Showing papers in "International Affairs in 2010"
Journal Article•
280 citations
TL;DR: A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007-2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007–2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment. This regulatory environment placed a faith in banks own internal risk models, contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour and turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking. The article argues that a form of ‘multi-level regulatory capture’ characterized the global financial architecture prior to the crisis. Simultaneously, regulatory capture fed off, but also nourished the financial boom, in a fashion that mirrored the life cycle of the boom itself. Minimizing future financial booms and crises will require continuous, conscious and explicit efforts to restrain financial regulatory capture now and into the future. The article assesses the extent to which this has been achieved in current global financial governance reform efforts and highlights some of the persistent difficulties that will continue to hamper efforts to restrain regulatory capture. The evidence concerning the extent to which regulatory capture is being effectively restrained is somewhat mixed, and where it is happening it is largely unintentional and accidental. Recent reforms have overlooked the political causes of the crisis and have failed to focus explicitly or systematically on regulatory capture.
263 citations
TL;DR: A close reading of history reveals that the Bretton Woods system did not emerge from a single moment but rather from a much more extended historical process as discussed by the authors, and that a new international financial system is being born today, it will be a slower and more incremental development process that can be divided into four phases: a legitimacy crisis; an interregnum; a constitutive phase; and an implementation phase.
Abstract: The 2007–2008 global financial crisis encouraged speculation about the prospects for a ‘Bretton Woods moment’ in which the global financial system would be radically redesigned Many of those hoping for this outcome have since become disillusioned with the limited nature of the international financial reform agenda But the success and innovation of the Bretton Woods conference was made possible by unique political conditions that are not present today, notably concentrated power in the state system; a transnational expert consensus; and wartime conditions Moreover, a close reading of history reveals that the Bretton Woods system did not emerge from a single moment but rather from a much more extended historical process If a new international financial system is being born today, it will be a slower and more incremental development process that can be divided into four phases: a legitimacy crisis; an interregnum; a constitutive phase; and an implementation phase Viewed from this perspective, post-crisis developments look more significant The crisis of 2007–2008 has already intensified twin legitimacy crises relating to international financial policy and leadership It has also generated an international reform initiative that has been unusual for its speed and internationally coordinated nature Many of the details of this reform initiative remain unresolved and its content and breadth are hotly contested in various ways We thus find ourselves in more of an interregnum than a constitutive phase It remains unclear how quickly, if at all, the latter might emerge and in what form
170 citations
TL;DR: The G20 can be viewed as a "recessionbuster" with a vital but momentary purpose as mentioned in this paper, or as an embedded "steering committee" for the world.
Abstract: Arguably the most important catalytic effect of the ‘Great Recession’ of 2008–2009 has been the creation of the G20 at the leaders’ level. As a form of improvised diplomacy the G20 merits extensive scrutiny, revealing as it does the degree of adaptation possible in the international system. The G20 links a significant ideational component, a new dynamic between established and emerging powers, and a complex set of issues. The innovative quality of the G20, however, rests on two very distinct strands of activity and tests of accomplishments. The G20 can be viewed as a ‘recession-buster’ with a vital but momentary purpose. Alternatively, the G20 can be taken to be an embedded ‘steering committee’ for the world. Both of these interpretations have validity. The crisis committee scenario highlights a technical regulatory-driven agenda. The steering committee scenario by way of contrast showcases the connection between the G20 and a new type of global settlement. Passing the test as a crisis committee hinges on very specific deliverables. Passing the test as a steering committee is even more demanding as any move toward a new state-specific ‘concert’ is highly contested. This article examines these debates, locating the G20 in a historical/comparative perspective and in terms of the wider context of shifting power structure at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
155 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that too many recent contributions to academia rely on assumptions and "conventional wisdom" rather than testable and falsifiable empirical research and methods to explain how an individual departs from point a (a good Muslim boy) to point b (a suicide bomber) and demonstrate how the over-simplification of conventional wisdom privileges convenient political narratives over the complex realities of such situations.
Abstract: Politicians, the media, and some academics are getting it wrong about radicalization. Relying on simple narratives to explain how an individual departs from point a (‘a good Muslim boy’) to point b (‘a suicide bomber’), too many recent contributions to academia rely on assumptions and ‘conventional wisdom’ rather than testable and falsifiable empirical research and methods. Through specific cases, this article seeks to demonstrate how the over-simplification of ‘conventional wisdom’ privileges convenient political narratives over the complex realities of such situations. In light of this failure to account for reality, this article seeks to challenge current thinking on radicalization by exposing its limitations, as currently being used, as a meaningful basis and departure point for rigorous social science research. The article concludes by showing how the current persistence of this ‘conventional wisdom’ approach to radicalization ultimately betrays the normative political assumptions of those who insist on using this term, and how this adherence to ‘conventional wisdom’ now deprives radicalization from being a relevant and useful academic or policy discourse. This is because radicalization as an area for study has been corrupted by its instrumental political application.
118 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the divergence of human security narratives between the UN and the EU and argue that the UN's use of the concept ran aground owing to a triple problematic of lack of clarity, confusion between previously distinct policy streams on human rights and human development and conceptual overstretch.
Abstract: The concept of human security, while much contested in both academic and policy debates, and highly fragmented across different meanings and forms of implementation, offers a potential locus around which global security discourse might converge, particularly in light of current shifts in US security thinking. However, key pioneers of human security, such as the United Nations and Canada, appear to be losing their enthusiasm for the concept, just at the moment when others such as the European Union, are advancing a human security agenda. This article examines the divergence of human security narratives between the UN and the EU. It argues that the UN's use of the concept ran aground owing to a triple problematic of lack of clarity, confusion between previously distinct policy streams on human rights and human development and conceptual overstretch. After assessing the EU experience with the concept to date, the article argues that future use of human security will require greater focus on how it deepens ideas of individual security, rather than treating it as an agenda for broadening security. As well as a need to project clarity on the conceptual definition of human security, there is also a need to associate human security with greater clarity of intent. If successful, this would contribute to establishing second generation human security as a new policy paradigm.
96 citations
TL;DR: The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was the first trade round to be negotiated under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ninth in the post-war multilateral trading system as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) – the first trade round to be negotiated under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ninth in the post-war multilateral trading system – has been dogged by recurrent deadlock. But the stasis surrounding the Doha negotiations should not be mistaken for stasis in the WTO. The world that the WTO was created to govern has been changing rapidly, and, unlike many other international organizations, the WTO has proved unusually responsive to these changes. The most important has been the shift in the economic balance of power, with the emergence of the new powers that have come to be popularly known as the BRICs. Unlike other organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the United Nations (UN) Security Council, that have been slow to adapt their decision-making structures to reflect these ground-level changes, the WTO has welcomed Brazil, India and China (the BICs) into the core of its decision-making. Moreover, many of these institutional changes within the organization are not a knee-jerk reaction to the financial and economic crisis, but predate it. As a result, the WTO today looks quite different from the ‘rich man’s club’ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was dominated by the old Quad (the European Union (EU), the United States (USA), Canada and Japan). Interestingly, however, this ability of the WTO to adapt to changing external imperatives has generated mixed results. In this article, I address the question: What impact has the emergence of the new powers of the BICs had on the WTO?
92 citations
TL;DR: The work in this article explores the development of community engagement within the UK's strategy to tackle international terrorism linked to and inspired by Al-Qaeda, commonly known as CONTEST, focusing mostly on the Prevent strand of the strategy which seeks to prevent radicalization towards violence, reduce tacit support for violence, and increase the resilience of communities to tackle radicalization and extremist messages themselves.
Abstract: This article explores the development of community engagement within the UK's strategy to tackle international terrorism linked to and inspired by Al-Qaeda, commonly known as CONTEST. It focuses mostly on the ‘Prevent’ strand of the strategy which seeks to prevent radicalization towards violence, reduce tacit support for violence, and increase the resilience of communities to tackle radicalization and extremist messages themselves. Community engagement for counterterrorism also relates to certain aspects of the ‘Pursue’ strand of CONTEST, and these are highlighted. The article outlines the case for a community-based approach to counterterrorism and outlines a number of the key developments in its emergence from 2005 onwards. It analyses the performance of this aspect of the counterterrorism strategy, pointing to a number of shortcomings in relation to the establishment of partnerships, the integration of the approach, capacity shortfalls at the local level, and the wider challenges of a hostile political and media environment. Written as the new UK coalition government announces a review of the ‘Prevent’ strategy, it offers a number of recommendations for the future direction of this area of policy. It calls for an overhaul in working styles, a focus on people rather than projects, and the need to draw a much clearer line between downstream and targeted ‘Prevent’ work and the broader and longer-term community development work, with the latter encapsulated within the government's Big Society Programme and aimed at all fragile communities, not just Muslims.
84 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines the interaction between the emerging and traditional powers in global governance reform, and asks whether we are heading towards an international financial system that is more fragmented, where power is more diffused and national and regional arrangements play a more prominent role, at the expense of global multilateral institutions.
Abstract: This article examines the interaction between the emerging and traditional powers in global governance reform, and asks whether we are heading towards an international financial system that is more fragmented, where power is more diffused and national and regional arrangements play a more prominent role, at the expense of global multilateral institutions. It begins with a brief discussion of the global systemic and country-specific factors that motivate Brazil, China and other emerging countries to accumulate large currency reserves. We find that national arrangements for managing financial and currency crises will continue to hold sway for emerging countries in the wake of the global crisis. However, the actual capacity of regional arrangements in managing future financial crises is uncertain, and the significance of regional alternatives in the emerging architecture should not be overstated. The real capacity of East Asian regional arrangements to manage financial crises, payments problems or currency attacks is still untested, and key thresholds in multilateralization still lie ahead. In South America, multilateral lender-of-last-resort support inside the region is largely confined to the sub-regional level and is limited by Brazil's reticence. Enduring reliance on bilateral measures for financial crisis management is noted. Where there has been progress in regional solutions, since the global crisis, has been in the role of regional development banks in providing financing for developing countries to enact counter-cyclical policies. Such support also provides insulation for states in the region against the contagion effects of international financial crisis. We are in the midst of transitioning to a more diverse and multi-tiered global financial and monetary system. A reformed IMF could have a role to play in addressing global imbalances and encouraging a shift from national reserves to collective insurance, however, it would be preconditioned by significant shifts in the policy, lending operations, and internal governance of the Fund, and willingness among the G20 to strike a new consensus on how to deal with imbalances, and new accommodation on acceptable reserve levels.
77 citations
TL;DR: Aboul-Enein et al. as mentioned in this paperierke, Kutchesfahani, Richard Tauwhare and the editor of International Affairs for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
Abstract: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) comes to an important crossroads in 2010. The five-yearly review conference which will take place this May at the United Nations in New York will send a crucial signal about the future of the NPT. The treaty is facing growing pressures that are eroding what has been an effective barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation since it came into existence in 1970. We are not thinking here primarily of the debate over whether the bargain that has underpinned the treaty is becoming increasingly untenable. The problems with this bargain and its implications for the longevity of the treaty have been a source of concern and debate since the treaty was first negotiated in the 1960s. Instead, the new pressures stem, principally, from concrete cases which have revived the old worries about the potential of civilian nuclear fuel-cycles being redirected into military programmes, as well as about the universality of the treaty. The former problem has been graphically illustrated by the fear that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been secretly developing a nuclear weapon under the guise of a peaceful nuclear programme—a loophole to which attention was drawn by Albert Wohlstetter, who had identified the dangers in his classic article ‘Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules’. 1 The latter problem has manifested itself in the outcry over the 2005 US–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, subsequently endorsed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). In the eyes of many non-nuclear-weapon states, India received special treatment even though it did not agree to be bound by the rules and norms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It therefore matters a great deal for the future of international nuclear order how the review conference plays out. It might follow in the footsteps of the largely unsuccessful, if not outright disastrous, review conference held five years ago. Such an outcome would further erode support for the NPT and potentially * W e would like to thank Karin Fierke, Sara Kutchesfahani, Richard Tauwhare and the editor of International Affairs for their comments on earlier versions of this article. We are also grateful to Sameh Aboul-Enein, John Simpson and William Walker for their suggestions during the writing of the article. This is the first output of the ESRC/AHRC fellowship on ‘The challenges to trust-building in nuclear worlds’ under Research Councils UK’s ‘Global Uncertainties’ programme, ‘Security for all in a changing world’. For more details of this research please visit http: //www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/en/research/DDMI/research_trust_building.html.
73 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Germany has become a normalized power with significant implications for the EU, with reference to three policy areas: constitutional reform in the EU; justice and home affairs policy; and an issue that has made German European policy very salient of late, the management of the Eurozone.
Abstract: Germany has traditionally played a key role in promoting European Union solutions to domestic policy problems. In doing so it gained a reputation as a 'tamed power' (Katzenstein). This article reviews Germany's diplomacy two decades after unification. It explores the 'tamed power' hypothesis with reference to three policy areas: constitutional reform in the EU; Justice and Home Affairs policy; and an issue that has made German European policy very salient of late, the management of the Eurozone. The article argues that Germany has become a much less inclusive actor in European policy, pursuing policy solutions through 'pioneer groups' where these offer greater promise than the EU itself and becoming increasingly attentive to domestic political constraints. The article argues that Germany has become a normalized power, with significant implications for the EU. © 2010 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2010 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate a hypothesis drawn from Martin Wight, that a society of states lacking a shared culture, as a result of expansion beyond its original base, will be unstable.
Abstract: This article investigates a hypothesis drawn from Martin Wight, that a society of states lacking a shared culture, as a result of expansion beyond its original base, will be unstable. This instability hypothesis has been influential in how the English School has presented the history of the expansion of European international society to a global scale. The article starts by offering two models of how a global international society could have come about since the late classical era: a multicultural encounter among several expanding civilizations (polycentric), or the takeover of the system by one centre (monocentric). Using these models as a backdrop, two accounts of the expansion story are developed. The Vanguardist account emphasizes the exceptionalism of European culture, posits a 500-year period of western domination, sees multiculturalism and the decline of western power as problematic, and tends to pessimism about the future of international society. The Syncretist account emphasizes the permanence of cross-cultural exchange, posits only a 200-year period of western dominance, sees culture and international society as evolving together, and is not pessimistic about the stability of international society. These two models and two accounts are then used to assess the possible future of international society. The article argues that culture is less of a problem for international society than Wight, and much of the English School, suppose. The evidence for the substantial success of syncretism is strong and provides considerable stability to most of the likely outcomes. The key problem is not culture, but socio-political structure. How can what North et al. call natural states and open access orders find shared practices and institutions that do not destabilize international society?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the dynamics of the process of settling the status of Kirkuk, principally within the framework of the current Iraqi constitution of 2005 and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq proposals of 2009, taking into consideration the broader local, national, regional and international context in which a settlement has to be achieved.
Abstract: This article focuses on the dynamics of the process of settling the status of Kirkuk, principally within the framework of the current Iraqi constitution of 2005 and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq proposals of 2009, taking into consideration the broader local, national, regional and international context in which such a settlement has to be achieved. The article proceeds in four steps. Beginning with a conceptual clarification of the stakes and remedies associated with territorial disputes, it gives a broad overview of the three principal forms in which such disputes occur and illustrates this with pertinent examples of past disputes and their settlement, using this as an empirical basis for discussing the general dimensions of territorial dispute settlements and the factors that determine their precise nature in different cases. This is the background against which the following section contextualizes the situation in Kirkuk. Based on personal interactions with key interlocutors from all of Kirkuk's communities and key Iraqi and external players and analysts, the article examines the three (im-) balances of grievances, demands and power in and around Kirkuk that are essential for understanding the dynamic underlying any efforts to resolve the dispute in and over the province. Taking as a baseline the options currently available under the 2005 constitution of Iraq and the recommendations of the 2009 UN Report on Disputed Territories, it offers some observations on areas of possible compromise centred on power sharing in Kirkuk and status of Kirkuk vis-a-vis Baghdad and Erbil.
TL;DR: In this article, a detailed analysis of the three-year Helmand mission (Operation Herrick) is presented, highlighting the way in which this distinctive campaign lay-down may be a reflection of British military culture and its military doctrine.
Abstract: British forces are now engaged in a major operation in southern Afghanistan, the outcome of which is likely to be strategically decisive—especially for the configuration and status of Britain's land forces. Although progress seems to have been made, there has been much criticism of the campaign. Through an analysis of the three-year Helmand mission (Operation Herrick), this article explores whether, for all the improvements in the campaign in terms of resources and numbers of troops, the basic structure of the campaign established in 2006 has endured. Instead of focusing on an ‘ink-spot’ from which to expand, British forces have tended to operate from dispersed forward operating bases from which they have insufficient combat power to dominate terrain and secure the population. They are consequently engaged in a seemingly endless round of high-intensity tactical battles which are normally successful in themselves but do not contribute to the overarching security of the province. The analysis explores the way in which this distinctive campaign lay-down—the preference for dispersal and high-intensity fighting—may be a reflection of British military culture and its military doctrine. By highlighting potential unacknowledged aspects of the British military profession, the article aims to contribute to debates about the development of the armed forces.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an analysis of the EU's engagement in Georgia as a standpoint from which to assess the EU role as a conflict manager, concluding that the EU has suffered from two key weaknesses that have prevented it from living up to its aspirations of becoming a globally significant and effective conflict manager.
Abstract: This article offers an analysis of the EU's engagement in Georgia as a standpoint from which to assess the EU's role as a conflict manager. The article begins with a brief narrative account of the development of EU - Georgia relations in the context of the country's two unresolved conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It then proceeds to the analysis of two sets of factors - those within, and those external to, the EU - that are crucial for understanding the nature and impact of EU efforts to manage the two Georgian conflicts. On the basis of this case-study analysis, the authors offer a wider analysis of the EU's potential for assuming a wider role as an international security actor. This is undertaken by considering both the limitations of the EU's existing capabilities for conflict resolution and the new developments contained within the Lisbon Treaty. The final part of the article asserts that the EU has suffered from two key weaknesses that have prevented it from living up to its aspirations of becoming a globally significant and effective conflict manager. The first is structural - the lack of, to date, a permanent External Action Service; the second is conceptual - the lack of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy. The article concludes with five substantive principles that should guide the EU's approach to conflict management. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
TL;DR: The historical characteristics of Europe's counterterrorism approach have been first, to treat terrorism as a crime to be tackled through criminal law, and second, to emphasize the need for understanding the root causes of terrorism in order to be able to prevent terrorist acts as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Europe did not wake up to terrorism on 9/11; terrorism is solidly entrenched in Europe's past. The historical characteristics of Europe's counterterrorism approach have been first, to treat terrorism as a crime to be tackled through criminal law, and second, to emphasize the need for understanding the ‘root causes’ of terrorism in order to be able to prevent terrorist acts. The 9/11 attacks undoubtedly brought the EU into uncharted territory, boosting existing cooperation and furthering political integration—in particular in the field of justice and home affairs, where most of Europe's counterterrorism endeavours are situated—to a degree few would have imagined some years earlier. This development towards European counterterrorism arrangements was undoubtedly event-driven and periods of inertia and confusion alternated with moments of significant organizational breakthroughs. The 2005 London attacks contributed to a major shift of emphasis in European counterterrorism thinking. Instead of an external threat, terrorism now became a home-grown phenomenon. The London bombings firmly anchored deradicalization at the heart of EU counterterrorism endeavours.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present evidence of internal Kurdish discord with the strategy concerning the restoration of Kirkuk governorate's boundaries, which may indicate that there is also internal disagreement about the need to re-calculate the boundaries.
Abstract: The disputed internal boundaries in northern Iraq between the Kurds and the Arabs have been a persistent fault-line in the state's history and have rapidly emerged as a core dispute since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Kurds underwrote, more than any other constituency, the democratic project in the new Iraq and contrived an ambitious constitutional route through Article 140 to place Kirkuk and other disputed areas under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) by December 2007. Article 140 was designed to resolve the issue in the Kurds favour once and for all, to circumvent yet another tedious negotiation round with the Arabs and to quarantine the Kurdish project from regional interference, particularly Turkey. On all three counts the strategy failed. This is primarily because of the complexity of the issue but there is also evidence of internal Kurdish discord with the strategy concerning the restoration of Kirkuk governorate's boundaries. The years 2007–2008 were a watershed for Kurdish designs to incorporate Kirkuk through a constitutional process and since then the disputed boundaries question has been left in a state of suspended animation.
However, if a negotiating framework were to emerge the contours of a ‘deal’ have begun to crystallize and there is scope to move from management of the issue to resolution. Answers to the questions of when and how will depend on the shape of the complete package, the new government constellation and the extent that Turkey and Iran reveal themselves in the political marketplace.
TL;DR: The recent decision by President Barack Obama to deploy 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan is premised on the idea that to disrupt Al Qaeda and prevent it from forming training camps in Afghanistan it will be necessary to first reverse the momentum of the Taleban insurgency.
Abstract: One of the underlying assumptions of the contemporary debate over Afghanistan is that counterterrorism objectives can be achieved through counterinsurgency methods. The recent decision by President Barack Obama to deploy 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan is premised on the idea that to disrupt Al Qaeda and prevent it from forming training camps in Afghanistan it will be necessary to first reverse the momentum of the Taleban insurgency. This approach—which places the US and UK on the offensive to disrupt terrorist plots before they arrive on their shores—assumes that the threats from Al Qaeda and the Taleban are intertwined and thus the strategy of response must seamlessly comprise elements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. In fact, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are very different—often contradictory—models of warfare, each with its own associated assumptions regarding the role of force, the importance of winning support among the local population, and the necessity of building strong and representative government. Rather than being mutually reinforcing, they may impose tradeoffs on each other, as counterterrorism activities may blunt the effectiveness of counterinsurgency approaches and vice versa. The last four years in Afghanistan provide evidence that when employed in the same theatre counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies can offset one another. To be in a position to begin the withdrawal of US troops before July 2011, the Obama administration will need to find a way to manage the tradeoffs between its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan.
TL;DR: The G20 summit has recently emerged as the dominant agency of global governance as discussed by the authors and it claims that its economic weight and broad membership give it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system.
Abstract: The G20 summit has recently emerged as the dominant agency of global governance. It claims that its economic weight and broad membership give it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system. But the G20 still excludes from membership some 150 other countries, all of which have interests at stake within the contours of contemporary global governance. In the financial arena these excluded countries contributed significantly to the alternative agenda for dealing with the global financial crisis proposed by the United Nations conference that met in June 2009. In the trade arena they engaged extensively in a variety of coalitions within the World Trade Organization during the so-called Doha Round and played a part in preventing a deal emerging that was unsatisfactory from their perspective. Questions are raised about the legitimacy of the G20 by the active presence of so many other country voices outside its remit and it can be expected that the excluded ‘G150’ will increasingly explore different ways to engage with the members of the G20 over the next few years.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue for greater nuance in our understanding of the link between HIV/AIDS and security, and the effects of its securitization, suggesting that neither is straightforward, and both are subject to case sensitivities.
Abstract: HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest single causes of death and suffering on the planet. Over the last decade the societal impact of HIV/AIDS has been widely discussed in terms of national and international security. This article assesses the securitizing move and suggests that HIV/AIDS was only partially securitized at best and both the political consensus and strength of evidence were overestimated. It argues for greater nuance in our understanding of the link between HIV/AIDS and security, and the effects of its securitization, suggesting that neither is straightforward, and both are subject to case sensitivities.
TL;DR: In the wake of the crippling cyber attack on Estonia's internet infrastructure in 2007, several world powers announced their intentions to deploy offensive capabilities in cyberspace and discussed why now may be the time for international society to begin working towards ratification of a global cyber treaty as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In the wake of the crippling cyber attack on Estonia's internet infrastructure in 2007, several world powers announced their intentions to deploy offensive capabilities in cyberspace. As cyberspace evolves from a technology enthusiast's domain into a global economic and military ‘battlespace’, the likelihood of a major interstate cyber conflict increases significantly. The article discusses why now may be the time for international society to begin working towards ratification of a global cyber treaty. It begins by reviewing the converging forces responsible for making cyberspace a dynamic zone of political and economic competition among states. It then examines the central debates surrounding how the laws of armed conflict may or may not apply to cyber warfare. The article concludes by arguing that given proper political support, a multilateral cyber treaty could prove an effective international instrument in preventing cyberspace from becoming the default platform for states seeking to settle conflicts outside the reach of customary international law and diplomacy.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors outline the recent attempts to design-in counterterrorism features to the urban landscape while paying attention not just to their effectiveness and robustness, but also to their acceptability to the general public and impact upon the everyday experience of the city.
Abstract: The events of September 11 2001 in New York and Washington, and of July 7 2005 in London, have ushered in a new era in protective counterterrorist planning within UK urban areas. With the mode of terrorist attack now encompassing the possibility of no-warning suicide attacks, and target selection now often being seen as related to crowd density, a variety of public places such as sports stadiums, shopping centres, light rail systems, and nightclubs now have to consider ‘designed-in’ counterterrorism measures. As such the UK has developed a national counterterrorist strategy (CONTEST) which is constantly revised, and one strand of which focuses on protective security measures. In the context of this ‘Protect’ strand of policy, and the increased targeting of crowded places by international terrorist groups, this article outlines the recent attempts to design-in counterterrorism features to the urban landscape while paying attention not just to their effectiveness and robustness, but also to their acceptability to the general public and impact upon the everyday experience of the city. The article also addresses how the need to consider counterterrorism has affected the practices of built-environment professionals such as spatial planners. Reflections upon how this aspect of counterterrorism policy might develop in the future are also offered.
TL;DR: The plan for the southern energy corridor delivering a new secure supply of natural gas to the European Union is shaped by projects for two pipelines (Nabucco and the South Stream) as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The plan for the southern energy corridor delivering a new secure supply of natural gas to the European Union is shaped by projects for two pipelines—Nabucco and the South Stream. Economic rationales for both projects are far from solid as the prospects for returns on massive investments are doubtful due to uncertainty about demand. Much political effort has nevertheless been expended on advancing these competing ‘mega-projects’, which have acquired symbolic status in different approaches to securitization of energy matters. The continuing recession has not added much weight to common economic sense, which dictates that the most efficient way to bring Russian and Caspian gas to Europe is modernization and joint management of Ukrainian gas infrastructure. Parallel construction of both pipelines remains the most probable outcome of their ‘race’, while simultaneous cancellation could have saved resources and political faces.
TL;DR: The authors examines the evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror, focusing on the United Kingdom, and argues that terrorism has evolved strategically and is hybridized owing to the security environment-interpenetrated by globalization, digital media and information communication technologies-in which it occurs.
Abstract: This article examines the evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror, focusing on the United Kingdom. The analysis is broken down into two sections. The first part of the article presents four distinct and yet overlapping notions of the threats which have influenced both the West, and more specifically the UK, in debates about counterterrorism since 9/11. The four threat narratives-Al-Qaeda as a central organization; decentralized terror networks; home grown; and finally apocalyptic threats-have all been used to inform counter terror measures in the West. The second section of the article argues that terrorism has evolved strategically, and is hybridized owing to the security environment-interpenetrated by globalization, digital media and information communication technologies-in which it occurs. The article concludes with a preliminary discussion of some strategic and operational themes which have influenced the form and character of terrorism and insurgency, exploring how they impact on the ways in which threats are constituted and countered, illustrating that what is new maybe the nature of our own fears.
TL;DR: The authors argues that financial internationalism is better served by institutions that help to integrate diverse systems than those which try to enforce one-size-fits-all approach to very different economies.
Abstract: If the G's are the world's steering committee, the step from G7 to G20 deepened the democratic legitimacy of this committee. However, it also shifted influence to a group that share little else other than economic power: they have diverse experiences, challenges, cultural perspectives and starting points. This is particularly the case in the field of financial regulation, where action across these countries in recent months—despite all the language of global regulation—is increasingly local. The prospect of the new global being quite local has dismayed some. But it need not. This article challenges the dichotomy of more global versus more local. It argues that financial internationalism—greater cooperation by nations for the benefit of all—is better served by institutions that help to integrate diverse systems than those which try to enforce one-size-fits-all approach to very different economies.
International banks persuaded regulators of the benefits of home country regulation and a level playing field for bankers. But the benefits accrued largely to the banks in the boom and proved an avenue for contagion during the crash. Host country regulation may prove a safer way to regulate financial systems, in particular by allowing regulation to be more responsive to national economic conditions and cycles. It is likely that a shift back to host country regulation will act as a drag on international capital flows. The instinct of economists is that the cost of this is uncertain, suspect and conditional, especially when compared to the costs of financial crashes. Host country regulation does not mean there is no role for international institutions, such as the newly minted Financial Stability Board. Instead, it suggests a more nuanced role, potentially encompassing the policing of international market infrastructure, financial protectionism, information free flow between regulators and the convergence of regulatory principles and the consolidation of regulatory instruments. An informed and collegiate process of integrating different financial systems will be a more resilient system than one which tries to apply a single rule book across inherently different countries.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the evolution of UK-French security relations in terms of neo-classical realist theory and assesses the likelihood of closer UK and French security collaboration in the future.
Abstract: Traditionally divided on security matters, France and Britain broke new ground when they signed the 1998 Saint-Malo agreement, promising to collaborate on defence and security, and pledging to cooperate bilaterally and in a ‘bi-multi’ fashion on Africa. This Anglo-French collaboration is the focus of this article, which begins by setting out the lack of UK–French security cooperation in Africa from the colonial to the early post-Cold War era. It then shows how there has been a degree of institutionalization of Anglo-French relations, alongside greater cooperation in terms of ESDP missions and the training of African peacekeepers. Next, this study explains the recent evolution of UK–French security relations in terms of neo-classical realist theory. Finally, it assesses the likelihood of closer Anglo-French security collaboration in the future.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present two approaches that have dominated International Relations in their approach to the international politics of health: the security-focused approach and the globalist approach, which aims to advance health not because of its intrinsic security value but because it advances the well-being and rights of individuals.
Abstract: This article presents two approaches that have dominated International Relations in their approach to the international politics of health. The statist approach, which is primarily security-focused, seeks to link health initiatives to a foreign or defence policy remit. The globalist approach, in contrast, seeks to advance health not because of its intrinsic security value but because it advances the well-being and rights of individuals. This article charts the evolution of these approaches and demonstrates why both have the potential to shape our understanding of the evolving global health agenda. It examines how the statist and globalist perspectives have helped shape contemporary initiatives in global health governance and suggests that there is evidence of an emerging convergence between the two perspectives. This convergence is particularly clear in the articulation of a number of UN initiatives in this area—especially the One World, One Health Strategic Framework and the Oslo Ministerial Declaration (2007) which inspired the first UN General Assembly resolution on global health and foreign policy in 2009 and the UN Secretary-General's note ‘Global health and foreign policy: strategic opportunities and challenges'. What remains to be seen is whether this convergence will deliver on securing states’ interest long enough to promote the interests of the individuals who require global efforts to deliver local health improvements.
TL;DR: The authors examines contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, and concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts.
Abstract: This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re-setting’ the US-Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.
TL;DR: The European Union is the major financial partner in both military and non-military assistance to the African Union (AU) as discussed by the authors and has shifted from being a major UN troop contributor towards the funding of African-led peace operations.
Abstract: This article overviews the development of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to date and examines EU involvement in this. The European Union is the major financial partner in both military and non-military assistance to the African Union (AU). Europe has shifted from being a major UN troop contributor towards the funding of African-led peace operations, as well as the emergence of time-limited, high-impact, missions. With the exception of Somalia, these ESDP operations have provided little direct security benefit to Europe and their success has been limited. They have provided experimentation opportunities of ESDP capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Guinea Bissau. Events in the eastern Congo in late 2008 demonstrate that the EU needs to consider carefully when it intervenes militarily in Africa: non-intervention and coordinated bilateral diplomatic efforts by EU member states can be more effective.
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