Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 1998"

TL;DR: In this article, the rationality of choices in a game depend not only on what players believe, but also on their policies for revising their beliefs in response to surprising information, and a general descriptive framework for representing belief revision policies in game situations is sketched.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined cost sharing arrangements on a sample of twenty-five irrigation ditches located in a south-central Montana community and provided axiomatic characterizations of these mechanisms using a list of static and dynamic equity principles.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a simple production model where skills are common resources and propose to give all agents an equal property right to both the technology and the skills, and derive a class of welfare lower bounds from this idea.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that discounting optima may differ from anonymous optima in an essential way, and a joint characterization reduces the choice between discounting rules and medial limits to a choice between anonymity and the strong Pareto principle.

TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of ranking profiles of opportunity sets, one for each agent in the society, is studied, and three ways of ranking opportunity profiles, all of them looking first at the common opportunity set, are proposed.

TL;DR: In this article, a large class of rules satisfying strategy-proofness are presented, which are obtained by combining one of the following principles: (1) starting from a fixed subset of lotteries, and for each profile let one fixed agent choose her preferred lottery from that subset (we call them unilateral rules); or, (2) start from two fixed lotsteries and a rule assigning weights to each of them depending on the coalition of agents which prefer one of them to the other; let the outcome at each profile be the convex combination of these two given lot

TL;DR: In this paper, a characterization of the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good) is given.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend Boland's (1989) work on the Condorcet's Jury Theorem (CJT) for heterogeneous groups and show that CJT holds for groups with supermajority decision rules if the mean individual competence is at least (π(n+1)/n).

TL;DR: It is found that, in contrary to the more restrictive model of Sprumont (1996), in this setting the properties of Independence of Null Agents, Rank Independence of Irrelevant Agents together with Ordinality and the Serial Principle are incompatible.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a simple demand revelation mechanism in which potential customers bid to be served and the regulator accepts a set of bids that maximizes revenues net of costs, possibly with a surplus for the producer.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend Ramsey's model to be in accordance with the facts that self-reported levels of satisfaction are almost unrelated to economic prosperity, both across countries and across time.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated properties of composite majority functions with the aid of recursive formulas in the context of collective decision making in multi-tier hierarchies and examined the effects of changes in system structure on collective competence.

TL;DR: In this article, the Banzhaf power indices for simple games on convex geometries were defined and the concept of swing was defined, obtaining convex swings. But the concept was not defined in this paper, and it was only used to compute power indices in the Spanish and Catalan parliaments and in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

TL;DR: Three consensus rules for electing committees can be modeled as optimization problems based on criteria involving distances, angles or ratios of quantities derived from the election tallies.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider pure matching problems where being unmatched (being single) is not a feasible choice or it is always the last choice for every agent and show that there exists a proper subsolution of the stable solution that is implementable in Nash equilibria.

TL;DR: For a broad class of smooth random exchange economies, relaxing anonymity and non-bossiness admits mechanisms which are asymptotically Walrasian for all except one balancing agent, while being manipulable with generically vanishing probability as mentioned in this paper.

TL;DR: In this paper, various additional conditions on surmise mappings are introduced and their consequences for the corresponding knowledge spaces are investigated, in particular, the condition describing well-graded knowledge spaces is detected.

TL;DR: This paper decompose the truth axiom into three parts: truth of common belief, truth about common belief and quasi-coherence, and show that these characterizations may not hold in more general non-Bayesian models of decision-making under uncertainty.

TL;DR: In this paper, the relation between leximin ordering and two other orderings is studied in a more general framework, and the results are applied to the nucleolus corresponding to so-called normal excess functions.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that Welfarism and strong neutrality are each equivalent to the joint satisfaction of Pareto Indifference and Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze trading in a model in which the agents and their preferences are the same as in the main models of matching and bargaining, but in which trade is centralized rather than decentralized.

TL;DR: In this article, negative introspection of common belief is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of Truth of individuals' belief about what is commonly believed (TCB) and common belief in TCB.

TL;DR: In this article, two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with multiple inputs and multiple outputs are characterized by means of axioms of upper and lower bounds of welfare respectively and an axiom of informational efficiency, Supporting Price Independence.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply Selten's measure of predictive success to the problem of comparing and ranking various theories of decision making under risk, and two experiments are carried out for this application: one a pairwise choice experiment involving 15 such choices and the other a complete ranking experiment involving 11 risky choices.

TL;DR: In this article, the existence of an equilibrium of private property rights in social systems where individual agents decide to make individual or collective gifts according to their individual preferences on the distribution of private consumption expenditures is studied.

TL;DR: Martin and D. Osherson as discussed by the authors discuss the relation between the two approaches and consider whether they allow scientific inquiry to be represented as a process of rational hypothesis selection in the face of data.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the adjunction of new agents is beneficial to incumbents if the newcomers bring positive initial endowments, but that no incumbent will benefit from their adjunction unless his own initial endowment is augmented at the same time.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose the axiom of individual monotonicity under individual rationality and combine it with the axioms of efficiency, symmetry, invariance under utility transformation, independence of irrelevant alternatives other than the ideal point, to characterize the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for 3-person bargaining problems.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that there exists no coherent preference relation on the set of nonnegative consumption paths which rationalizes the underlying choice behavior in general, and that the considered rules do not satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference in general.

TL;DR: The authors characterizes solutions for allocation problems with indivisibilities that can be rationalized by social-welfare orderings on the agents' utility vectors, and the approach chosen in this paper is welfarist in the sense that allocations are compared solely on the basis of the utilities experienced by the individuals involved in the problem.