Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2020"

TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a simple macroeconomic setup in which the social planner determines how to optimally intervene, through income taxation, in order to minimize the social cost, inclusive of infection and economic costs, of the spread of an epidemic disease.

TL;DR: This paper examines the implication of the nature of competition in a market with network externalities on strategic investment in process RD but, that effect is larger under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce two new inconsistency measures for incomplete pairwise comparisons matrices and show several examples of their calculation, and carry out a comparative analysis of the new inconsistency indices with the existing ones based on the Monte Carlo simulation.

TL;DR: This paper assumes that the cooperation between players is restricted by an acyclic graph and introduces new sharing rule for this type of game, and offers an axiomatization of this sharing rule based mainly on linearity and a consistency axiom.

TL;DR: In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy- proof.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the representation and explicit description of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams and proved that there exists no real-valued representation of such orders and established that the existence of a social welfare order satisfying the anonymity and upper asymptotic Pareto axioms implies that there is no non-Ramsey set.

TL;DR: The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the interaction between capacity constraints and local monopoly power using a standard Hotelling setup and to show that the high level of product differentiation results in a variety of equilibrium firm behavior.

TL;DR: The model can yield huge welfare losses, non-downward sloping Laffer curves and tax reforms that are never Pareto improving.

TL;DR: This paper characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness and imposes the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property.

TL;DR: Overall, the findings suggest that firms have a strong incentive to coordinate prices when the products involved are vertically differentiated.

TL;DR: A new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value is introduced, such that agents are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique.

TL;DR: The notions of separability and weightedness are introduced in this context of rules that specify the collective acceptance or rejection of a proposal with several dimensions and a partial characterization of separable rules is provided.

TL;DR: It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.

TL;DR: How successful the apportionment methods used by the Republican Party in their 2012 and 2016 state presidential primaries were in making the Republican delegate process more proportional is summarized.

TL;DR: This paper defines and characterize the class of all egalitarian solidarity values, which are convex combinations of the solidarity value and the equal division solution, and gives two characterizations of the whole family of egalitarian solidarityvalues in such a way that the parameter α is obtained endogenously by the set of axioms.

TL;DR: This article defines the restricted TU-game taking into account the limited possibilities of cooperation determined by the intersection closed system, and introduces and axiomatically characterize a family of allocation rules for T U-games on intersection closed systems, which contains a natural extension of the Shapley value.

TL;DR: A symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is determined of the production-in-advance type symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game for the most challenging case of intermediate capacities, which was unknown so far.

TL;DR: A very simple model of privacy-jeopardizing mechanisms, along with a normative methodology for understanding how these mechanisms are ranked, is proposed and tested by using it to rank clustering models based on data provided by the Recommendation Team at Microsoft Research.

TL;DR: It is shown that under certain conditions the equilibrium probability that patentees delay licensing in each period is positive and increasing in the common discount factor adopted by innovators and firms.

TL;DR: The existence and characterization results for unilateral support equilibrium in n -player games are provided, and the case of unilaterally support equilibrium relative to a coalition structure, wherein mutual (but still unilateral) support is coalitionaly dependent, is considered.

TL;DR: Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.

TL;DR: This paper explores the relationship between several value-like solution concepts for cooperative games with incomplete information and utility transfers in the form of sidepayments and establishes that the ex-ante evaluation of Myerson's solution equals Kalai and Kalai’s cooperative-competitive value in two-player games with verifiable types.

TL;DR: The paper uses the most general version of a Dixit-Stiglitz economy and the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, defined in previous work, with firms maximizing profits in prices and quantities under a market share and a market size constraint to partition the oligopolist sector into groups.

TL;DR: Algorithms for calculating Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for three different type of games are proposed: weighted AND-games, weighted OR-games and games where the tiers have conjunctive normal form.

TL;DR: This paper characterized the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this extended game by adding a recommendation stage before the regular bargaining stage and found the equilibrium recommendation is optimal for the coordinator among all acceptable recommendations.

TL;DR: In this article, a tractable framework to prove verification theorems for optimal consumption and investment problems with annuitization is presented. But the verification of the verification theorem is difficult.

TL;DR: The class of rules proposed and characterize can be viewed as a variant of the standard model in the literature on cost and surplus sharing and comprises some prominent sharing rules such as equal split and the proportionality principle.

TL;DR: The class of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions is characterized in terms of simple functional properties, which generalizes rationalizability of a choice function by a single acyclic binary relation torationalizability by a set of such relations.

TL;DR: This study identifies optimal transmission mechanisms for a streaming video service in a peer-to-peer network structure as a function of the number of active peers, a common service value, and a common discount factor.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider social learning where agents can only observe part of the population (modeled as neighbors on an undirected graph), face many decision problems, and arrival order of the agents is unknown.