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Showing papers in "Journal of the American Academy of Religion in 1970"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Preface of his important study of a proposed sequence and interpretation of Paul's Corinthian correspondence, John C. Hurd, Jr. as mentioned in this paper acknowledged his indebtedness to a former teacher, Charles Buck.
Abstract: In the Preface of his important study of a proposed sequence and interpretation of Paul's Corinthian correspondence, John C. Hurd, Jr. acknowledged his indebtedness to a former teacher, Charles Buck.' We are now fortunate in having Buck's own position on these matters laid out in a clear and comprehensive way in his own book, Saint Paul: A Study of the Development of His Thought,2 written in collaboration with Greer Taylor. The authors' prose is lucid, they develop their thesis with a logical consistency wondrous to behold, and the results of their work, if sustained, would render obsolete the ways most interpreters proceed with the analysis and exposition of Pauline theology. Clarity and consistency alone, however, do not assure valid results; and, although this volume is so provocative as to compel widespread attention, it is not sufficiently persuasive to command assent. I

32 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the American Academy of Religion's definition of a key concept, religion, is discussed, and a constructive and critical aim is to sketch out a definition of religion, briefly explain it, test it, and show some of its uses.
Abstract: INTERPRET my invitation to address the American Academy of Religion on the definition of its key concept, religion, as an opportunity to exercise several of what I believe to be my philosophical responsibilities. In this paper I reject, therefore, the currently popular view of the philosopher as technician, restricted in his proper function to the clarification of linguistic meanings. This technical role is indeed one of my important responsibilities, but the "love of wisdom" involves far more than technique. In what follows three sections correspond to my three primary aims for this occasion. First, I have an apologetic aim: to defend the very enterprise of definition-making, particularly the enterprise of defining religion, against several significant criticisms. Second, I have a constructive and critical aim: to sketch out a definition of religion, briefly explain it, test it, and show some of its uses. And third, I have a frankly hortatory aim: I want what I say to make a fruitful difference, both among inquirers in the fields concerned with religion and outside them. I intend, therefore, to close with an appeal to this body to take a vitally required initiative in ending the present state of conceptual chaos engulfing studies about religion.

18 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Bultmann lists the parable (16:1-9) with those whose original meaning "... has became irrecoverable in the course of the tradition." Can nothing be said about its meaning?
Abstract: 1UKE 16:9 has been a troublesome verse for interpreters of Jesus' parables. Many consider it a separate saying of Jesus, appended by _4 Luke to the parable of the "Dishonest Steward/' which would have ended originally with vs. 8 (possibly vs. 8a, or even vs. 7). C. H. Dodd does not discuss the story in his Parables of the Kingdom, but gives his judgment that vss. 8, 9, and 10 ff. are secondary additions. Some, however, believe that vs. 9 belongs to the original parable.' Luke evidently understood that it did, even if he then proceeded to elaborate some variations on its theme in vss. 10-13. Bultmann lists the parable (16:1-9) with those whose original meaning " . . . has became irrecoverable in the course of the tradition." Can nothing be said about its meaning? First we must ask some questions. In particular, what are the "eternal habitations" or "tabernacles," who are the "friends," and why will "they" receive "you" into the "eternal habitations"? Is the saying meant seriously, or sardonically? The latter would be the case if the "eternal habitations" meant Sheol, the place where the unrighteous dead reside forever in misery and despair, as in Enoch 63:10 (cf. Eccles. 12:5).

8 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The role of the laity in the modern revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka is discussed in this article, where the authors analyze the character of lay Buddhism and the types of relationships existing between layman and bhikkhu (monk).
Abstract: WITH the arrival of Ceylon's independence in 1948 and the election of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) eight years later, Theravada Buddhism in Ceylon experienced a noticeable revival. The nature of this revival is, however, a matter of dispute. Some observers insist that revival has not been accompanied by reformation nor has it resolved numerous problems inherited from a long colonial past. Yet, even such pessimists would agree that a significant resurgence of Buddhism has occurred with Buddhist laymen making one of the most prominent contributions. For this reason a study of the role of the laity in the revival of Buddhism in Ceylon deserves our attention. In this study after describing two turning points in the history of the modern revival of Buddhism in Ceylon we shall analyze the character of lay Buddhism and the types of relationships existing between layman and bhikkhu (monk). Then we shall describe the forms of the lay Buddhist revival and, in conclusion, indicate some of the greatest problems and promises of the revival.

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
John L. Cheek1
TL;DR: In this paper, the author argues that we should use some of the new knowledge about mystical experiences to open the door to a contemporary understanding of Paul for which recent psychedelic investigation has given us a key.
Abstract: This paper is not concerned with the very real problems of drug abuse, or laws on psychedelic drugs and the need for a fresh look at them, or the need for research in this area. It neither proposes nor tries to prove a particular inner-cycle pattern which we could with assurance say was Paul's experience in his conversion or in his mystical experience-the author does not believe we have enough evidence for such a move. Rather, this paper urges that we should use some of the new knowledge about mystical experiences to open the door to a contemporary understanding of Paul for which recent psychedelic investigation has given us a key.

4 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt Wittgensteinian terminology to develop and justify a new approach to the varieties of religious phenomena and structures, and suggest that the search for the illusive essence of religion or of religious traditions should give way to the description of religion and religions in terms of how the religion game is played.
Abstract: HIS paper is an attempt to analyze the nature of religion in terms of its components and characteristics. In Part One, I adopt Wittgensteinian terminology to develop and justify a new approach to the varieties of religious phenomena and structures. Applying to the study of religion some Wittgensteinian reminders for the replacement of essences with a theory of language-games and family resemblances, I suggest that the search for the illusive essence of religion or of religious traditions should give way to the description of religion and religions in terms of how the religion game is played.' Thus, historical religious traditions and their respective components may be seen as members of the religion family, and qualities, characteristics, or functions which these members share may be viewed as their family resemblances.

4 citations


Journal ArticleDOI

4 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the new editor of this journal asked me if I would be willing to set down my reflections on the "pace and character of change in the study of religion in American higher education" on the assumption, presumably, that my own zig-zag career from department of religion (four years) to seminary (ten years) back to department of theology must have been accompanied if not motivated by some opinions regarding the state of the discipline.
Abstract: RECENTLY, the new editor of this journal asked me if I would be willing to set down my reflections on the "pace and character of change in the study of religion in American higher education" on the assumption, presumably, that my own zig-zag career from department of religion (four years) to seminary (ten years) back to department of religion must have been accompanied if not motivated by some opinions regarding the state of the discipline. At first, I was reluctant to accept the invitation. Although my recent departure from a theological seminary did, indeed, reflect some convictions about the field, it was rooted, like all such decisions, as much in my own personal interests and concerns as it was in some more abstract beliefs about this field. I did not see how I could disentangle these personal reasons from the more abstract considerations. But not to do so, involved me in a question of taste. To do so, however, would be to give a somewhat unreal account of the matter. Moreover, I particularly wanted to avoid giving any suggestion that I regarded my move as reflecting the view one hears frequently these days in department of religion circles, namely, that the future of scholarship in religion belongs to the university rather than to the divinity school. As I reflected on this latter issue, it occurred to me that my reasons for resisting having my decision so interpreted might itself prove interesting to some readers, and so I accepted the invitation. But when I put the matter in this fashion, it seemed that I could scarcely avoid being more autobiographical than suited my taste. I have tried to check this tendency by concentrating upon matters of intellectual autobiography, so to speak, and by eliminating any reference to those concrete personal reasons that were involved. This gives my account a more rationally consistent character than

4 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors suggest that the triumphalist stance of the Church has been reinforced, if not guided, by the special attention given certain texts and types of texts in the exegetical history.
Abstract: tradition, the history of exegesis is a primary way of tracing the history of the Church.' Pursuing one line of that hypothesis, I wish to suggest that the triumphalist stance of the Church has been reinforced, if not guided, by the special attention given certain texts and types of texts in the exegetical history of the Church. To be sure, the problem is in part a circular one and to determine the direction of influence is difficult: (1) In part it has been theological conviction of the Church which has led it to stress some parts of Scripture to the neglect of other parts. 2 (2) Yet, along with theological conviction, it is likely that cultural setting and indeed cultural accommodation has played a larger role in placing stresses in Scripture than has often been recognized. A certain stance adopted toward a cultural situation has probably been decisive in determining the use made of various parts of Scripture.3 (3) Conversely, we

3 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One of the most creative and influential attempts to wed theological reflection and linguistic analysis is the effort to draw parallels between the logic of the words I and God as discussed by the authors, which has been undertaken most notably by Bishop Ian Ramsey and Professor William Poteat.' The gist of the proposal is that the grammatical and logical oddness of I constitutes a paradigm or model for "God-talk"; more strongly, it is said that one who does not understand why the use of I generates such peculiarities cannot hope to grasp what it is to speak of God.
Abstract: ONE OF the most creative and influential attempts to wed theological reflection and linguistic analysis is the effort to draw parallels between the logic of the words I and God. These efforts have been undertaken most notably by Bishop Ian Ramsey and Professor William Poteat.' The gist of the proposal is that the grammatical and logical oddness of I constitutes a paradigm or model for the oddness of "God-talk"; more strongly, it is said that one who does not understand why the use of I generates such peculiarities cannot hope to grasp what it is to speak of God. The proposals of this program are highly significant for three reasons at least. In a day when metaphysics is on the ropes, here is an apology which eschews that dark science for the illumination of linguistic and phenomenological analysis. Second, it is apologetic! Some efforts to blend analysis and theology simply begin with the religious "language game" as given and proceed to an analysis of its grammar, its methods of verification, and, in general, the sorts of meaning its utterances possess. One who does not play the game already will find little reason or argument given in these writings for joining in. As it has been remarked recently, "such an analysis . . . is not at all equipped to establish or to demonstrate [its] intelligibility, to recommend religious language as essential to life, to show a secular doubter why this language game should be used in the first place."2 This is less true of the proposal before us, for it takes a word from ordinary language, I, and uses it to show us what God means. It represents an effort to bridge the gap between secular and religious language. Finally, we have here a theological effort which makes contact with continental thought. Like existentialism it tries to show the irreducible difference between persons and things, between mysteries and observa-

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The question of whether and in what degree an American Christian of the modern day may in any way gain from Jesus guidance or clues for behavior, for existence "in the world" is a perennial theological problem as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: HE relation of Church (or Christian) to world is a perennial theological problem that is particularly pressing today. This paper will investigate, in part, one aspect of that problem: the significance of Jesus for its solution. Specifically, the question is whether and in what degree an American Christian of the modern day may in any way gain from Jesus guidance or clues for behavior, for existence "in the world." In order to seek an adequate answer, we must realize that everyone lives in a highly complex ethical situation. This ethical situation requires both individual and corporate response the two sometimes separate, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting. Further, what we have come to call our "pluralistic society" confuses ethical issues to a still greater degree, especially on the corporate level, since the possibility is immediately raised that "Christian" ethics may not be appropriate to such a society, composed, as it is, of a variety of non-Christian groups and individuals. Because of this complex ethical situation, our inquiry regarding Jesus will have to raise at least in passing the question whether Jesus may be valid for individual ethics, corporate ethics, or both; and whether this validity may extend to a pluralistic society. To be sure, there is hardly any hope of finding individual instructions that will still be valid after nearly 2000 years; but whether Jesus provides a general ethical validity --middle axioms, norms, or even a mere direction of response will be the question. In fact, a considerable number of Christian theologians (including pastors and theological students), although not all, assume and will argue that Jesus left an ethical teaching which all Christians should attempt to follow. An example of this view is to be found in the Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, where it is stated that the Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12) is "a climactic summary of the Sermon on the Mount," and that this, along with the commandment to love God and one's neighbor as oneself, "justifies the conclusion that

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a reconception of the nature of God and of God's relationships to the world, which they think is both necessary and adequate for our understanding of God as God is made known to us through Christianity.
Abstract: Professor Cobb undertakes to present in minimally technical form a reconception of the nature of God and of God's relationships to the world, which he thinks is both necessary and adequate for our understanding of God as God is made known to us through Christianity. First he presents "a consensus of contemporary theology" with which he agrees, "that God must be reconceived in a way more faithful to Jesus Christ." The new conception of God is based upon our experience of "a call forward into the future" an analysis which discloses to originate from an everlasting, actual agent, capable of bearing the predicates appropriate to God. In his third chapter, Cobb shows that the concept of God, as developed in the reconception of the first two chapters, is compatible with and complementary to the conception of the world that we find in contemporary science and philosophy (in Whitehead, primarily). In the fourth chapter, Cobb applies the process of reconception to the problem of evil, showing that if we conceive God as he proposes, the difficulties over evil which appeared insuperable in previous theologies will be vastly mitigated. The fifth chapter is somewhat of a dislocation of the lines of the whole and may be bypassed here. The sixth chapter returns to the main theme with a discussion of the conditions under which Christian theology is possible, the important conditions being that the conception of God and the conception of the universe should be coherent and compatible with the achievements of secular inquiry; Cobb argues that the conception of God as creator, inherent in Whiteheadean philosophy, is satisfactory both religiously and intellectually and provides the "vision of the world" within


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The first volume of this monumental work of translation has appeared, already containing almost as many entries as the major selection from the journals that we have had available in English before as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The three works under review are among the most important additions of the past few years to the Kierkegaard literature in English. The importance of the new translation of the journals and papers, projected in five large volumes, hardly requires comment. The first volume of this monumental work of translation has appeared, already containing almost as many entries as the major selection from the journals that we have had available in English before, and it is safe to say that when Howard and Edna Hong have finished their work we shall have as much of the journals and papers available in English as we are ever likely to need. It will still be no more than a substantial selection from the twenty folio volumes of the Danish edition, but those whose interest in Kierkegaard is so determined that they need much more than the Hongs give us will probably want to learn Danish anyway. The other two books, aside from revealing a penchant for alliteration in their titles, are representative of the substantial, critical interpretation of Kierkegaard's work that has begun to appear in this country in the years since the Kierkegaard vogue ran its course. Neither book is an introductory text designed to initiate the casual reader into the mystique of "SK," nor on the other hand does either book contain earnest warnings against the pathological irrationalism of an author who, if anything, was pathologically reflective. Both Professor Thompson and Professor Sponheim are thoroughly at home in the Danish texts of Kierkegaard's corpus, and also in his personal and cultural milieu, and they are sufficiently sure of themselves to undertake dis-


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Tillich was also a philosopher who analyzed the structures of finite being in terms of a cluster of ontological polarities ultimately grounded in being-itself as discussed by the authors, and this side of Tillich has been recently scrutinized by William L. Rowe.
Abstract: As a confessing theologian of the Christian church, Paul Tillich achieved a remarkable synthesis of the interaction of the basic symbols of this religious tradition, exhibiting their revelatory significance for the existential plight of contemporary man. David H. Kelsey has shown us what a systematic and comprehensive picture of Tillich's activity emerges if we view him strictly from this vantage point.' Yet Tillich was also a philosopher who analyzed the structures of finite being in terms of a cluster of ontological polarities ultimately grounded in being-itself. This side of Tillich has in turn been recently scrutinized by William L. Rowe, particularly his theory of being-itself and his theory of symbolic predication.2 Both monographs focus their attention upon the same two central issues in Tillich's thought, the nature of God and the character of our symbols pointing to God, but they do so from such widely divergent angles of vision that there is practically no overlap between their treatments. Together they show how Tillich's dynamic unity of theology and philosophy could be shattered in either direction. Most comprehensively, however, Tillich sought to be neither a confessional theologian nor a philosopher but a philosophical theologian, combining his ontological analysis of being-itself with the fundamental symbol of western religious faith in the central affirmation, "God is being-itself" (ST I 238),3 the one nonsymbolic statement that can be made about God. While Rowe offers us three careful

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, two salient concepts are discussed in reference to history and religion; "universal history," and "the history of religion" in the theologies of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Ernst Troeltsch.
Abstract: HISTORY and religion form the two focal points in the theologies of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Ernst Troeltsch. For both Pannenberg and Troeltsch religion is historical in character, and history is considered primarily in religious terms. In this paper two salient concepts are to be discussed in reference to history and religion; "universal history," and "the history of religion." In my judgment the conception of the former determines the conception of the latter for both these thinkers.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the relation between philosophy and theology as shown in a specific theme: the function and truth of hope, and propose a phenomenology of hope as a mediating tool between hope as expressed in the New Testament and its modern interpretation.
Abstract: HIS essay will explore the relation between philosophy and theology as shown in a specific theme: the function and truth of hope. Theology is here to be reflection on and clarification of the reality-shaping commitments of a believing community; philosophy the attempt to form a coherent understanding of the most general properties of what can be known. Concretely, the fruitfulness of process-philosophical categories for a contemporary understanding of New Testament forms of hope will be the topic. In presenting hope in the New Testament, attention will be given to the intellectual and mythological forms in which hope is expressed, but the paper will try to explicate hope in terms of the human structures of response to which the mythological forms correlate; in this sense the phenomenology of hope will be a mediating tool between hope as expressed in the New Testament and its modern interpretation.