Showing papers in "Interest groups & Advocacy in 2014"

Defining and classifying interest groups

Abstract: The interest group concept is defined in many different ways in the existing literature and a range of different classification schemes are employed. This complicates comparisons between different studies and their findings. One of the important tasks faced by interest group scholars engaged in large-N studies is therefore to define the concept of an interest group and to determine which classification scheme to use for different group types. After reviewing the existing literature, this article sets out to compare different approaches to defining and classifying interest groups with a sample of lobbying actors coded according to different coding schemes. We systematically assess the performance of different schemes by comparing how actor types in the different schemes differ with respect to a number of background characteristics. This is done in a two-stage approach where we first cluster actors according to a number of key background characteristics and second assess how the categories of the different interest group typologies relate to these clusters. We demonstrate that background characteristics do align to a certain extent with certain interest group types but also find important differences in the organizational attributes of specific interest group types. As expected, our comparison of coding schemes reveals a closer link between group attributes and group type in narrower classification schemes based on group organizational characteristics than those based on a behavioral definition of lobbying.

Revolving door lobbyists and interest representation

Abstract: Although experience inside the halls of power afford lobbyists valuable political, policy and procedural skills that can improve the deliberative process, it also gives them privileged access to former employers that others do not have. Washington’s revolving door evokes legitimate ethical concerns, such as when former legislators resign their seats to take lucrative jobs representing the very industries they regulate. However, social scientists know surprisingly little about the revolving door beyond such sensational, albeit important, cases. To shed more light on the broader phenomenon, we systematically explore the revolving door on a large scale to answer a simple question: Do revolving door lobbyists represent different interests than conventional lobbyists? If, as revolving door proponents imply, these lobbyists work on behalf of organized interests solely for their specialized subject-matter expertise, then we would expect them to represent clienteles that are no different than conventional lobbyists. Alternatively, if they represent a wider variety of economic interests than conventional lobbyists then we assume they are hired more for their ability to get a foot in the door than to serve as policy expert adjuncts to government. Using evidence from original data on the professional biographies of roughly 1600 registered lobbyists – which we link to data from almost 50 000 quarterly Lobbying Disclosure Act reports – we expose a significant transparency loophole in the law. Because lobbyists are not required to continuously disclose their ‘covered official’ status – the statutory definition of revolving door – periodic lobbying disclosure reports effectively hide the revolving door from public scrutiny. Instead, we rely on our more comprehensive information on lobbyists’ connections to previous employers to more accurately measure the size and scope of Washington’s revolving door, and to investigate how these connections affect which interests they represent. We find that revolving door lobbyists have worked mostly in Congress, tend to work as contract lobbyists rather than in-house government-relations staff and are more likely to specialize in lobbying for appropriations earmarks. Then, after controlling for a variety of lobbying specializations, we show that former members of Congress are no more likely than other lobbyists to attract a more economically diverse set of clients than their conventional-lobbyist counterparts. However, congressional staffers who had worked their way up the organizational ladder on Capitol Hill do. We infer that well-connected congressional staffers who spin through the revolving door sell access to key decision makers in Congress, not their industry- or issue-specific technical or substantive expertise. Simply, the revolving door problem is not limited to a handful of headline-catching former legislators, is much bigger than the existing lobbying disclosure regime reveals and – most importantly – significantly distorts the representation of interests before government. The practical implications are clear: lobbying transparency rules, cooling-off periods and other restrictions are insufficient disincentives. Interest group demand for access is simply too strong. We advocate enhancing lobbying transparency by expanding the statutory definitions of lobbying activities, requiring lobbyists to disclose more details about government employment and shifting some of the disclosure burden to democratically accountable government officials themselves.

The INTEREURO Project: Logic and structure

Abstract: This article outlines both the overall structure of the INTEREURO Project (Comparative Research on Interest Group Politics in Europe) and the theoretical foci, research activities and data sets generated by its several modules. We provide this description for two purposes. First, it provides a necessary backdrop for understanding the remaining essays in this special issue. Importantly, we do not believe that the methodological challenges we faced are unique to the INTEREURO Project. Rather, they characterize any large-N research project on interest representation. Thus, we hope that these articles based on the INTEREURO Project are useful to a broad range of scholars. Our second purpose is to describe for the wider community of interest organization scholars the INTEREURO Project and the data generated thereby.

Policy-centred sampling in interest group research: Lessons from the INTEREURO project

Abstract: Proper sampling is the foundation for all scientific enquiry aimed at making generalizable claims about a wider set of cases. Indeed, inferential statistical analysis presupposes representative samples and units of analysis that can be considered as independent observations. Establishing a sample of issues on which lobbying may take place, which is at the same time representative of an overall population of issues and of the varying levels of conflict and political mobilization, however, is a major challenge for interest group research. Drawing on existing research practices, we discuss a series of different approaches that may be used to establish a sample of policy issues. The focus then is on the policy-centred stratified sampling procedure used in the INTEREURO project. Although our approach has important advantages, we extensively discuss several challenges we faced as well as the procedures we developed in order to deal with these.

Let's talk! On the practice and method of interviewing policy experts

Abstract: This article sheds light on the practice and method of expert interviewing in research projects on interest group politics. We first discuss the rationale of interviewing as a data collection instrument, arguing that a careful combination and cross-validation of behavioral and observational data improves the quality of interviews as well as provide a means to validate existing unobtrusive data sources. Moreover, this approach makes it possible to conduct a comprehensive analysis based on both behavioral and observational data sources. Subsequently, we discuss several methodological and practical issues to avoid biases associated with interviewing. One of the key observations from our experience with INTEREURO is that establishing a robust interview project on the role of interest groups in public policymaking rests largely on careful preparation. Thus, most work needs to be situated before the effective interview takes place, and our key objective is to clarify the importance of this preparatory stage.

Identifying frames: A comparison of research methods

Abstract: Framing plays an important role in public policy. Interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of a policy proposal while downplaying others in order to steer the policy debate in a favorable direction. Despite the importance of framing, we still know relatively little about the framing strategies of interest groups due to methodological difficulties that have prevented scholars from systematically studying interest group framing across a large number of interest groups and multiple policy debates. This article therefore provides an overview of three novel research methods that allow researchers to systematically measure interest group frames. More specifically, this article introduces a word-based quantitative text analysis technique, a manual, computer-assisted content analysis approach and face-to-face interviews designed to systematically identify interest group frames. The results generated by all three techniques are compared on the basis of a case study of interest group framing in an environmental policy debate in the European Union.

The two worlds of lobbying: Washington lobbyists in the core and on the periphery

Abstract: For decades, political scientists have had two divergent views on lobbyists in Washington. On the one hand they focus on the privileged access of a few groups in balkanized issue niches, and on the other they observe highly inclusive lobbying campaigns where hundreds of lobbyists vigorously compete for policymakers’ attention. Not surprisingly, these disparate observations lead to contradictory conclusions about lobbying tactics, relations with relevant policymakers and the nature of interest group influence. In this article, we make a simple, yet novel, empirical observation: these seemingly incongruent observations of lobbying at the micro level are not inconsistent when we uncover the structure of lobbyists’ interactions at the macro level. That is, both views are correct, depending on the policy context. Using data from 248 543 Lobbying Disclosure Act reports filed between 1998 and 2008 – which consists of 1 557 526 observations of 32 700 individual lobbyists reporting activity in 78 issue areas – we reveal that the Washington lobbying community has a fundamental and stable core–periphery structure. We then document how the empirically derived core–periphery mapping is a superior way to differentiate bandwagon or niche policy domains. As transaction cost theory suggests, we find that policy domains in the core have more in-house lobbyists and more revolving door lobbyists. And, on average, lobbyists active in core domains represent a greater diversity of interests and tend to be policy generalists. The converse is also true. Highly specialized contract lobbyists drift toward those sparsely populated domains in the periphery where they may focus on obscure policy minutiae, relatively free from public scrutiny. Our findings have important implications for the study of lobbying and interest representation. In Washington, there are really two worlds of lobbying. The first world, where most lobbying attention is directed, is one in which we see a great deal of interconnectedness and interest diversity. The second world, home to an overwhelming majority of policy domains, cultivates niche lobbying and policy balkanization. That these two worlds exist simultaneously is precisely why observers fail to agree on what ‘typical’ or ‘average’ lobbying is. We believe that this is why the political science literature on interest groups have been contradictory for so long. The abstract core–periphery structure we uncover also has important practical implications for influence in Washington. At first glance, those highly competitive policy domains in the core appear to embody the pluralistic ideal. However, we show that these conditions give interest groups the incentive to hire revolving door lobbyists, who sell access to former employers – not highly specialized expertise – at a premium. Existing lobbying disclosure and revolving door regulations do little to level the playing field. Washington’s most powerful interests know they need to staff up with large numbers of former government officials if they want to stick out in the crowd. Indeed, it appears to be one of the most effective ways to find a seat at the center of the conversation.

Measuring lobbying success spatially

Abstract: The measurement of the political success of organized interests continues to be among the thornier tasks faced by political scientists. The methodological challenges include determining the preferences of key actors and the extent to which these are satisfied by the policy outcome. We examine how interest group success has been measured in the literature and develop an alternative, spatial approach to measuring lobbying success. We present and compare different spatial measures of success using simulations and new data from the INTEREURO project. We demonstrate that the choice of measurement has implications for the findings generated by studies of interest group success. Assessments of success differ according to whether or not they consider a reversion point. However, different modes of incorporating the reversion point lead to largely similar findings.

Exploring the diversity of transnational actors in global environmental governance

Abstract: This article describes and explains the diversity of two populations of transnational actors (TNAs) in global environmental governance, namely, the non-state observers at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Available financial resources and proximity to COP venue emerge as strong indicators of a TNA’s likelihood to participate at both UNFCCCC and CBD COPs.

The European Citizens’ Initiative: A new sphere of EU politics?

Abstract: European Union (EU) public policy is notoriously technical and consensus orientated, and dialogue between political institutions and interest groups may enhance tendencies for inward looking and elite politics. A new European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) mechanism seems to offer an opportunity to address these structural defects. We examine the entire set of more than 60 signature collection campaigns stimulated by the ECI for the degree of contention and type of campaign they bring to EU politics. A key feature of a majority of campaigns involves a diversity of origin, both by territory and campaign source. We record the diverse ways in which the ECI has been utilised by campaigners, noting how campaigns have largely been introduced by a markedly different set of activists than professionalised EU lobbyists, many newly mobilised by a direct participation device and which may require EU lobby organisations to engage with new forms of campaigning. A key finding is that campaigns originating from sponsors already well linked to EU politics were less likely to be of a contentious nature than those from other sources.

It's not all about the money: Explaining varying policy portfolios of regional representations in Brussels

Abstract: The literature on territorial lobbying in the European Union (EU) has paid much attention to the interaction between regional representations in Brussels and the member-state central governments, and the relations of these representations with the European institutions. Surprisingly, far less systematic research has been conducted on the policies that regional representations prioritize when they lobby in Brussels. In this article, we focus on the policy portfolios of these organizations and analyze variation concerning the domains and issues these regional representations prioritize. Empirically, we demonstrate that the size and the nature of a policy portfolio is not primarily affected by the capabilities of a regional representation, but rather results from structural ties of regional lobbyists with other public and private interests. This claim is corroborated by data collected through a telephone survey with 127 officials from regional offices and trans-regional associations.

Multilevel ‘venue shopping’: The case of EU’s Renewables Directive

Abstract: Lobbying has traditionally been an enterprise of national interest organizations, which chiefly seek to influence national actors, especially governments. However, studies find that national interest organizations increasingly also target the European Union (EU). As the EU agenda has increased in depth and scope, interest organizations at national and EU political levels might be expected to align in coalitions in order to influence EU legislation. Such strategies potentially increase interest organizations’ political leverage significantly; despite that, lobbying coalitions consisting of organizations aligned to different political levels have been scantily studied in the literature on EU lobbying. Therefore, the first aim of the article is to illustrate a case where coalition lobbying is highly likely: the lobbying strategies employed by the interest organizations of Germany’s energy industries in the process leading up to the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive. These industries are represented by several organizations at both the national and the European level. The second aim of the article is an investigation into how the Renewables Directive came about, as the outcome has profound impact on power production and consumption, and future prospects for EUs mitigation of greenhouse gases. Large controversy was connected to the legal proscriptions of support mechanisms for enhancing renewable energy production in particular. Two of the organizations that would be the most severely affected by the Renewables Directive were the European utilities industry and renewables industry, together constituting all power producers and their affiliates in Europe. The utilities and renewables industries disagreed deeply on core issues, such as legislation on support mechanisms for expanding production of renewable energy in the EU. The utilities industry favored an EU-wide green certificate scheme, whereas the renewables industry pressed for national choice of support mechanisms. Because the stakes were high, both had large incentives to invest substantial resources into lobbying on this legislation. The third aim of the article is to discuss what such multilevel lobbying reveals about perceptions of where real decision-making power is located in the EU. Energy policy is traditionally a strong national domain, which makes the governance theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) relevant to use. However, as the EU is increasingly expanding its legislation on energy issues, the multilevel governance theory (MLG) also might describe how interest organizations perceive power to be located when EU legislation is formulated.The results indicate that despite all lobbying that organizations targeted toward the German government, which played a key role in the negotiations, the observations of the lobbying behavior is still better described by MLG than LI; the limited leverage of LI is illustrated by three points. First, all the German interest organizations lobbied institutions at both the national and at the EU levels. Second, national and European interest organizations participated in informal multilevel political coalitions consisting of a broad church of actors, as regards the renewables industry in particular. By coordinating political positions, pooling resources and developing common strategies, the interest organizations probably increased their leverage substantially, not the least because these coalitions also were backed by governments in key member states and members of the European Parliament. Third, all the EU-level interest organizations lobbied both the core EU institutions and central national governments. Summing up, these findings suggest that multilevel strategies should be considered for inclusion in analyses of national and European-level interest organizations’ lobbying of EU legislation. The interest organizations themselves seem to see power as distributed across multiple levels of governance, and lobby accordingly. In order to grasp momentum of the lobbying process, it is moreover often probably relevant to assess coordination of strategies between interest organizations at different levels in complex multilevel advocacy coalitions. By demonstrating that all organizations covered, regardless of sizes and resources, lobbied at multiple governance levels, this study also nuances the picture of which actors participate in EU policymaking. When legislation on crucial issues is created, small national interest organizations might also target EU institutions. Finally, at least one national interest organization cooperated with private companies to share tasks and enhance lobbying strength. Such cooperation between an interest organization and its private members is a relevant topic of research in future studies on interest organizations.

Access and agenda-setting in the European Union: Advocacy NGOs in comparative perspective

Abstract: In the European Union (EU), rights advocacy NGOs increasingly seek to influence supranational policy making. The success of immigration and asylum NGOs in inserting themselves into policy making depends on existing (in)formal ties to EU institutions. In contrast, human rights-based NGOs received institutional support through the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) containing a civil society platform that aggregates NGO claims. This article applies a comparative framework derived from the literature on transnational advocacy, using the distinction between venues and frames as starting points for analysis. It compares both sets of NGOs, exploring issues of institutional access and agenda-setting, and examines the strategies and objectives of advocacy NGOs in these two different political settings: while immigration and asylum advocates rely mainly on pluralistic lobbying strategies and pre-given, exogenous institutional opportunity structures, Fundamental Rights Platform NGOs engage in a novel approach in which civil society actors endogenously co-constitute aspects of participatory governance in the EU. On the basis of interviews with NGOs and EU officials, we conclude that each of these strategies exhibit specific trade-offs based on the nature of the relationship to the EU institutions. It is argued that each type of access has its idiosyncratic drawback: while immigration and asylum advocacy may result in dispersed opportunities to steer outcomes at the EU level, the inclusion of rights-based NGOs in the FRA limits their strategic repertoire. Finally, issue-specificity also conditions agenda-setting as higher issue convergence enables more focused framing, while a diffuse issue spectrum yields weaker frames and authority.

Upstream influence: The positive impact of PAC contributions on Marcellus Shale roll call votes in Pennsylvania

Abstract: Political scientists have long tried to explain how interest group lobbying and political action committee campaign donations affect election outcomes and public policy debates. Unfortunately, they are often met with null or conflicting results. Consequently, scholars have tested the influence of campaign donations on Congressional outcomes in different parts of the policy-making process, such as roll call votes and committee hearings. Building on these findings, I use the adoption of a Marcellus Shale impact fee in Pennsylvania to test whether campaign contributions have a different effect on bill amendment roll call votes than final floor votes. Given the differing political contexts of these two votes, it stands to reason that there is variation in the relationship between campaign donations and member voting behavior. Specifically, I expect that legislators have more flexibility in voting on amendments than on final bills, and thus factors other than party, including campaign funding, are also relevant. I find that while party, ideology and tenure are the only significant factors associated with roll call votes on final bills, campaign contributions and local-level salience are positively associated with voting on amendments. This shows that while moneyed interests may not be successful in stopping undesirable legislation, they can achieve legislative victory by shaping the bill as it travels through the legislature.

Introduction to the special issue of IG&A on methodological issues of large-N research on interest representation

Abstract: The last decade has seen a remarkable transformation in the study of European national and EU interest representation toward mid-range theories tested with large-N research. One result of these developments is renewed anticipation about the emergence of a true comparative theory of interest representation, one fully attentive to the importance of institutional and issue context. Given this expansion of large-N research on interest representation, the articles in this special issue examine several of the most important methodological issues inherent in such analyses as typified by the still on going INTEREURO (Comparative Research on Interest Group Politics in Europe) Project, sponsored by the European Science Foundation (10-ECRP-008).

In defense of the lowly scorecard: What legislator ratings can tell us about interest groups

Abstract: Oh, the lowly interest group scorecard. Although it has fallen from favor with political scientists in recent decades, we contend scorecards still offer considerable potential for those engaged in interest group research. By aggregating scores across sectors of interests, we can determine under what conditions different types of groups are satisfied with Congress. In our analysis, we aggregate 105 893 ratings of US senators issued by 249 different organizations from the 106th through the 111th Congresses. By ‘flipping’ congressional scorecards on their heads, we find that public interest organizations show the lowest levels of satisfaction, regardless of which party controls the Senate. Business and professional trade associations tend to show higher levels of satisfaction with senators, except during the robust Democratic majority of the 111th Congress. And labor unions produce higher evaluations during Democratic majorities. The typical layperson may assume that groups with popular missions (those representing large populations) and lots of money or those who spend considerable amounts on political activities (for example, campaigning and lobbying) may be more satisfied with Congress. However, this study finds no relationship between group satisfaction and those factors.