Showing papers in "Journal of Economic Theory in 1988"

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors transform a non-cooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player, where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the priors of other players on the choice of others players, priors over priors, and so on.

TL;DR: In this paper, the Allais paradox reveals a certain property of the decision scheme we use to determine the preference of one lottery over another, which is based on the use of similarity relations on the probability and prize spaces.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterized incentive compatibility conditions for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents' types are multidimensional, and analyzed two questions of monopoly pricing under multi-dimensional uncertainty.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a continuous and continuous tax-apportionment method with four properties: (i) the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable incomes; (ii) an increase in the tax total implies that everyone pays more; (iii) every incremental increase in tax is apportioned according to taxpayers' current after-tax incomes; and (iv) the ordering of taxpayers by pre-tax income and after tax income is the same.

TL;DR: In this article, an axiom system on a policy maker's preferences is proposed and shown to characterize the class of linear inequality measures, and a measure for the policy makers degree of "equality mindedness" is then developed.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that every Condorcet consistent method must generate the paradox among four or more candidates, i.e., a voter is better off not voting than casting a sincere ballot.

TL;DR: In this article, a principal can use a more subtle contractual mechanism to stop agents from cheating at no extra cost, using one agent to police the other, and exploiting certain properties of the optimal contracts.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the implementation problem with incomplete information, where for each agent, only knowledge about his and his neighbors' preferences is always sufficient to enforce his optimal behavior.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider several notions of distance between games and characterize their implications for the robustness of equilibrium refinements, and show that these notions have a strong impact on game robustness.

TL;DR: In this paper, a stability axiom due to Harsanyi is used to give a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution without independence of irrelevant alternatives, and it is shown that the Nash solution is the only one to satisfy Pareto optimality, anonymity, scale invariance, and stability.

TL;DR: In this article, a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second-price, comon-value auctions is examined, and the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer's standpoint, in a repeated auction setting, is partially addressed.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal (s ∈ S) that is correlated with the risk-neutral seller's costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study correspondences defined over classes of exchange economies and associating with each element in the class a set of allocations at which resources are thought to be divided fairly among the agents.

TL;DR: In this paper, a new Condorcet Choice Correspondence (CCC) rule is proposed, which is axiomatically characterised and compared with those of the uncovered set and the Kemeny rule.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that money metrics are concave for all reference prices if and only if preferences are homothetic and concave on a consumption set bounded away from the origin.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the double-sided moral hazard problem in a competitive market characterized by such a doublesided contract problem and study what kinds of contracts will be offered in such a market, where consumers cannot observe product quality at the time of purchase so that only warranties can induce firms to supply high quality products.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with bounded recall, as the capacity of the memories of both players grows to infinity.

TL;DR: If players are small, one might expect that optimal reactions to one-player deviations are negligible, so that the open- and closed-loop equilibria are approximately the same, but this work investigates the circumstances in which this is true.

TL;DR: In this paper, axiomatic bargaining theory is re-examined by focusing upon the economic exhange environment instead of the traditional utility possibility set, and weaker alternative axioms, making explicit use of economic information, are used to characterize the standard bargaining solutions.

TL;DR: In this article, the boundary behavior and optimal portfolio rules for cases when marginal utility at zero consumption is finite are discussed. But they do not satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equations and do not represent appropriate value functions because the boundary behaviour near zero wealth is not satisfactorily dealt with.

TL;DR: In this article, a new proof for a classical characterization of maximin, a new characterization of leximin, and a new variant of the maximin: the protective criterion are presented.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the problem of finding a best-response automata for a player in a repeated game, and showed that the problem is relatively easy if the number of players is fixed, but "difficult" otherwise.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk-neutral agents operate in correlated environments and identify a class of examples in which, in contrast to the case where the agents are risk-averse, the Nash constraints induce a subgame dominant strategy equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this article, general conditions for the existence of two different types of cyclical equilibria are given in terms of the elasticities of demand for savings and for capital with respect to the interest rate and of the capital-consumption ratio at the golden rule steady state.

TL;DR: In this article, the determinacy of perfect foresight equilibrium near steady-state equilibria of stationary infinite-horizon economies is studied and it is shown that indeterminacy is possible in robust examples, and that the dimension of the indeterminate can be as large as the number of goods per period.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors reconsiders the proposition, due to Jaynes, that the market with adverse selection has a Nash equilibrium once the sharing of information about customers is treated endogenously as part of the game among firms.

TL;DR: The existence of sunspot equilibria in a one-commodity overlapping generations model without stationarity assumptions on preferences, endowments, or nominal taxes was shown in this article.

TL;DR: In this article, revealed preference theory puts essentially no restrictions on the behavior of the data and observes n choices of k goods and prices when the consumer is actually choosing from a set of k + 1 goods.

TL;DR: In this article, the Modigliani-Miller theorem is shown to hold in a general model of a multi-period, stochastic economy with incomplete markets and perfect foresight.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present several comparative statics results concerning the entry problem in assignment games and compare sets of equilibria, and hence do not require the usual assumption of a unique equilibrium.