Showing papers in "Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology in 2011"
58 citations
43 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of essence in psychology is examined from a constructivist viewpoint, after which constructs are distinguished from concepts in order to position ontology and epistemology as modes of construing.
Abstract: The notion of essence in psychology is examined from a constructivist viewpoint. The constructivist position is summarized and differentiated from social constructionism, after which constructs are distinguished from concepts in order to position ontology and epistemology as modes of construing. After situating constructivism in relation to philosophical approaches to essences, the distinction between essences and kinds is examined and the presumed constructivist critique of essences in psychology outlined. It is argued that criticizing constructivism as an “anything goes” form of antirealism fails to grasp how constructivist psychology, by emphasizing structure and viability, does indeed place limits on the constructions people may hold. In applying a constructivist understanding of essences in general to those fundamental to human psychology, people can be seen as having three essential psychological qualities: they are closed systems, active meaning-makers, and irreducibly social beings. Yet a constructivist view also maintains that these psychological essences only hold while operating within and committed to a constructivist perspective. In other words, what counts as an essence always depends on one’s assumptions, or how one construes events. Finally, a personal construct theory model of essentialist and nonessentialist construing is introduced based on the assumption that everyone construes in both essentialist and nonessentialist ways at different times because doing so is pragmatically viable.
25 citations
TL;DR: One study found that psychology departments had more courses in methodology than corresponding physics departments, and psychology departments were far more likely to offer an introductory course in general methodology than did physics as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Two studies examined the possibility that instruction in psychological methodology is committed to a philosophy of science, logical positivism, that is not adequately acknowledged and is empirically problematic. Study 1 suggested that psychology departments had more courses in methodology than corresponding physics departments, and psychology departments were far more likely to offer an introductory course in general methodology. Study 2 suggested that psychology had more introductory general methods textbooks than did physics. Both studies suggested psychology still presents itself as the kind of science that was defined by logical positivism. Study 2 suggested psychology does this only implicitly in its texts and without acknowledging problematic features of that philosophy. Psychology methods texts commonly justified the importance of the scientific method by describing human cognitive fallibilities without cautioning that these same fallibilities could be seen alternatively as showing the problematic nature of the positivistic conception of scientific methodology. In several regards, texts conformed to Fleck’s notion of “textbook science” and to Kuhn’s description of science texts as “tourist brochures.” It was cautioned that an implicit appeal by psychology to logical positivism contradicts its claim that its methods and data are objective, transparent, and little influenced by philosophy, logic divorced from data, or authority.
24 citations
TL;DR: This article introduced the concept of tradition and its importance for critical-intellectual development, and emphasized the role of Marxist and post-Marxist thought in various critical approaches, critical programs are presented as theoretical endeavors that share the critique of ideology.
Abstract: York UniversityIntroducing the concept of tradition and its importance for critical-intellectual devel-opment, traditions of radical philosophy and psychology are presented. Emphasizingthe role of Marxist and post-Marxist thought in various critical approaches, criticalprograms are presented as theoretical endeavors that share the critique of ideology.These approaches examine knowledge production and knowledge biases in the sciencesand psychology from the perspective of social categories or in terms of power. It issuggested that critical thinking in psychology could beneÞt from incorporating cate-gories from this tradition. Consequences for critical thinking in psychology arediscussed.Keywords:
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TL;DR: The authors argue that scientistic approaches to inquiry also color phenomenological, critical theoretical, and social constructionist viewpoints, and suggest that hermeneutic/dialogical conceptions of inquiry, including the idea of social theory as itself a form of ethically motivated human practice, give a fuller account of critical thinking in the social disciplines.
Abstract: Yanchar, Slife, and their colleagues have described how mainstream psychology‟s notion of critical thinking has largely been conceived of as “scientific analytic reasoning” or “method-centered critical thinking.” We extend here their analysis and critique, arguing that some version of the one-sided instrumentalism and confusion about tacit values that characterize scientistic approaches to inquiry also color phenomenological, critical theoretical, and social constructionist viewpoints. We suggest that hermeneutic/dialogical conceptions of inquiry, including the idea of social theory as itself a form of ethically motivated human practice, give a fuller account of critical thinking in the social disciplines.
17 citations
TL;DR: Experimental psychology in the early 20th century was targeted by several authors who described a crisis, often expressed as a lack of theoretical and experimental progress as discussed by the authors, which was largely overcome but several current emphases hinder the development of a mature experimental science, such as an ethnocentrism that focuses on Western standards and populations, neuroscientism which often treats neurological evidence independently of mental and behavioral events, and the tendency for demonstration experiments to replace coordinated theoretical approaches.
Abstract: Experimental psychology in the early 20th century was targeted by several authors who described a crisis— often expressed as a lack of theoretical and experimental progress. In the 21st century, the crisis of competing theories has been largely overcome but several current emphases hinder the development of a mature experimental science. Central among these are an ethnocentrism that focuses on Western standards and populations, neuroscientism which often treats neurological evidence independently of mental and behavioral events, and the tendency for demonstration experiments to replace coordinated theoretical approaches.
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9 citations
TL;DR: The authors take a cultural-historical approach to suggest that the clarification of concepts requires both a genuine rupture and a historical study of the movement of a concept, and that our study of concepts has to be reflexive because they are simultaneously objects of inquiry and means by which such inquiry unfolds.
Abstract: A science that does not critically interrogate its theoretical concepts literally does not know what it is doing. The attempt to clarify a widely used concept in psychological research-the concept of concept-therefore constitutes an important effort in clarifying what role it plays in the discursive work of the field. In this commentary, I take a cultural-historical approach to suggest that the clarification of concepts requires both a genuine rupture and a historical study of the movement of a concept. Moreover, our study of concepts has to be reflexive because they are simultaneously objects of inquiry and means by which such inquiry unfolds. Rather than doing mere analysis of concept use, I propose a categorical, historical reconstruction of the concepts psychologists use.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider how both critique and metacritique may be combined, repositioned, and recontextualized, to advance the important cause of meta-critical thinking in and about psychology.
Abstract: Do mainstream psychologists think critically? And are the many critiques of the mainstream made by its (theoretical and philosophical psychology) critics “on target”? Answering both questions (critical and metacritical, respectively) requires consensus about what critical thinking consists in, and there seems to be little consensus in sight. I begin by accepting Slife, Yanchar, and Reber’s (2005) claim that “rigorous thinking” itself is insufficient for critical thinking in and about psychology, and I then consider various suggestions made by critics of the mainstream about thematic assumptions (or content categories) that should be included in critical thinking about the mainstream. After identifying three areas of mainstream research in which some of these assumptions seem to have been challenged from within the mainstream, I conclude by considering how both critique and metacritique may be combined, repositioned, and/or recontextualized, to advance the important cause of (meta) critical thinking in and about psychology.
TL;DR: In this paper, the concept of the empirical is revisited by following thephenomenological train of thought that empirical experience is always tied to a mode of living and can therefore not be thought of as existing independently from subjective modes of engagement.
Abstract: Citrus Health Network, Miami, FLIn the following essay, I set out to rethink the concept of the empirical by following thephenomenological train of thought that the empirical is always tied to a mode of livingand can therefore not be thought of as existing independently from subjective modes ofengagement. This does not mean that every experience is henceforth to be understoodas a subjective experience because the subject is just as much constituted by the objectas vice versa. This dialectical interpretation of lived experience is best exempli ed inHeideggers interpretation of experience as a strife between earth and world. Thisconcept is developed further and used to reanchor experience in a thirdness betweensubject and object. Finally, suggestions are made of what it will mean to adopt theconcept of strife as the basis of a new kind of empirical psychology.Keywords: