenter values correct responses. In the absence of the value statement, participants with piece-rate rewards for correct responses generate more correct and incorrect responses than do their counterparts with fixed pay, correcting errors as they go along to maximize compensation. Essentially, piece-rate compensation acts as an output control, incentivizing participants to maximize correct responses through a “produce-and-improve” strategy. The value statement suppresses this strategy because participants appear to perceive it as an input constraint, prompting greater initial care at the expense of lower overall productivity. As a result, the value statement eliminates the gains in correct responses that piece-rate incentivized participants otherwise realize. Thus, in settings in which individuals can gain efficiency by working expeditiously and improving quality when necessary, our results suggest the possibility that organizations could be better off just letting incentive schemes operate, rather than emphasizing quality in ways that could overly constrain productivity.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found a significant cross-sectional association between banks' 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008-2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance.
Abstract: In this paper, we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks’ financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress? We find a significant cross-sectional association between banks’ 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008–2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance. The mean abnormal short interest in our sample of banks increased from 0.66 percent in March 2005 to 2.4 percent in March 2007 and the association between short interest and leading financial statement indicators also increased. In contrast, we observe neither a meaningful change in analysts’ recommendations, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and audit fees nor an increased sensitivity of these actions to financial indicators of bank distress over this time period. Our results suggest that actions of short sellers likely provided an early warning of the banks’ upcoming distress prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article found that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions, and that managers who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations.
Abstract: This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short-tenured CEOs, CEOs promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEOs are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career-concerned CEOs. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEOs' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEOs with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors find evidence indicating that donors use third-party rating information when they donate to U.S. nonprofit organizations (nonprofits), and they also hypothesize and find that nonprofits with ratings from multiple rating organizations receive incrementally higher levels of donations.
Abstract: We find evidence indicating that donors use third-party rating information when they donate to U.S. nonprofit organizations (nonprofits). Specifically, using a sample of over 3,800 unique nonprofits rated by the three largest charity rating organizations in 2007, and over 12,000 unrated control nonprofits, we find that rated nonprofits have significantly higher direct donations than unrated charities. We also hypothesize and find that nonprofits with ratings from multiple rating organizations receive incrementally higher levels of donations. In addition, although charities that receive a positive rating have higher levels of donor support than those receiving a negative rating, both positively and negatively rated nonprofits receive a higher level of direct donations than unrated nonprofits. Finally, we find that nonprofits with consistently good ratings receive higher donations than those with mixed or consistently negative ratings, indicating the donor community values consistency across the three rating agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effect of targets' participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions and found that targets that make this statement in their merger filings are associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average.
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of targets' participation in tax shelters on takeover premiums in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel data set in which targets disclose that they have not participated in tax shelters, we find that targets that make this statement in their merger filings are associated with 4.6 percent higher takeover premiums, on average. These findings suggest that acquirers are concerned about the potential future liabilities when targets have engaged in tax sheltering. Consistent with this interpretation, the results also indicate that the positive association between targets' nonsheltering disclosure and acquisition premiums is stronger for less tax-aggressive acquirers. This paper demonstrates the importance of targets' aggressive tax positions in the determination of premiums offered to targets' shareholders.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection and found that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance co-venants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender.
Abstract: This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]