Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 1995"

TL;DR: In this article, the authors designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting and found that observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust extended to an anonymous counterpart.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting and define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria, and they argue that for predicting observed behavior the intermediate term predictions of dynamic learning models may be even more important than their asymptotic properties.

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of human behavior in 3 × 3 symmetric games was developed and tested, and the experimental evidence rejected the rational expectations type but confirmed the boundedly rational theory.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the role of the anonymity hypothesis in the deviation from perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum game and conclude that the punishment hypothesis explains much more of the deviation than does the anonymity.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that if common knowledge of rationality obtains in a game of perfect information, then the backward induction outcome is reached, and they formulated precisely and proved the proposition.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the payoff in the Ultimatum Game is such that responders are more apt to be noisy than proposers, and as a result the learning process readily leads to outcomes that are Nash equilibria but not subgame-perfect.

TL;DR: This article showed that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first mover's selection, i.e., when the choice of the subsequent mover is imperfectly observed.

TL;DR: The authors showed that randomizing the order in which players update their strategic choice suffices to achieve coordination on the risk-dominant strategy in symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games, where the "persistant randomness" which is necessary to achieve similar coordination with global interaction is replaced under local interaction by spatial variation in the initial condition.

TL;DR: In this paper, the concept of norm equilibrium for random matching games was introduced, which is a Nash equilibrium that relies on substantially less information than common knowledge of the game, and it has been shown to be useful in understanding economic problems in which strategic behavior is important.

TL;DR: In this paper, the results of an experiment studying the choices of subjects playing mixed extensions of three variants of simple 2 × 2 non-constant sum, strictly competitive games of the same form (Matching Pennies) are presented.

TL;DR: The authors conducted ultimatum games in which a proposer offers a division of $10 to a respondent, who accepts or rejects it, if an offer is rejected, players receive a known outside option.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies, and show that the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the behavior of the system over finite time periods.

TL;DR: In this article, a model of adaptive learning was proposed to capture the bidding patterns evident among human subjects in experimental auctions and provided a variety of insights into the nature of learning across different auction institutions.

TL;DR: In this article, a mathematical model is suggested for measuring the strength of the incentives that each type of any player has to use any particular strategy in the case he represents this player in the game.

TL;DR: For many normal form games, the limiting behavior of fictitious play and the time-averaged replicator dynamics coincide as discussed by the authors, where this limit is not a Nash equilibrium, but a Shapley polygon.

TL;DR: In this paper, a group of individuals repeatedly play a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions, and each player maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a more general class of learning processes in which agents' choices are perturbed by incomplete information about what the other side has done, variability in their payoffs, and unexplained trembles.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction and show that when playing a subjective game repeatedly, subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this paper, order independent equilibria (OIE) were introduced for noncooperative games of coalition formation, based on an underlying game in coalitional form, and a strategy profile is an OIE if, for any specification of first movers in the sequential game, it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff.

TL;DR: In this article, a dynamic learning process that has two main characteristics: players have a bounded memory and they play best replies against beliefs, formed on the basis of strategies used in the recent past is presented.

TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of fairly allocating an indivisible good to one of several agents equally entitled to it when monetary compensations to the others are possible is considered.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play, which allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the equilibrium solutions for common pool resource dilemma games in which X has a uniform distribution, players have power utility functions with a common parameter, c, and requests are made simultaneously or sequentially.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose to use the notions of strong uninvadability and strong unbeatability, refinements of evolutionary and neutral stability, respectively, for games of interest for economics.

TL;DR: In this paper, the influence of commitment versus discretion in a simple bargaining game was investigated and it was shown that commitment does significantly increase efficiency in the experiment. But the authors did not consider the effect of trust on the efficiency of the bargaining process.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied repeated games with a finite number of players, a fixed number of actions, discounted payoffs, and perfect recall, and the players' initial expectations were given by a common prior distribution over player types, a type being a discount rate and payoff matrix.

TL;DR: A measure of risk dominance between two strict equilibrium points of a bipolar game with linear incentives is characterized by 11 axioms in this article, where the game is defined as a normal-form game with two pure strategies for each player and two equilibrium points without common equilibrium strategies.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a dynamical model of mutation in evolutionary games, in which all possible mixtures of n pure strategies are admitted, and the case of n = 2 pure strategies is investigated in detail.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that monotonicity of the best-reponse functions in a two-player game is not sufficient to derive predictions about the order of moves.