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Showing papers in "Governance in 1994"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a critical review of the statist perspective on East Asian political economy is presented, finding that it is lacking in its claims to explain economic performance, neglectful of intra-state dynamics, and inadequate in its depictions of state-society relations.
Abstract: This article presents a critical review of the statist perspective on East Asian political economy. The statist perspective is found lacking in its claims to explain economic performance, neglectful of intra-state dynamics, and inadequate in its depictions of state-society relations. Studies attempting to remedy these shortcomings through an application of concepts from network theory are also examined. These studies provide a conceptually richer description of state-society interaction. However, they fall short of explaining the essentially political nature of interaction, both between state and society and within the state. New directions for research are suggested. The key elements of the alternative approach are politics, institutions and leadership choice. These factors are widely acknowledged to be mutually influencing; however, the nature of their interrelations is only vaguely understood. A crucial task of research lies in explaining how politics, institutions and leadership choices interact to constitute lines of policy and to shape trajectories of economic development.

101 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors outline the case for, and assesses the merits of, placing the purchase of governmental policy advice on a more competitive basis, and argue that neither option is likely to enhance the efficiency or effectiveness with which policy advice is produced, whether under conditions of short-term or long-term contracting.
Abstract: Throughout the OECD, governments have been contracting out an increasing range of goods and services. Against this background, this article outlines the case for, and assesses the merits of, placing the purchase of governmental policy advice on a more competitive basis. Two options are given particular attention: first, the creation of an internal market for policy advice within the public sector under which departments and other government agencies would tender to supply specific policy outputs; and second, a more radical option under which public and private sector organizations would compete for the contracts to supply governmental policy advice. Drawing on the insights of the new institutional economics, it is argued that neither option is likely to enhance the efficiency or effectiveness with which policy advice is produced, whether under conditions of short-term or long-term contracting. This is due to the likelihood of: only partial contestability (due, among other things, to asset specificity in the form of transaction-specific expertise and trust); a greater risk of opportunistic behavior by the suppliers of advice (and also, under some conditions, by the purchasers); higher agency costs and transaction costs; and greater problems with respect to horizontal and vertical policy coordination. Such considerations suggest that the widespread reliance of governments on relatively permanent advisory institutions and in-house expertise can be explained and justified on the same theoretical grounds that have prompted the contracting out of other publicly-funded goods and services.

93 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explores various recent uses of the concept of competence, with particular attention to political conditions favoring an emphasis on neutrality or responsiveness, and concludes with a brief comparative analysis of the quest for responsiveness in administration.
Abstract: Competence is a frequently used but complex concept This article explores various recent uses of the concept, with particular attention to political conditions favoring an emphasis on neutrality or responsiveness We close with a brief comparative analysis of the quest for responsiveness in administration

76 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors establish a framework for understanding the basic characteristics and use of companies from a comparative perspective, focusing on their "publicness" and accountability as affected by their ownership, management, financing, and control, which can all involve a varying mix of the public and private sectors both domestically and internationally.
Abstract: Privatization initiatives and the doctrines of “New Public Management” have led to incorporated companies assuming considerable significance within government in many countries. The implications of this development for the structure and operation of the modern state are potentially far-reaching, but are yet to be appropriately comprehended. In response, the article seeks to establish a framework for understanding the basic characteristics and use of companies from a comparative perspective. Attention is focused on their “publicness” and accountability as affected by their ownership, management, financing, and control, which can all involve a varying mix of the “public” and “private” sectors both domestically and internationally. An underlying belief is that a lot more research and analysis are required in this important area of organizational activity.

75 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an instrumental or "action-oriented" model is proposed to focus on formal organizational, demographic and physical structures of institutions as the possible instruments, or steering factors, in organizational design.
Abstract: The discipline of public administration could play a more constructive role in the field of administrative policy if the gap between empirical-theoretical research and the professional role of political scientists in governments were bridged. This article outlines an instrumental or “action-oriented” model which provides a theoretical framework through which to focus on formal organizational, demographic and physical structures of institutions as the possible instruments, or “steering factors” in organizational design. The model emphasizes empirical observations of the relationships between the instrumental indendent) variables and actual decision behavior (dependent variables). The author draws on studies conducted in the central governments of several countries.

43 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the debate over the principle of subsidiarity may be undermined or cut off prematurely in at least three ways: First, if the debate is conducted with a view to arriving at a fairly fixed, detailed and instrumental understanding of the allocation of responsibilities and tasks between different levels of government.
Abstract: This article explores whether and how subsidiarity can serve as an instructive aid to discussion and clarification of the current and future structure and functioning of the European Community. W e argue that the debate over the principle of subsidiarity may be undermined or cut off prematurely in at least three ways. First, if the debate is conducted with a view to arriving at a fairly fixed, detailed and instrumental understanding of the allocation of responsibilities and tasks between different levels of government. Second, if the principle of subsidiarity is mainly used as an instrument of political expediency and opportunism to further organizational or self interests. Third, if the principle is linked to and interpreted as an endorsement and justification of existing (entrenched) political and social doctrines. In a concluding last section we consider how the principle of subsidiarity may contribute to constructive discussion.

31 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In contrast to the authoritarian rule of other Asian developmental states, the Chinese state exercises totalitarian rule over the society as discussed by the authors, and state organizations thoroughly penetrate society and the state plays a hegemonic role in the economy, based on the principles of public ownership and central planning.
Abstract: Since the nature of the state and state—society relations in China are significantly different from other "developmental states" in East Asia, an analysis of Chinese political economy has to go beyond the developmental state theory. The Chinese state is a socialist state which is an amalgamation of the Communist Party, the government, and their vast network of affiliated social organizations. In contrast to the authoritarian rule of other Asian developmental states, the Chinese state exercises totalitarian rule over the society. Among other characteristics of this totalitarian rule, state organizations in China thoroughly penetrate society and the state plays a hegemonic role in the economy, based on the principles of public ownership and central planning (McCormick, 1990, p. 7). Therefore, alternative theoretical arguments are needed to explain China's political economy.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The success of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with little linkage to the state in Taiwan strongly suggests that more than state leadership must have been involved in the island's economic miracle as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: This article seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on moving “beyond the developmental state” by tracing the important role of “guerrilla capitalism” in Taiwan's political economy. The success of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with little linkage to the state in Taiwan strongly suggests that more than state leadership must have been involved in the island's “economic miracle.” The SMEs are quite important for the overall economy, especiaiiy the export sector where they have long accounted for more than half of total exports. Their success has resulted from the practice of “guerrilla capitalism” which includes aggressive and even audacious pursuit of business opportunities, extreme flexibility in rapidly filling even small orders, atten tion to quality and design, audacious bidding, participation in complex networks of subcontracting, and only partial observation at best of government regulations and international laws, such as those regarding intellectual property rights. The emergence of guerrilla capifalism, in turn, can be explained by the long-sfanding challenge in Chinese history to “official” Confucianism by a “heterodox counterculture” that is quite conducive to entrepreneurship and small-scale business activities.

17 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examines Japan's "financial system reform", the process by which the Ministry of Finance has recast the regulatory barriers between different types of financial institutions, such as banks and securities houses, and suggests that they have been remarkably successful in promoting their own peculiar interpretation of the public interest and in preserving and enhancing their own power.
Abstract: While all industrialized countries have enacted financial reforms over the past decade, Japan's Ministry of Finance (MoF) officials have crafted a distinctive approach to reform. They have managed to pursue their own agenda while at the same time responding to international market pressures and domestic political demands. This article examines Japan's “financial system reform,” the process by which the MoF has recast the regulatory barriers between different types of financial institutions, such as banks and securities houses. Financial system reform represents an extreme case of a common Japanese policy pattern—the bureaucratic-led bargain—in which Japan's bureaucrats, rather than its politicians, organize the bargains that eventually emerge as policy. Two ministry policy councils deliberated for seven years before the Diet passed comprehensive reform legislation in 1992, and the ministry continues to redefine the reform at the stage of implementation today. While MoF officials have been forced to make concessions to industry groups and to adjust to unforeseen developments along the way, they have maintained overall control of the reform process. In fact, this article suggests that they have been remarkably successful in promoting their own peculiar interpretation of the public interest and in preserving and, in some cases, enhancing their own power.

15 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe variables related to these theoretical approaches and test them as determinants of two operationalizations of interest group influence, one objective and one reputational.
Abstract: Corporatism and pluralism predict different characteristics of interest groups; their environments are important in understanding the level of influence that these groups have. This article describes variables related to these theoretical approaches and tests them as determinants of two operationalizations of interest group influence, one objective and one reputational. Results of these tests on Swedish interest group information indicate that, although Sweden has usually been considered a model corporatist political system, the situation is more complicated, with some pluralist factors being quite important. The study suggests that interest group influence may be more objectively determinable than is usually believed.

13 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The connection between administrative structure and policy strategy for public agencies is neither well understood, nor widely appreciated in political science as mentioned in this paper, and much more emphasis is placed on the structure of linkages between bureaucracies and other political institutions.
Abstract: The connection between administrative structure and policy strategy for public agencies is neither well understood, nor widely appreciated in political science. Much more emphasis is placed on the structure of linkages between bureaucracies and other political institutions. In this article, 1 advance an argument explaining the importance of strategy in policymaking for public agencies, and demonstrate how the concept needs to be refined in order for it to have meaning for public sector organizations. Strategy is analyzed in terms of two categories of uncertainty: generalized and contingent. Because of the ubiquitousness of generalized uncertainty in public policymaking, developing a capacity for anticipating uncertainty problems is critical in strategy formation. Whether that capacity exists is a function of administrative structure. 1 further present an argument for why structure deserves consideration as a political and technical matter, and not simply as a consequence of political preferences. For most of the past decade and a half, public sector planning has been in disfavor. Much of the hostility toward planning has been directed at the American federal bureaucracy. Recently, however, a more favorable climate seems to have emerged regarding the prospects of large-scale bureaucratic planning. But even as new policy ventures - such as massive reform of the American health care insurance and delivery system - are contemplated, the ghosts of past failures serve as reminders that success entails more than advancing innovative policy ideas; it necessarily includes the bureaucratic structures and processes involved in the administration of new policy. The issue of whether public bureaucracy, particularly American public bureaucracy, is designed to innovate or to plan for much of anything is a contentious one for students of administration. Both incrementalist and public choice models of bureaucratic behavior argue that American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective, much less efficient (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1973; 1979; Moe 1989). Competing interest groups and elective political institutions see to it that careful controls

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined the role of the state in the development of a variety of Asian nations through a series of paired comparisons to evaluate the model of the developmental state that has become prevalent in the analysis of East Asian political economy.
Abstract: This article examines the role the state has played in the development of a variety of Asian nations through a series of “paired comparisons” to evaluate the model of the developmental state that has become prevalent in the analysis of East Asian political economy. The cases included in the study indicate that neither the state nor the market (as argued by neoclassical economists) can explain developmental outcomes by itself. Too many strong and interventionist states succeeded to gainsay the idea that economic competitiveness can be manipulated. However, the statist faith in strong and autonomous developmental states does not fare very well either. Strong states failed as well as succeeded. In fact, the strongest and most autonomous states may well be in the greatest danger of degeneration because they can resist pressures for change and can use their powers to become a “predator” over society. In addition, quite a few of these mini case studies directly imply that the nature of society is an important variable in deter-mining how well a political economy operates. Thus, the case for “bringing society back in” appears to be a strong one.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue the worth of investigating political regime forms, the extent to which a country's politics are stable or unstable and democratic or authoritarian, focusing on three important Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand).
Abstract: Because of the diversity that characterizes politics in Southeast Asia, area specialists hasve lacked a framework for comparative analysis. Drawing on some of the recent transitions literature, this article argues the worth of investigating political regime forms, the extent to which a country's politics are stable or unstable and democratic or authoritarian. It then focuses on three important Southeast Asian countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand — analyzing stabilitylinstability in terms of state elites and their rules of the game, while considering democracylauthoriturianism in terms of societal audiences and legitimating “mentalities.” Briefly, Indonesia's authoritarian regime (and its strong appearance of stability) is attributed to astute personalist leadership, muted elite rivalries, and control over societal audiences. In contrast, Thailand's unstable democracy emerges from uneven national leadership, perennial elite disunity, and episodic surges in societal pressures. And Malaysia's semi-democratic regime — in some ways bordered by the outcomes in Indonesia and Thailand — is explained by skilful national leadership and sustained elite unity, offsetting the country's ftuctuating levels of societal tensions and claims.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy is made, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.
Abstract: Political science can offer few theoretical generalizations about the exercise of presidential power. From one perspective, this is no disadvantage: there are few presidents, and presidential leadership so intrinsically involves the interplay of ideas and persuasive deliberation that success depends on personal traits and the fit of the president's ideas with the times. Striving for inductive generalizations in such a case would mistake rote scientific method for the pursuit of knowledge. Others argue, however, that the dearth of theoretical generalizations is a temporary weakness, remediable by shifting to a deductive approach. Deductive theorizing can claim insights in other areas once typified by historiographic methods, notably in studies of Congress, and formal models of legislation have been extended to generate hypotheses about transactions between president and Congress. I suggest that neither side of the dilemma offers a satisfactory and complete approach to the puzzle of presidential leadership; it then goes on to specify how the contributions from each side fit together. Rational choice models, based on bargaining as the mode of influence and the repeated game as the image of process, show how institutional structures can produce stable decisions where majority rule tends toward endless cycling. But the cost is that the resulting decisions are typically ad hoc and disjointed. Achieving consistent and coherent policy requires more subtle coordination of individual expectations than legislative organizations can manage, and it is this limitation of bargaining that establishes the potential for presidential leadership. Presidents can attempt to capitalize on this opportunity either by intervening as an additional (but situationally advantaged) bargainer, or by employing persuasion, the explicit appeal to collective goals rather than particularistic trades. I develop the distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of Mexico, it may be the case that the social-liberal model brings economic growth but does not help in bringing about a better distribution of income and more democracy as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Nowadays, the Mexican political regime is one of the oldest regimes in the world. Established in 1929, in a few years it could break the USSR record for a party in power. After an important crisis in 1988, president Salinas managed to get the ship out of the storm with an effective set of macroeconomic policies. In fact, he has been seen internationally as a very effective leader, who achieved what Gorbachev could not: a deep economic reform without a political crisis. He proposed and succeeded in starting a North American Free Trade Agreement and reformed the state structure along the lines of what he calls “social liberalism.” The prospects for the regime and the party in power look good for the presidential elections of 2994. Nothing however assures that the current policies will really help to solve Mexico's unemployment and inequality problems. The vertical political and administrative structures are not well suited for that purpose and are a source of political instability. It may be the case that the social-liberal model brings economic growth but does not help in bringing about a better distribution of income and more democracy. In this case, either in 2994 or later, the regime may face dificulties and it may not allow for a pacific political transition. To avoid this, the country will need active social, small business, regional and educational policies, handled by a professional administrative apparatus. It will also need more democratic electoral and policymaking systems plus a working division of powers and federalism. In a country with long authoritarian traditions these are difficult to attain, yet possible objectives.

Journal ArticleDOI
Paul Teague1
TL;DR: A significant coordination deficit exists between the two economies in Ireland, which, if reduced, could bring mutual economic benefits; however, this does not mean that deeper economic integration can be a conduit to the political unification of Ireland as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A significant coordination deficit exists between the two economies in Ireland, which, if reduced, could bring mutual economic benefits; however, this does not mean that deeper economic integration can be a conduit to the political unification of Ireland. To the extent that economic integration has a political dimension, it should be about reducing the decades of mistrust and even animosity between the two parts of the island.

Journal ArticleDOI
John A. Rohr1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the understanding of executive power in the debates at the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and found that the framers intended to place the prime minister at the head of the executive power and to shield him from removal by the President of the Republic.
Abstract: This article examines the understanding of executive power in the debates at the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The examination discovered a concept of executive power quite different from the real executive power revealed in the history of the Fifth Republic. The framers of the constitution intended to place the prime minister at the head of the executive power and to shield him from removal by the President of the Republic. The direct election of the president, brought about by the problematic constitutional amendment of 1962, provided the legitimacy for the de facto dominant role of the president apart from the two cohabitation periods.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the Italian and Canadian experiences suggest that political and institutional factors may shape how national states respond to the pressure to shift regulatory capacity to structures at some other level.
Abstract: The pressures of globalization and capital flight create two sets of challenges for national state structures. They are seen fo limit the boundaries of state action, and within those boundaries, they lead to a transfer of regulatory capacity to supra and/or subnational structures. The article explores the second set of challenges and asks whether globalization has led to uniform changes in the regulatory capacity of national states in the area of financial institutions. It argues that the Italian and Canadian experiences suggest that political and institutional factors may shape how national states respond to the pressure to shift regulatory capacity to structures at some other level. In the Italian case, the emergence of a single market for banking in Europe led to a strengthening of the state's policymaking capacity. In Canada, on the other hand, the federal government's authority was limited by competition with provincial regulatory regimes. Globalization may limit the boundaries of state action, but this does not necessarily mean that those boundaries will not be occupied primarily by national state structures.